while their masters have endeavoured by negociation and new arrangements, to obviate the fatal consequences of their collision.

It must however be acknowledged, that those heavy clouds which overhung the political horizon are far from being dispersed, and that whenever they burst it must be with a dreadful violence. The extraordinary power and uncommon activity of some of the continental princes, the jealousy of others, and the ambition of all, are ill calculated for the preservation of the public tranquillity. Nations are now become soldiers, and must find employment. Like the ancient Marauders of the Northern Hive, their countries are become too narrow for the support of so many arined men. The present state of quiet, or rather of inaction, is more to be attributed to mutual distrust and apprehension, and a sagacious caution, that waits for favourable circumstances or accidents, than to a love of peace, or regard for justice. The state of Poland is still undetermined. A diet indeed has been held, delegates appointed, and treaties of cession and dismemberment ratified; and yet it would be difficult to shew that any thing has been really concluded. On one side, the losers are obliged to submit to an inevitable present necessity, still hoping that some unexpected intervention of fortune may enable them to reclaim their rights; on the other, the demands of the armed claimants, seem to increase with their acquisitions and the facility of obtaining them. Thus they both continue in their former situations; the one having obtained no additional security in his new, nor the other in his old possessions.

This has been sufficiently shewn since the conclusion of those treaties, by the late conduct of the Prussians with regard to Dantzick. And though the other two partitioning powers have not yet taken any steps of the same nature, there is little room to doubt that in proper time and season they will follow the example. Indeed the measures they have all taken for a continual interference in the affairs and government of Poland, sufficiently explain the nature of their future designs.

Distracted and torn as this unhappy country continues, it has not during this year presented those shocking scenes of calamity, which had long made it a spectacle, as much of horror as of compassion. The vast armies with which it was covered, having rendered all opposition impracticable, the pretences for cruelty were taken away; and the multitude of spectators, composed of different nations, and under different commands, being a mutual check upon the enormities of each other, the rage for blood dwindled into regular oppression. Upon the whole, the condition of Poland is not worse than it has been ; nor are the possibilities fewer, in its favour.

· The fortune of Russia has not at all been predominant this year with respect to the war. Their enemies become daily more habituated to arms, and have been beaten into order and discipline. Distance and situation were also much against them; and they have been taught by experience the difficulties of a Bulgarian campaign; a service, which can scarcely be carried on with probability of success, without the assistance of such a fleet, as can maintain a superiority on the Black

a

Sea.

Sea. The rebellion in the Crimea, and apprehensions of danger nearer home, prevented, however, some of the exertions that might otherwise have been made in the war upon the Danube.

It still remains to be seen, whether it was a wise policy in Russia, to attempt increasing the bulk of that vast empire, by adding new conquests to those boundless and illcultivated regions which she already possesses; and which are perhaps at present too large for the grasp of any single government. It may possibly hereafter be thought, that the immense waste of treasure and blood, which has been so lavishly squandered in this pursuit, would have been much better applied to the great purposes of population and internal improvement; and that the glare of fruitless victories, are a poor recompence for the disorders excited by the consequent oppressions of the people, and the real weakness that must ensue, from so long and so violent an exertion.

It was evident from the nature and situation of the countries, and the consequences of former wars with the Turks, that conquests in Moldavia, Wallachia, or Bessarabia, and victories on the Pruth or the Danube, were not likely to be attended with much benefit to Russia. The gaining of a port upon the Black-Sea, was indeed an object of the utmost importance; but of such a nature as to be attended almost with insuperable difficulties; both from the fatal aspect which it must bear to the Ottoman empire, and the jealousy which it must excite in several of the European powers.

It still remains to be enquired,

whether the new acquisitions in Poland, or the influence gained in that country by the court of Petersburg, be equivalent to the loss, expence, and danger of such a war. These will be found, upon examination, to be very inadequate to such a price. If Poland still continued to be, what it long was, a great and powerful nation, under the conduct of illustrious princes, and guarded by a nobility famous for their prowess and military virtues, such an extension of frontier would be a matter of real moment, and carry with it great additional security. In the present instance these circumstances are totally changed. Russia had nothing to apprehend from Poland, and much to gain by it. She has now obtained a large accession of territory in Lithuania, of the same nature, with respect to soil and climate, and much in the same state as to cultivation, with those wide extended, but half desart countries, which she had already possessed in that quarter; and which will still require the time and labour of ages to be peopled and cultivated. Both the old and the new possessions produce the same commodities, have the same wants, require the same degrees of improvement, and are incapable of being of any use or assistance to each other.

With respect to frontier, for the neighbourhood of the peaceable, indolent, and impotent Pole, Russia has now extended her boundaries into contact with those of her jealous, watchful, and enterprising rivals; and has thereby laid the foundation (if the present system continues) for such endless altercation and disputes, as must keep Germany and the North in a con[4] 2

tinual

tinual state of warfare and confusion. The wisest and most benevolent statesman could not have wished for a happier barrier than Poland, to prevent the clashing of the German and Muscovite empires; nor could the demon of discord have thrown out bitterer seeds of contention, than it is now likely to produce.

As to the obtaining or preserv¬ ing of an influence in Poland, her late measures have been attended with as little advantage in that respect as in any other. Russia be fore, solely guided and directed the councils of that country, nor could she have been deprived of the great security and advantage which she derived from that unbounded in fluence, but by the most mistaken conduct and falsest policy. She now divides her authority with the other members of the triumvirate, who will be sufficiently careful that she does not retain more than her share; nor will her dividend in a future partition of the remains of that republic, be in any degree an equivalent for the advantages which she has foregone, in losing that supreme influence and direction by which she guided the whole.

Those schemes which were trum peted throughout Europe, of totally conquering and subverting the Ottoman empire, however they might have been held out to flatter the imaginations of the people, or to answer purposes in negociations for loans, could not have been seriously adopted by any statesman. If the practicability of such an event were even admitted, it could answer no good purpose, and would probably be highly pernicious to Russia. The eternal boundaries

which Nature has placed between those empires, their distance, situation, and vast extent, the extreme difference of climate, and in the manners, customs, and religions of the inhabitants, are insuperable bars to their coalescing; and render it as impossible for Petersburg to rule the Ottoman empire, as it would be for Constantinople to govern the Russian.

The war in the Mediterranean has this year been attended with little honour, and with no other advantage than what proceeded from the taking of prizes. As a war of this nature is always very prejudicial to commerce, and has in this case been particularly so to the French merchants, it has given much umbrage to the two great branches of the house of Bourbon. And as the death of Ali Bey, and the return of Egypt to its duty, has cut off one of the principal sources of advantage that could be expected from it, and that the passage of the Dardanelles seems no longer to be thought practicable, it may still be a matter not unworthy of consideration, how much farther it may be consistent with prudence, to irritate the resentment of those princes; and whether any advantages now to be expected from a continuance of the war in the Levant, are equivalent to the risque of a rupture with France and Spain. This fleet, however, has been lately reinforced, and it is said will be rendered formidable in the ensuing summer.

The cession of the Dutchy of Holstein to Denmark, is to be considered in no other light than as a sacrifice to the present war, and is therefore to be brought-as a dis» count, on any future advantages that Russia may obtain by it. At

the