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Allusion has already been made to the immense measure of the enfranchisement of the serfs by which the reign of Alexander II. will be distinguished for all time to come. If we would rightly estimate the practical bearings of that measure, we must think of something beyond its domestic results. We should consider also what are its consequences with regard to the prospects of Russia beyond her borders; in other words, how that change is likely to affect her foreign policy. Thus, it is now felt throughout Russia, and the fact is dwelt on with the utmost complacency by her writers, that the emancipation of the serfs has, as it were, caused the pulse of her national life to beat in a manner hitherto unknown. Whereas before, the people of Russia were but as a drove of cattle obeying the whip of the driver, they are now influenced by a national sentiment. They say further, that the nation is so young, is so fresh in its feeling, is so little disturbed by the distracting influences which fatally affect the strength of the Western Powers, that this national sentiment, developed as it now has been, and pervading as it does a people who for the first time enjoy the sense of individuality, is a source of a new power to Russia with reference to extension, whether through the sympathy of race or by the amplification of territory.

Such would appear to be the language which has been held for some years. Travellers tell us that the awakening from the state of lassitude and hopelessness following on 1856 is thorough and complete. The measure of emancipation having been executed, the fatigue of the late war having been forgotten, time and opportunity are afforded, and a stimulus is given to the Government to follow the military and diplomatic bent which since the days of Peter the Great has been the characteristic of Russian policy and administration.

Russia has reached a new epoch in her history. At length, in giving free scope to the tendency towards extension, the Czar does but follow the bias evinced by the people in the strongest manner. He moves in the direction indicated by public opinion in the discussions of the press. If we except the kingdom of Poland, the press in Russia has long had a freedom till lately unknown to other countries on the Continent of Europe. Any attempt at interference with this which may have been made at St. Petersburg, and such attempts have not been wanting from time to time, has met with but little success. The writers of Moscow have indeed been in a position to make terms with the Government; in short, to have their own way generally, notwithstanding occasional bureaucratic opposition.

Although these writers may have been sometimes inconvenient to the Government of the day, there can be but little doubt that the education they spread abroad, the never-ceasing glorification of the Russian name and power, the biting criticism of the institutions belonging to a state of society built on the past of serfdom in the lower classes and an utter dependence on the will of the Czar among the higher ones, have conduced in no slight manner to form the public opinion which gives life to the sentiment of national power and pride consequent on the emancipation. The administration of the Czar receives the full benefit flowing from such a state of things. It now feels that it relies on a basis of educated intelligence as distinguished from the solitary fact of a blind and stolid obedience. How this is likely to operate for the development of military power, we can judge from what goes on among ourselves. Thus, so soon as a people declaring the necessity of military extension, whether from motives of ambition or from a sense of insecurity, takes its foreign policy and the management of its military affairs into its own hands, but little more is heard of economy and the hardships of military service. The popular voice quickly shows itself to be more potent than the silent consultation and decisions of absolute government. In no country have we seen this truth illustrated with more force than in our own. The application of it has, if we are rightly informed, begun with no slight significance in the empire whose affairs we are considering.

Although the measures taken for the purpose are naturally obnoxious and odious to those living outside the Russian dominions, it is not difficult to understand, when Russian affairs are contemplated from the foregoing point of view, how it arises that the process of Russification of non-Russian provinces, as it is called, is considered a national duty by the old Russian party, the headquarters of which are at Moscow. The original annexation of Poland was an affair of Imperial ambition. This ambition was prompted by the desire to convert Russia into an European Power, and to establish a firm footing in the diplomacy of Europe. The prosecution of that policy has been followed up with invincible consistency and tenacity for 150 years. It was the effort of Imperial will and of the cabinets which influenced the minds of the successive Czars. Even very lately, that is to say, not more than fourteen years ago, evidence was available to show that it was by no means generally recognised in Russia, that the annexation of Poland had been a real advantage to that country. It was felt by many of the old Russian party that Russia Proper might lose

in importance as being merged in a great confederation welded together under the name of the Russian Empire. Thus an article is in our recollection which appeared in a Moscow newspaper in 1857, arguing that the liberation of the people from absolute government, and so forth, was fatally delayed, if not absolutely impeded, by the facts of the annexation of Poland and the consequent necessity of military repression in that province. It was said that in the interests of Russia as well as of Poland, the remedy lay in the separation of the two countries, and in leaving Poland to shift for herself. The expression was used that Poland was as the boulet attached to the heel of the convict, and that [the convict could not hope for self-assertion until he had rid himself of the boulet.

All this seems now to be changed. Except among the Poles themselves we do not hear of a party which desires, or even hints at, the expediency of depriving Russia of provinces the acquisition of which has cost so much blood. The retention of Poland and, if need be, its forcible repression, depend now on the national decision. The process of Russification is ruthlessly proceeded with, this being, so to speak, an expression of the national will rather than of mere Imperial policy. It is perhaps not too much to say that we here perceive the first great result of the abolition of serfdom on what may be called the foreign policy of Russia. For the original seizure of Poland and its strong military occupation were the salient points of her foreign policy during the last century, and, as will be indicated hereafter, form the basis of her action. towards central and southern Europe in the present one. Indeed, to such a pitch have risen the aspirations of the national party, that many of the leading men have of late years persistently urged on the Government the necessity of applying to other provinces than Poland the Russifying process. Thus is sought to be reversed the prudent policy, which has generally left to conquered provinces and alien races the institutions and laws to which they had been accustomed prior to their absorption into the Russian Empire. The Russian Government has perhaps yielded to this pressure more easily than is consistent with what is due to her engagements towards those provinces and to their superior civilisation. We do not propose, however, to enlarge on this point of the domestic policy of Russia, it having been alluded to merely to show the bias of the public mind of the country since the people began to take a share in the direction of their affairs which, as might have been expected, tends directly to increase the solidity of the old Russian or national party.

resources.

Side by side with the measures necessary for enfranchisement, a great material prosperity has been proceeding in Russia. Her revenues have increased in an extraordinary manner, her expenditure having, however, year by year exceeded her annual Notwithstanding her chronic deficit, no country in Europe-indeed it might be said, or in America-displays a more rapid increase of wealth and all that serves to produce it. This is proved alike by the statistics of domestic and foreign trade. We need hardly remind the reader, who notices the operations of the Russian Government on the exchanges of Europe, of the great railway development which has taken place during the last few years. Railway enterprise, originally initiated by the will of the Government, has now, as in other countries, come to be prosecuted by the population. The first great railway between St. Petersburg and Moscow was completed in 1851. Since then three state railways have been opened for public traffic, and not less than eight private ones. On the 8th of January, 1869, a ukase was signed for the construction of eight more lines. The latter, designed at the instance of the military authorities for strategical purposes, will open new roads into vast districts, thereby affording an outlet for produce; the political and commercial interests of the country being thus made to march together.

Such, then, is the broad basis of national reform, of material development, and of popular sentiment on which the politicians of Russia take their stand. This it is on which the Government of the Czar is able to proceed when declaring a military policy which regards a free population in the place of a system founded on aristocratic privilege and subservience in the higher ranks and serfdom in the lower ranks of the people at large. This it is that brings forward such writers as General Fadejew on the military power, the war policy, and the vast potential resources of his country, which he wishes to apply for the purpose of domination over Europe in the sense of an aggressive foreign policy. To the consideration of his pages we now turn. Their publication has not only exercised much influence in Russia; they have been translated into German, and are held to be a warning of what united Germany may at some future time be expected to encounter from her great neighbour. This volume is a revised collection of critical treatises which appeared in 1867 in the Russki Westnik,' or Russian Messenger, a literary political monthly review, edited in Moscow by Katkow and Leontjew. The name of the first of these editors is well enough known in England to show to us what would be the uncompromising character of

Fadejew's opinions, and with what boldness they would be given to the world. Accordingly this character is discovered in every page of his composition, which in its audacity as being directed against the failure of existing institutions, and towards the exercise of authority in high quarters, is certainly not exceeded by the public criticism of this country. It is not, however, the boldness of contemporary criticism which gives its great value to the publication of General Fadejew's opinions. He brings to bear on his subject of military reform an accurate practical knowledge of the army in which he has risen and served. An ardent reformer, he is at the same time an opponent of the Ministry of War engaged, as that ministry is, in the prosecution of searching reforms. At the same time General Fadejew is able to write with an extraordinary freedom from professional bias and technical pedantry.

Before proceeding to consider the personnel of the Russian army, we may reflect for a moment on the great natural advantages possessed by Russia in respect of strategical position, of the configuration of her boundaries, and of the population existing within them. And first with regard to strategical position. The year 1812 gave the evidence that whatever the military genius and concentration of war power which might be directed against Russia, the invasion of the country, owing to immensity of area, to sparseness of population, and to climatic causes, could only result in the ultimate discomfiture of the invading armies. The Russians say, with satisfaction, that the successful invasion of any country west of her own frontier may be followed by its indefinite occupation or its absolute ruin. Such consequences cannot result to Russia herself from an unsuccessful war. The utmost that can happen to her, as was seen in 1855, is that her resources can be so exhausted, that it might be expedient and prudent, in a political as well as military sense, to make peace. She might have the worst of the conflict, and therefore find it wise not to shrink from considerable sacrifice at the particular moment to effect a truce, trusting thereafter to the healing effects of time for the reparation of damages and the recovery of any advantages which might have been given up when peace was desired. We may take it as proved by the events of 1812, of 1855, and 1870, that this theory is a correct one. The worst that can happen to Russia in consequence of unsuccessful war is a temporary stoppage of European influence. She never can incur real national risk such as that which threatened Austria after the battle of Sadowa, or what we have seen to have overwhelmed

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