"tial to the nature of the thing: as Homo, or Man, represents "Animal rationale, or A rational living creature. But Bonus, "Good, reprefents only an accidental quality; which, though "morally neceffary is not naturally fo, but merely accidental. "So that though a Man may be called Good: and therefore "Good, in fome fenfe, may be faid to be his name; yet it is not "equally or as much his name, as Man. This last representing "all that is essential to his nature; the other only what is "accidental."

Ben. Johnson, whom you likewise esteem, followed the opi nion of Frifchlinus; that the diftinction between fubftantive and adjective arifes from the latter's being common to three genders." For a fubftantive is a Noun of one only gender, or (at the most) of two. And an Adjective is a Noun of three "genders, being always infinite.”

વર્લ

And fome Grammarians have faid that an Adjective only connotes, and means nothing by itself.

"Nel modo che l'Accidente s'appoggia alla Suftanza, l'Aggiun " tivo s'appoggia al Sustantivo."-" E come l'Accidente non puo ftar fenza la Suftanza, cofi (gli Aggiuntivi) non poffono "ftar nell' orazione fenza un Sustantivo: e ftandovi, non vi ftarebbon a propofito; perchè non fignificherebbon Niente." Buonmattei.

H.

The opinion of Frifchlinus is fufficiently confuted by Vof

2

fius.

fius *. And, notwithstanding R. Johnson's confident affertion that nobody would fay fo, I maintain that the Adjective is equally and altogether as much the Name of a Thing, as the Noun fubftantive. And fo fay I of ALL words whatever. For that is not a word which is not the name of a thing. Every word, being a found fignificant, must be a fign; and, if a fign, the Name, of a Thing. But a Noun fubftantive is the Name of a thing-and nothing more. And indeed fo fays Voffius"Nec rectiús Subftantivum definitur-Quod aliquid per fe fignificat.-Nam omnis vox ex inftituto fignificans, aliquid fig"nificat per fe."

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De Analog, lib. 1. cap. 6.

I mean not to withdraw any portion of the respect which I have always declared for R. Johnson, B. Johnson, or Buonmattei. But it does not follow that I fhould be compelled jurare in verba upon every thing they have advanced. They were Grammarians, not Philofophers. Were I to compofe in Latin, I certainly fhould not venture to use an uncommon fupine or a compared participial, without first confulting R. Johnson: but for the philosophy of language I cannot confider him as an authority. How ftrangely does he here impofe upon himself with his example of Good Man: concluding, because Good does not fignify the fame thing which Man fignifies, that therefore Good fignifies nothing, i. e. is not the name of any thing. So, if he had reversed his inftance and chofen this-Human Goodness :-He muft, by the fame kind of

* De Analogia. lib. 1. cap. 6.

reafoning,

reafoning, have concluded that Goodness was, but that Human was not the Name of a thing. Still more abfurd will this appear, if, instead of Human, we employ Wallis's Adjective and fay-Man's Goodness: for then (if Wallis is right in regard to the genitive) this reasoning will prove that-Man's-is not the name of a thing.

But, to return to R. Johnson's inftance of Good Man.

"The fubftantive Man (he fays) reprefents all that is effential to the nature of the thing; but the adjective Good reprefents only an Accidental quality." Which, when well confidered, amounts to no more than this: That the fubftantive Man reprefents all that is fignified by the term Man; but that the adjective Good does not reprefent any idea that is fignified by the term Man. And this is very true. But whoever will reflect a moment, will fee that each of these words, both Good and Man, reprefents equally all that is effential to the nature of the thing of which Good and Man is refpectively the fign. Good indeed does not represent (i. e. is not the fign of) any idea fignified by the term Man, nor was it intended: any more than the term Man reprefents (i. e. is the fign of) any idea fignified by the term Good. But Good reprefents all the ideas fignified by the term Goodness. And all the difference between a subftantive (as Goodness) and its correfponding adjective (Good) is ; that, by fome fmall difference of termination, we are enabled when we employ the fign of an idea, to communicate at the fame time to the hearer, that fuch fign is, then meant to be added to another fign in fuch a manner as that the two signs together may answer the purpose of one complex term. This

con

contrivance is merely an Abbreviation in the forts of words to fupply the want of an Abbreviation in Terms. For InftanceA Holy Man. Here is a difference of termination in one fign -Holiness-to fhew us that it is to be joined to another fignMan: and that these two together are to serve the purpose of one complex term. In this last instance, our language enables us to exchange them both for one complex term, (which we cannot do with Good Man) and, inftead of a Holy Man, to fay a Saint.

In fome cafes our language is fo deficient as not to enable us to ufe either of thefe methods, when we want to exprefs a certain collection of ideas together; and we then have recourse fometimes to Prepofitions, and fometimes to another expedient: If we speak, we do it by joining the terms close in pronunciation: if we write, we do it by using a mark of junction, thus-. Which mark is not a word nor a letter, because it is not the fign of a found; but is itself, what a word fhould be, the immediate sign of an idea; with this difference, that it is conveyed to the eye only, not to the ear. Thus Sea-weed, Ivory-wand, Shell-fish, River-god, Weather-board, Hail-storm, Country-houfe, Family-quarrel, &c.

For thefe collections of ideas our language does not furnish us either with a coinplex term, or with any change of termination to Sea, Ivory, Shell, River, Weather, Hail, Country, Family, &c. by which to communicate to the hearer our intention of joining those terms to fome other term.

That

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That an Adjective therefore cannot (as the Grammarians exprefs it) "Stand by itself, but must be joined to fome other noun;" does not proceed from any difference in the nature of the idea or of the thing of which the Adjective is the fign: but from hence, that having added to the sign of an idea that change of termination which, by agreement or common acceptance, fignifies that it is to be joined to fome other fign, the hearer or reader expects that other fign which the adjective termination announces. For the adjective termination of the fign fufficiently informs him, that the fign, when thus adjectived, is not to be used by itself or to ftand alone; but is to be joined to fome other term *.

Yet we very well know by the Adjective alone, as well as by the fubftantive alone, of what idea or collection of ideas the term mentioned (whether Adjective or Subftantive) is the fign:

Though moft languages are contented to give a diftinguishing termination only to the added fign; In the Perfian language the figu which is to receive the addition of another fign to it, has a diftinguishing termination to inform the reader when it is to receive an addition. So that in the Perfian language there are Subftantives which cannot stand alone, but must be joined to fome other word in the fame fentence. But I hope it is not neceffary to travel fo far as to Perfia, to convince our grammarians of the impropriety of making its inability to ftand alone in a sentence, the diftinguishing mark of an Adjective; if they will be pleafed only to recollect, that no Subftantive, in any of its oblique cafes, can stand alone any more than the Adjective. And this latter circumftance might perhaps incline Wallis to call our Genitive, an Adjective: for Man's cannot ftand alone, any more than Human.