The reason of this triple alliance between Great Britain, France, and Prussia was, as I take it, this. The Emperor, without the knowledge of the Kings of France or Great Britain, who were the mediators at Cambray, unknown to them, clapped up a peace with Spain, the general contents of which peace were, to settle the succession of Tuscany, Parma, &c. in Don Carlos, according to the quadruple alliance, to secure the succession of the hereditary countries of the Empire in his daughters. We understood that there were secret articles relating to the Ostend company, to give them a privilege of sending ships to the South Sea, and that the Emperor would take upon him to mediate all differences between the Courts of Spain and Great Britain. By which was understood, the Emperor's interposing to obtain the restitution to Spain, of Gibraltar, and Minorca; and the Queen of Spain was promised by the Emperor, that Don Carlos should marry the eldest daughter of the Emperor, and that he should be sent to Vienna, to be there educated in the German manner. By this method, there was a prospect of bringing the three greatest monarchies of Europe and Italy into one hand. Don Carlos would, by this means, have Italy, and

by his marriage the Austrian hereditary dominions-whosoever had these, would be fair for the Empire. The Prince of Asturias is hectical, and if he should drop, Don Carlos would have Spain. If the present King of France should die without issue, Don Carlos, likewise, then would have title to France; and if all or two of these governments should unite in one person, it would be formidable to Europe.

The Queen of Spain being under great resentment for sending back the Infanta Queen, was worked upon by the Emperor, under the view of this marriage of Don Carlos, to do whatever the Emperor desired. The Emperor, as we understood, put the Spaniards on demanding Gibraltar and Minorca, and promised to manage it so as that they should accomplish the obtaining it.

When Count Staremberg notified this peace to the King, and offered the Emperor's mediation to make up the differences between Great Britain and Spain, the King told him he was very glad that the peace was made between them, especially since the terms for the main were the same as the mediator Kings had proposed at Cambray, but that as for any differences between him and Spain, he knew of none, and so there was no need of any mediation.

In the mean time, Mr. Stanhope, our envoy at Madrid, was given to understand both by the King and Queen, that they expected the King should give up Gibraltar and Minorca, and do it speedily. And when he remonstrated to them that the King could not do it without his Parliament, and a Parliament could not now be called the King being beyond sea, the Queen said that it was worth the King's while to come over on purpose to hold a Parliament, that she was sure, as soon as it was proposed, the Parliament would unanimously give

it

up, rather than lose the advantages of trade they now enjoyed from Spain. Mr. Stanhope told her she was misinformed, and that the King could not give it up.

The Emperor's ministers were exceedingly elated upon this peace, and could not forbear publicly declaring, that now having established peace with Spain, and made their alliance, they should be able to manage the Protestants in Germany, and get the Empire and other princes to guarantee this succession. This obliged the Kings of Great Britain, France, and Prussia, to enter into this treaty, with liberty to other princes to accede.

Thursday, March 10, 1726. At the desire of Lord Townshend I was this evening at

the Duke of Devonshire's, with the said Lord and Duke, the Dukes of Argyle and Newcastle, and Sir Robert Walpole, where the Lord Townshend acquainted us, that when he came from Hanover with the King, as he was at Helvoetslues, Major-General Diemar, agent from the Landgrave of Hesse, had made a proposition to him in writing to furnish the King with 8000 foot and 4000 horse, upon certain terms in the said writing contained; but inasmuch as he had not then the express direction of the Landgrave of Hesse, he expressed it so in the writing, and that these terms were subject to the approbation of the Landgrave; that since the King came over, the Landgrave had sent a ratification in form, which was then produced, and that the King thought it reasonable to accept this proposal. None present could declare an opinion to the contrary, but agreed it to be reasonable, because the King being by the treaty at Hanover obliged, in case of an attack on any of the allies, to furnish 8000 foot and 4000 horse, here they would by this means be ready, and would be a satisfaction to the King of Prussia and to Holland, who were both desirous to know where these men would be in case of a rupture. Then the method of the ratification, or acceptance of this

declaration of the Landgrave was proposed to me, because Lord Townshend had brought the draught of a warrant under the sign manual, countersigned by himself, as secretary, purporting the proposition of Diemar, and the ratification by the Landgrave; after which followed the King's approbation and ratification under the Great Seal. This I thought was not the usual and legal form, because there was no minister of the King's to treat with Diemar, and so would be in effect a treaty made by the Great Seal only. Lord Townshend said that this was only a declaration under the Landgrave's seal, and that after he had ratified no minister could set his hand to it, because that would put the minister on an equality with a Sovereign Prince; and therefore the other Prince only must ratify: and that this was not properly a treaty, but only a declaration by the Landgrave, on what terms he would furnish the King with so many soldiers, and that there was nothing more to do than for the King to show his approbation, by a ratification under the Great Seal. I thought that the form of this instrument made no alteration in the substance, and that this was really nothing else than a treaty, and that there was no instance wherever the Great Seal made a treaty by it