points of view; first, as affecting our commerce; secondly, the constitution; and lastly, our negociation with America. When all the papers relative to this important question should be laid before the house, it would be the duty of the house particularly to enquire, whether his majesty's government could constitutionally enact such prohibitions as these orders of council contain; next, whether the time chosen for issuing these orders was not peculiarly exceptionable, as tending so much to inflame the minds of the Americans, already so strongly excited against us; and also, whether we had any right thus to annihilate the whole trade of America: thus to say to that power, as our orders distinctly expressed, "Not a ship of yours shall sail which shall not be subject to contiscation by us, or to conditions which shall subject it to confiscation by the enemy." Lord G. asked, whether such language was reconcileable with any law or usage, or principle of equity? On what grounds could the paragraph in the speech relate to the necessity of the orders in council? The plain interpretation of this paragraph was, "that we had been too long carrying on a most unequal contest of justice against injustice." Could that great man, Mr. Pitt, look down from heaven upon this declaration, how much would he deprecate the sentiment, "that we ought to terminate the unequal contest of justice against injustice?" It was to the principle which sustained justice against injustice that we owed our consequence, character, and safety. It was this principle that animated our army and navy, which upheld the spirit of the people, and which, if we should abandon, we would sink into shame and degradation. Lord Grenville concluded a long speech, of which we have only given briefly the substance, as all the topics he handled afterwards became subjects of separate discussion, with an earnest representation of the importance and necessity of an inquiry into the state of Ireland, with a view to the adoption of measures calculated to conciliate the population of that country. Lord Hawkesbury having observed, that ministers could not be expected to point out the precise quarter and channel from which they had received their information respecting the arrangements at Tilset, said, that even if ministers entertained any doubt of their information respecting what passed at Tilsit, it must long since have vanished. The information received through the channel alluded to was corroborated by a variety of other channels wholly unconnected with each other. It was corroborated by the testimony of the government of Portugal, to whom it was proposed to make common cause with the continent against England, and to unite their fleet with that of Spain, of France, and of Denmark, to enable the confederacy to make a general attack on these islands. It was corroborated by the testimony of different persons in Ireland, where all the designs and projects of the enemy were most speedily known, and where it was promised, that the combined fleets of Spain, Portugal, and Denmark, should make a descent on both Ireland and Britain, but the principal one on Ireland.— A wish had been expressed that we had proceeded to Cronstadt, and seized the Russian fleet, leaving the Danish ! Danish fleet of sixteen sail of the line behind us!! Besides, the Russian feet was not so ready for sea, nor so well calculated in any respect as the Danish fleet to carry the designs of the enemy into execution. Further, there were many circumstances in the treaty of Tilsit which indisposed the people of Russia against that trealy; and even at the time the seizure of the Danish fleet was known at Petersburgh, the emperor Alexander seemed more inclined than before to renew his relations with this country. As to all that was urged against the orders in council, and against the treatment of America, while a negociation with America was on foot, it was doubtless better to abstain from a discussion that would tend only farther to inflame the minds of the two countries. He lamented the uncalled-for mention of the state of Ireland. The concessions alluded to by the noble baron could not now be thought of. Indeed, even if these concessions were made, still more would be called for, and there would be no end of such demands. The earl of Lauderdale replied to lord Hawkesbury, and strongly urged the constitutional necessity of a bill of indemnity for the orders of council. Lord Mulgrave admitted, that neither at the time of rejecting the Russian mediation, nor at this moment, had government any copy of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. They were in possession of secret projects, but could only assert, not adduce proof of their nature. The duke of Norfolk's motion, to omit the fourth paragraph in the proposed address to the throne, respecting the seizure of the Danish feet; and another amendment by lord Grenville, declaratory of the opinion of the house, that it would neither be respectful to his majesty, nor becoming the dignity of the house, to give au opinion as to the propriety of rejecting the Russian mediation till the papers relative to that question were before the house, were both negatived without a division. The address was then agreed to, and ordered to be presented.-Against the decision of the house respecting the seizure of the Danish fleets, protests, with reasons of dissent, were entered by the duke of Clarence, lord Rawdon, the earl of Lauderdale, the earl Grey, lord Vassal Holland, the duke of Norfolk, the viscount Sidmouth, and lord Erskine. On the same day, Jan. 21, in the house of commons, as soon as the speech from the throne was read from the chair, Lord Hamilton rose, and in a maiden speech moved the address. After a review of the extraordinary state of Europe, the difficulties and dangers that environed our country, and the success and the glory with which it had made head against all these; he said, that in the regret which his majesty had expressed at being compelled to adopt hostile measures against Denmark, the house would undoubtedly join; but it would be a regret unmixed with reproach: for, after the treaty of Tilsit, and the subsequent conduct of Russia and Denmark, it was im possible that any man could doubt of a combination of powers having been formed against us. Too long had the common enemy of Europe been permitted to proceed in his career of violence to neutral powers for the aggrandizement of his own. That the expedition to Copenhagen was was most important, and most critical, every one must have felt when it was brought to a determination; every one must now be sensible that it was most wise. He challenged the annals of Europe to produce an instance of a warlike enterprize, in which so much entreaty had been resorted to before success, and so much forbearance manifested after it. What his majesty's ministers had planned with decision, they had carried into effect with a force which could not leave to the Danes any hope of triumphing in a contest. And he confessed, that he could no more consider the Danish government as justified in sacrificing the lives of so many gallant men in a hopless resistance, than he could admire the heroism of the prince, who, himself escaping from the dangers with which he was environed, coolly devoted his capital to destruction, and its inhabitants to slaughter. Accustomed as we had been lately to witness extraordinary events, he could not avoid expressing his astonishment at seeing the emperor of Russia, the champion of the continent, secured by his situation from the calamities which had overtaken other countries, voluntarily put the last hand to the degradation of the continental powers of Europe; to see him descending from the proud eminence on which he had been placed, for the purpose of violating his engagements, and crouching under the throne of that usurper, whom he had so lately insulted and defied. The contrast which the firmness and magnanimity of the king of Sweden displayed, commanded equally our admiration and support. And lord H. was sure, that the house would gladly enable his majesty not only to fulfil his engagements to that gallant prince, but also to shew to the world, that it was not by the quantum of immediate interest that we measured our national faith and friendship. Of many important subjects of consideration presented by his majesty's speech, none were more important than the principle adopted, and the steps taken by our government, to frustrate the enemy's designs against our commerce: the principle of retaliation and self-de fence. In a moment of frenzy, France had issued edicts levelled against our commerce. Had the objects of these measures been attained, had they even partially crippled our means, the consideration that a temporary distress to ourselves was utter ruin to our opponents, must have induced us to persevere in the contest with tranquillity and firmness; but the very reverse was the fact. So far from our means being diminished, although the different branches of our commerce might vary in extent, the aggregate exceeded that of the most prosperous period of our history: insomuch'that his majesty, in his most gracious speech, expressed his confidence, that no material increase of the burthens of his people would be necessary. There was one subject, from the contemplation of which unalloyed pleasure must be derived in every point of view; namely, the rescue from the power of France of one of the oldest and most faithful of our allies, transferred from a country weak and indefensible to one secure and powerful: an occurrence which afforded a field for the most brilliant anticipations, commercial and political. Lord Hamilton then said, that under the impression of the feelings which he experienced, he should move that an humble address should be presented to his majesty, &c. The address, which, as usual, was an echo to the speech, being read by the clerk at the table, Mr. C. Ellis seconded the motion. With respect to the design entertained by France, of compel ling Denmark to join the confederacy against Great Britain, if ministers were in possession in July of the information alone, which had since been publicly disclosed, they would have failed in their duty if they had not acted as they did. A similar attempt had been made by France on Portugal. But the frankness of the court of Lisbon, and its determination neither to lend its aid to the confederacy against Great Britain, nor to abandon British persons and property to the possession of the French, entitled it to the confidence of his majesty's government, and justified it in pursuing a line of conduct different from that adopted in the case of Denmark. Adverting to the Russian declaration, he contended, that a character very different from that of Russia marked the composition, not only in the sort of argument made use of, but in the peculiarities of the style, which, if not French, was the most happy imitation of French that he had ever seen. The magnanimity of his majesty in offering reparation for injury to the United States of America, was most praise worthy. He trusted the Anglo-Americans would see that it was not their true policy to unite themselves to France. We had ample means of carrying on war. In our navy we had not only the most efficient defence, but a greater power of active hostility than, perhaps, we ourselves were yet aware of. By exerting our naval force in every possible direction, we might shew the enemy that a predominant navy gives a power scarcely inferior to that of a conquering army. Lord viscount Milton regretted, that ministers had not expressed their willingness to enter into a negotiation, on suitable terms, for peace. At the same time, he did not approve of any idle clamours for peace before the terms of negotiation should be ascertained. The attack on Copenhagen he considered to be prima facie unjustifiable. Copenhagen was left defenceless, while the Danish troops were pouring towards Holstein, thus evincing an unaffected confidence in the amity of the British nation, and at the same time a sincere distrust of the French army. Yet he did not deny that there might have been circumstances as yet unrevealed, by which the attack on that capital might be justified. Mr. Ponsonby observed, that his majesty's speech embraced such a variety of topics, that it was not easy to express one's sentiments upon it. Had it been made known, as was the usual custom, two or three days before it was delivered, members would have had less dif ficulty in stating their opinions upon its contents. And this was the more to be wished, that it was the longest perhaps that was ever heard from the throne since the days of James I. Its principal object he understood to be, the elucidation of our relations of peace and war with other powers. But before he could deliver an opinion of the conduct, on on which these relations depended, he must be in possession of the correspondence which had taken place between our own government and the governments of foreign nations. It was right in ministers to assume an attitude of dignity, worthy of the character and resources of the country. Whether a prolongation of the war with France, or the commencement of hostilities with other powers was the only alternative left us, he was not in possession of information sufficient to for in an opinion. The house, he asserted, was equally destitute of information on the question relative to America and neutral nations. There was another subject of much importance, which might have been introduced into the speech, namely, the *present state of Ireland. As to the affair of Copenhagen, he would on a future occasion move for the production of necessary documents, so that it might, at least, be fairly brought into discussion. Mr. Milues, after an eulogy on the present administration, observed, that it would indeed have been impolitic to adopt any measure by which the character of the country might be affected, if the powers of Europe retained their independence, if the government of Denmark had been free to follow that course which its honour and interest dictated. But there was not a power on the continent which could have resisted the mandates of the enemy. It was the first duty of ministers to act upon the necessity of the case, and it was equally their duty to use their discretion in judging of that necessity. And if, inacting upon this, they were to err at all, it was best that they should err upon the side of public security. If Denmark If Denmark had been really worse disposed towards this country than she was, could she have pursued any other course than that precisely which she had followed? The extraordinary concentration of French troops qn the frontiers of Holstein, the submission of Denmark to the decrees of France, and her remonstrances against our maritime rights, together with her active and formidable naval equipments, were sufficient evidences of her submission to Buonaparte.-Was Buonaparte's system, that all Europe should be devoted, excepting Denmark?" With a large navy, with a more extended commerce, and with the keys of the Baltic in her hand, would he have allowed her to remain as a monument of reproach to the vassalage of surrounding coun-/ tries, and to have broken the continuity of the chain which binds every country of Europe? It was the declared opinion of a noble lord (Milton) that the expedition should be condemned, because the crown prince was in Holstein, and his forces unprepared for action. Strange as that sentiment might appear to his mind, it excited no surprize. It was a doctrine of the school of which the noble lord was a disciple, or perhaps the leader. And when a noble lord (Petty) announced, that their motto was"Nos Rebus Servamus Secundis ;" or that they would never afford any assistance to friends till they were in a condition not to want it, he could not but think the advice of the noble lord perfectly natural, that we should never resist an enemy till he should be in a condition to despise our resistance. As to peace, Buonaparte would certainly, in his terms, wish to question our maritime |