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THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW,

JULY, 1871.

No. CCLXXIII.

ART. L-1, General Fadejew über Russlands Kriegsmacht und Kriegspolitik. Uebersetzung aus dem Russischen, mit einem Vorwort von JULIUS ECKARDT. Leipzig: 1870. 2. Foreign Armies and Home Reserves. By Capt. C. B. BRACKENBURY, R. A. London: 1871.

3. A Letter addressed 'A sa Majesté l'Empereur Alexandre II, Un Slave.' Published at Brussels, anonymously.

THE

HE attention of Europe has during the last few years been much engaged by Prussian military organisation and the political greatness achieved by that country as a consequence of the improvement of her armies. All Governments have felt that a model has been set up before their eyes, the study of which was necessary to the sense of national security. The efforts made in France during the last years of Imperial rule for the purpose of placing her military establishments on a broader basis, and so to amplify the means of French aggression, have not altogether passed out of our recollection, notwithstanding the stupendous events which have overwhelmed. the imagination during the last year. Austria has not been left behind in the race of improvement. Turkey and Italy have alike yielded to the same impulse. We ourselves have not been backward in the preparation of military change. In short, the feeling has been general that new proportions and new forms are wanting and must be had in the array of military forces. The acknowledgment is made and practically acted upon, that the direction of international policy is no longer what it was before the war of 1854. Each State appears now to rely alone on its own power and consequence,

VOL. CXXXIV. NO. CCLXXIII.

B

and to have lost faith in the effect of the relations which used to bind the community of European nations.

While the doings of all other countries were thus coming under observation on account of their pronounced character, comparatively small attention was till lately bestowed on Russia with respect to military and political reform. This Power had ceased for several years to attract notice in the discussions of European politics. Russia had lapsed into a strange and unusual diplomatic silence since the Peace of 1856. She appeared in foreign eyes to be entirely devoted to internal reforms of a character to raise a vast population from the position of serfdom to liberty and the free possession of property,-reforms which did not hesitate to deal in the most sweeping manner with what had been hitherto deemed the inalienable rights and privileges of the higher classes. The land was handled by the State in the interests of the whole community and of the particular measure of change in a manner startling to those who take their notions of national business from the proceedings of the British Parliament, when dealing with questions of class and property. While these changes were in progress, others were impending, consequent on the life imparted to the people by the new reforms, and on the example of other Continental countries, but more especially of Prussia.

It may not be uninstructive to trace the military awakening of Russia after her long repose and apparent inactivity subsequent to her struggle with the Western Powers. We have it on no mean Russian authority, that for some years after the war in the Crimea, a general notion of defeat was abroad in Russia, to recover from which time was required. Under this notion of defeat lay the still broader idea that the great Russian nation had been overmatched-that more had been attempted than the country was equal to. This was attended by a feeling of political hopelessness and the paralysis of aspirations pointing to an ambitious foreign policy.

The want of rest was at the same time felt by the military administration. Recruiting was intermitted. Regiments were allowed to sink far below their usual strength. The fatigue of the nation was thus publicly acknowledged by the governing authorities, and time was allowed for recovery. But while admitting the lassitude of the people and of the administration in military affairs, it is certainly true that no signs of this were visible in the discharge of the great functions of Government for the development of internal reform and resources in almost every manner that could be named.

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