for the sins of all men-a doctrine the most wonderful and powerful of all the doctrines in the creeds of the human race, a doctrine which entwines itself with the tenderest feelings of affection in the heart, by images of blended benevolence and suffering, the ideal of dignity combined with gentleness unspeakably endearing and affecting, -a doctrine which, by representing the perfection of moral excellence in the object of an infinite gratitude the patron of every virtue in the sacrifice for every sinsways the moral feelings of every one who vitally believes it, to the imitation of so bright and so beloved an example; a doctrine which comes to the mind, when tossed and agitated by the convictions of conscience, like the Saviour over the breakers to the sinking apostle, giving safety and calm; a doctrine which, to the joyful and marvelling heart which first opens to a perception of it, is the focus or centre in which the designs of God in the eternity of the past meet their accomplishment in human salvation throughout the eternity of the future; in which the godhead forms a union with manhood, and where the hopes and belief of all ages in time, and of every tribe of men, join with the grand gratulations of celestial spirits.

** **

It is the most powerful thing in the world; it has been the most wonderful thing in history. The time we hope is come when philosophers, instead of investing it with puzzles, shall devote their powers of analysis to appreciate and explain it. This is the chief message the Dissenters carry to the whole earth."* And we are happy to add that this is the message that rings from innumerable pulpits in our land, without being confined to church or sect: would that it sounded from all, and in the spirit of a universal recognition of each other as the servants and imitators of one common Master and Lord!

Thus, as our former and present meditations have shown, the doctrine of the cross, or of the atonement made by the Son of God in behalf of guilty ruined men, affords the most astonishing display of the Divine glory; while it restores to

• Westminster Review, article "Congregational Dissenters."

every individual of the human race, who cordially believes in it, the happy immortality which our first parents forfeited, both for themselves and their offspring. It is the sole consideration which determines human destiny; while it is on earth the source of truest happiness, and in heaven the inspiring theme of the songs of angels, and the rapturous praises of the spirits of the just made perfect.

This brightest manifestation of Deity, in whatever form or sphere it is exhibited, imparts the greatest degree of happiness to those who are favoured to behold and to celebrate it. The value of the atonement, therefore, in this view, may be estimated by the harmonies and the joys which pervade the moral universe, and which spring from its exclusive influence. It is for the sake of the awful transactions of Calvary that this beauteous world is kept up, and that the sun shines on the just and the unjust. "Every sweet tone in nature comes forth from thy responsibility, O Jesus of Nazareth! Every little singing-bird has in thee more than a double Creator. Thou art Alpha and Omega in the strangely wrought song of time and its spheres. Every thing of affection which gladdens our earth is held fast to us in the same interference of thine, under which our souls are finally redeemed." What eternity, what innumerable millions of worlds will have to disclose on the mysterious joys which have proceeded, and which shall for ever flow from the redemption effected for man by the voluntary humiliation, sufferings, and death of the Son of God at Calvary, we can only faintly imagine; the conception must await the revelation. The peculiarity of the atonement, and the principles on which it is founded, will form the subject of another essay. In the mean time, let us turn with adoring gratitude to the Lamb of sacrifice.

"O blessed Well of Love! O Flower of Grace!
O glorious Morning Star! O Lamp of Light!
Most lovely image of thy Father's face,
Eternal King of Glory! Lord of might!
Meek Lamb of God!-before all world's behest,
How can we thee requite for all this good?
Or, what can prize, that, thy most precious
blood?"
SPENSER.

J. S.

317

To the Editor of the

DISCIPULUS.

"The great truth has finally gone forth to all the ends of the earth, That man shall no more render account to man for his belief, over which he has himself no control. Henceforward nothing shall prevail upon us to praise or to blame any one for that which he can no more change than he can the hue of his skin, or the height of his stature."

By the command which the will has over the attention, we become responsible, not only for our states of emotion, but also, in a great degree, for our intellectual states. The imagination, that there is neither moral worth, nor moral delinquency in the state of a man's belief, proceeds on the supposition that the voluntary has no share in the process which leads to that state. Now, through the intermedium of the faculty of attention, the will stands related to the ultimate convictions of the understanding, precisely as it stands related to the ultimate emotions of the heart. It is true, that as is the object in view of the mind, so is the emotion; and it is equally true, that as is the evidence in view of the

Evangelical Magazine.

mind, so is the belief. In neither case has the will to do with the concluding sequence; but, in both cases, it has equally to do with the sequences that went before it. There may be a pathological necessity beyond our control, in that final step of the succession, which connects the object that is perceived with its counterpart emotion, or the evidence that is perceived with its counterpart belief. But, in like manner, as it is by the attention, which we might or might not have exercised, that the object is perceived by us; so it is by the attention, which we might or might not have exercised, that the evidence is perceived by us. It is thus that, on innumerable questions, and those of vital importance, both to the present wellbeing and the future prospects of humanity, the moral may have had casual antecedency over the intellectual; and the state of a man's creed may depend on the prior state of his character. We have already seen how a present compassion may have been the result of a previous choice; and so may a present conviction be the result of a previous choice; being in proportion, not to the evidence possessed by the subject, but to the evidence attended to, and perceived in consequence of that attention. The designations of "virtuous," and "vicious, are only applicable to that which is voluntary; and it is precisely because, through the faculty of attention, the voluntary has had so much to do, if not immediately with the belief, at least with the investigations which lead to it, that man may be reckoned with for the judgments of his understanding, as well as for the emotions of heart, or the actions of his history.

That man is not rightfully the subject of any moral reckoning for his belief, would appear then to be as monstrous a heresy in science, as it is in theology; as philosophically unsound, as it is religi ously unsound; and deriving all its plausibility from the imagination, that the belief is in no way dependent on the will. It is not morally incumbent on man to see an object which is placed beyond the sphere of his vision; nor can either a

rightful condemnation or a rightful vengeance be laid upon him, because he has not perceived it. It must lie within that sphere; else he is no more responsible for not having reached it with his eye, than for not having stretched forth his hand to any of the distant bodies of the firmament. It must be within the range of his seeing; and then the only question which needs to be resolved is, what the will has to do with the seeing of it. Now to see is not properly an act of the will; but to look is altogether so; and it is the dependence of this looking on the will, that makes man responsible for what he sees or what he does not see, in reference to all those objects of sight which are placed within the territory of sensible vision. And if there be but a looking faculty in the mind, man may be alike responsible for what he believes, or for what he does not believe, in reference not to sensible objects alone, but to those truths which are placed within the territory of his intellectual or mental vision. Now attention is just such a faculty. Man can turn and transfer it at pleasure, from one to another topic of contemplation. He can take cognizance of any visible thing, in virtue of the power which he has over the eye of his body; a power, not to alter the laws of vision, but to bring the organ of vision within the operation of those laws. And he can take cognizance of any announced truth, in virtue of the power he has over the attention, which is his mental eye; a power, not to alter the laws of evidence, but to bring the organ of the intellect within their operation. Attention is the looking organ of the mind, the link of communication between man's moral and man's intellectual nature; the messenger, as it were, by which the interchange between these two departments is carried on; a messenger, too, at the bidding of the will, which saith to it at one time, "Go!" and it goeth; at another, "Come!" and it cometh; and at a third, "Do this!" and it doeth it. It is thus that man becomes directly responsible for the conclusions of his understanding; for these conclusions depend altogether, not on the evidence which exists, but on that portion of the evidence which is attended to. He is not to be reckoned with, either for the lack or the sufficiency of the existent evidence; but he might most justly be reckoned with for the lack or insufficiency of his attention.

It is not for him to create the light of day; but it is for him both to open and to present his eye to all its manifestations. Neither is it for him to fetch down to earth the light of the upper sanctuary; but if it be indeed true, that that " light hath come into the world," then it is for him to guide the eye of his understanding towards it. There is a voluntary part for him to perform; and thenceforward the question is involved with most obvious moralities. The thing is now submitted to his choice. He may have the light, if he only love the light; and if he do not, then are his love of darkness and the evil of his doings the unquestionable grounds of his most clear and emphatic condem

nation.

This principle is in force throughout all the stages in the process of the inquiry; from the very first glance of that which is the subject of it, to the full and finished conviction in which the inquiry terminates. At the commencement of the process we may see nothing but the likelihoods of the subject; not the conclusive proofs, but only as yet the dim and dawning probabilities of the question; nothing which is imperative on our belief, and yet every thing which is imperative on our attention. There may be as great a moral perversity in resisting that call which the mere semblance of truth makes upon our further attention, as in resisting that call which the broad and perfect manifestation of it makes upon our conviction. In the practice of Scottish law, there is a distinction made between the precognition and the proof; carried into effect in England by the respective functions of the grand and petty jury; it being the office of the former to find a true bill, or to decide whether the matter in question should be brought to a further trial; and it being the office of the latter to make that trial, and to pronounce the final verdict thereupon. Now, what we affirm is, that there might be to the full as grievous a delinquency in the former act of judgment as in the latter; in denying a further hearing to the cause, after the strong probabilities which have transpired at the one stage, as in denying a fair verdict after the strong and satisfactory proofs which have transpired at the other. All the equities of rectitude may be as much traversed or violated, at the initial or progressive steps of such an inquiry, as by the ultimate judgment

which forms the termination of it. To resist a good and valid precognition, and so to refuse the trial, is a moral unfairness of the very same kind, as that resistance of a good proof which leads to the utterance of a false verdict. He were an iniquitous judge, who should internally stifle the impression of those verities, which now brightened forth upon him at the close of his investigation; but he also were an iniquitous judge, who should stifle the impression of those verisimilitudes, which even but obscurely and languidly beamed upon him at the outset.

Now, in all the processes of the human intellect, there is a similar gradation silently, but substantially, carried forward. There is, first, an aspect of probability, which constitutes no claim upon our immediate belief; but which at least constitutes a most rightful claim upon our attention, -a faculty, as we before said, at the bidding of our will, and for the exercise of which we are, therefore, responsible; seeing that whenever there is a rightful claim upon our attention, and the attention is not given, it is wrongfully withheld. But we know that the effect of this faculty is to brighten every object of contemplation to which it is directed; gradually to evolve into greater clearness all its lineaments; and, lastly, to impress the right conviction upon the un

derstanding. In other words, the man, on such an occasion as this, is intellectually right, just because he is morally right. He becomes sound in faith; but only in virtue of having become sound in principle. The true belief, in which he ultimately lands, is not all at once forced upon him by the credentials wherewith it was associated; but he had the patience and the candour to wait the unrolling of those credentials, or rather he helped to unrol them with his own hand. He fastened his regards upon some proposition, which involved in it the interests or the obligations of humanity; because there sat upon it even at the first a certain creditable aspect, which had he had the hardiness to withstand or to turn from, it would have made him chargeable, not with a mental only, but with a moral perversity; not with the error that springs from a mistaken judgment, but with the guilt that springs from the violation of an incumbent duty. Many are the truths which do not carry an instant and overpowering evidence along with them; and which, therefore, at their first announcement, are not entitled to demand admittance for themselves, as the articles of a creed. Nevertheless, they may be entitled to a hearing; and by the refusal of that hearing a man incurs, not the misfortune of an involuntary blunder, but the turpitude of a voluntary crime.

This, indeed, is so commonly the fact, with those who have grown old without religion, that very little hope is entertained of the conversion of the aged, who have from their youth enjoyed the means of grace. And it is also a fact, that real Christians are not rendered more deeply sensible of the awful importance of eternal things, by becoming old and infirm. The truth is, that nothing but an increase of faith by the operations of the Holy Spirit, will be effectual to prepare us for that change which we know is rapidly approaching. Counsels and exhortations, however, are not to be neglected, as God is pleased to work by means. I have, therefore, undertaken

to address to you such considerations as occur to me. Having already spoken of the infirmities and sins which are apt to cleave to us in advanced years, I propose in this letter to inquire what are the peculiar duties incumbent on the aged. What would the Lord have us to do?for, undoubtedly, we are not privileged to fold our hands, and sit down in idleness, as if our work was ended. Indeed

it would be no privilege to be exempt from all occupation: such a life, to the aged or the young, must be a life of misery; for man never was made to be idle, and his happiness is intimately connected with activity. We may be no longer qualified for those labours which require much bodily strength; we may, indeed, be so debilitated or crippled by disease, that we can scarcely move our crazy frame; and some among us may be vexed with excruciating pain; yet still we have a work to perform for God and for our generation. If we cannot use our hands and feet, so as to be useful in the labours which we were wont to perform, yet we may employ our tongues to speak the praises of our God and Saviour. We may drop a word of counsel to those around us; and, especially, the aged owe a duty to the young, to whom they may have access, and who are related to them. Every aged Christian must have acquired much knowledge from experience, which he should be ready to communicate as far as it is practicable. Why is it, my dear friends, that we suffer so many opportunities of usefulness to pass without improvement? Why are we so often silent, when the suggestions of our own conscience urge us to speak something for God? How is it, that we consume hours in unprofitable talk, and seldom attempt to say any thing which can profit the hearers? We may plead inability -we may excuse ourselves because we are unlearned, and may not be able to speak eloquently and correctly; but let us be honest; is not the true reason because our own hearts are so little affected with these things? We cannot consent to play the hypocrite by uttering sentiments which we do not feel; and we have often been disgusted with the attempts of others, who, in a cold and constrained manner, have introduced religious conversation. It is easy to see where the fault lies; it is in the state of our own hearts. Let us never rest, then, until we find ourselves in a better state of mind. Let us get our hearts habit

ually under the influence of Divine things, and then, conversation on this subject will be as easy as any other. "Out of the abundance of the heart, the mouth speaketh." There are companies and occasions, when to obtrude remarks on religion, would be unseasonable and imprudent; for we must not cast our pearls before swine; but, in most cases, an aged person may give utterance to seasonable and solemn truths without offence;

very often a word spoken in season has been the means of saving a soul; and the advice and exhortations of parents and pious friends are remembered and prove salutary after their heads are laid low under the clods of the valley.

I have often heard aged persons, incapable any longer of active service, express surprise that their unprofitable lives were so long protracted; while the young and laborious servants of God were cut off in the midst of their years. The dispensations of God are indeed inscrutable; "his ways are past finding out;" and we are too little acquainted with his counsels, to sit in judgment on them.

But I would say to those who think they can be of no farther use in the world, that they do not form a just estimate of the nature of the service which God requires, and by which he is glorified by his creatures upon earth. All true obedience originates in the heart, and consists essentially of the affections of the heart: external duties are to be performed, but are only holy as connected with holy motives. The aged man may serve God, therefore, as sincerely and fervently as any others, if only the heart be right in the sight of God. He can glorify God in his spirit, by thinking affectionately of his glorious name, by contemplating his Divine attributes, and by exercising love and gratitude towards him. His devotion might thus approach more nearly to our conceptions of the services and exercises of the saints in heaven. But it may be that the lives of some are lengthened out, that they may offer up many prayers for the church and for the world; for, after all the activity and bustle and zeal apparent, there is no service which can be performed by mortals so effectual as prayer. Here there is a work to which the aged may be devoted. While Joshua and the men of war contend with the Amalekites in the battle, Moses assists by lifting up his hands in prayer; and when he was,