making itself felt in the salons of St. Petersburg. In connec tion with this we hear the name of Prince Bariatinsky, the late conqueror of the Caucasus, quoted with much authority, it being thought that he would not be unwilling to treat Poland on Pansclavic principles for reasons exactly similar to those put forward by'un Slave.' Fadejew is active in a like sense, as shown by a very recently published pamphlet.

At the same time we hear from various quarters that for the present, at all events, the Eastern question is held in Russia to be closed. The Russian Government stands now, as regards the Black Sea and its power of asserting a hostile attitude towards Turkey, nearly in the position it occupied before the war in the Crimea, with the advantage, however, of superior military organisation and a system of railways. Her views are not now immediately directed against Turkey. She has achieved a successful diplomatic campaign.

Although we may regret the step taken by Russia, we cannot be surprised at it. With the exception of ourselves the leading Powers of Europe had previously acquiesced in the expediency of making the concession she asked for. It may be that if with something of the warlike spirit which guided British counsels in the last century, Lord Granville had told the Sultan that England was ready to back him in a quarrel with the Czar, the former might have had recourse to the ultima ratio regum. But it is clear this was as little desired by the Turks as by the reasonable part of our own community, and a war for the Eastern question in its present form was never seriously contemplated by any Power throughout the discussion, which was finally terminated by the London Conference. It has suited certain continental politicians and parties to blame and depreciate England as the cause of the results of that Conference. But, in truth, neither government nor public of any country was serious in advocating resistance to the encroachments of Russia for her extrication from a position believed by all to be out of keeping for so great a Power. Russia, then, had her own way and is at present satisfied with reference to the aspect of her relations with Turkey. Indeed, we hear that her advances towards the latter have a highly pacific character. The Times' correspondent writes from Vienna on April 13, 1871, that harmony prevails between those two countries-all now goes smoothly. The Porte is left in peace and quiet. But Russia goes further than this negative proof of intention to avoid causes of discord:- Russia seems inclined to honour and approve the reigning disposition at Constantinople which tends towards emancipating Turkey

'from all foreign interference in her internal affairs.' Turkey comes forward with her views of what may be the policy to pursue towards Roumania in the event of certain contingencies, after having made sure of the consent of Russia. If Turkey be allowed, as we are now informed, to perform her due function, according to treaty, of putting down the threatened civil war-if, by the attitude of Russia, Austria be placed under the necessity of abstaining from all interference, notwithstanding the presence of many Roumanian subjects in Transylvania and her deep interest in the Sclave population-she may fairly ask, and her allies should also inquire, if in the fact of Russia's institution of an entente cordiale with the Porte, we do not find the first forward step in a policy on the part of the former, for the due execution of which the neutrality of Turkey is a cardinal condition.

It is, indeed, impossible to doubt that an anodyne to Poland in the north, the intrigues in Roumania on the south-west, and the Russo-Czech agitation in the country lying as it were between the two, are parts of the same scheme. For these three sections form the line of western frontier along which is, we are told by Russian statesmen and generals, the normal position of the Great active' Russian army. In confirmation of the theory and in affirmation of the reality of ulterior designs, we see the development of the Russian forces on that line during the last year, of which the German newspapers and the English correspondents have informed us. The aspirations of influential parties in Russia are taking political form. The aggressive inclination of her people, the sense of popular dissatisfaction declared by her writers to exist with reference to her being cribbed and confined in domestic affairs, the desire for expansion, of which we are assured by the Russians themselves, are seen to be assuming a practical shape. We are now able to follow the outline of a policy which is thus becoming positive, as being marked out by the acts of Government and no longer indicated merely by the polemics of the press.

What, then, is the obvious conclusion which suggests itself alike to Austrian statesmen, to the organs of Russian opinion, and to English observers? It is that a struggle is impending between Russia and Austria; that it is inevitable sooner or later; that it cannot be averted. As shown in the foregoing pages, the reorganisation of the Russian army may have rested on motives of a more general character; but those motives differ entirely from such as may be at the bottom of similar efforts of military reconstitution, as seen in the United Kingdom,

in Austria, in Italy, in Turkey. They present rather an analogy with the policy of Prince Bismarck and the Emperor of Germany, when after 1859 they set fairly to work to create military forces which, while conferring vast powers for aggressive purposes, should lay the basis of a policy of national aggrandisement. In Prussia this might mean the assertion of German unity after a fashion which should guarantee Prussian predominance in the Empire about to be created. In Russia the analogous military policy signifies expansion according to certain theories of Race, and the more complete rounding off of the Russian province of Poland. Hence the recent rapid armament of Russia, with a view to a contest with Austria, which it is urged on high Russian authority should not be long deferred. In Russian eyes the due occasion will be seen when preparation shall have been sufficiently advanced, when the new military organisation shall have attained a proper solidity, when the first line of 400,000 men may count on reserves of equal amount-in short, when Russian numbers and resources shall have reached the proportion exhibited by Germany in her late contest.

The Ministry of War in Austria is undoubtedly fully alive to the march of opinion in Russia and to the corresponding military and diplomatic policy pursued by her Government. We may believe that the preparations of Russia are in the course of being met by similar action on the part of the advisers of the Emperor Francis Joseph. Whilst as usual in Austria, attention to the army is not forgotten, it is known that the railways of Hungary, the domestic strategical lines, are in the course of being rapidly pushed forward. The necessity of preparation is thus clearly indicated, and the settled purpose of the Austrian Government practically shown. But Austria alone, unaided, is not equal to a contest with the Czar. Austria, as she well knows herself, as acknowledged by all in civil and in military authority, wants rest. She has done much and is doing more towards healthy recovery after the blows of 1859 and 1866. But time is required to complete the cure. Effective as has been the march of the civil and constitutional reforms of Austria, and real as may be the reconciliation with Hungary, strengthened as she has been by the new power for the concentration of her means consequent on liberation from the old Italian care, Austria must seek in the general European arrangement that safety which is denied to her by the configuration of her frontier and the heterogeneous masses of her population.

If we come to something more positive than the Pansclavic

Idea,' we find that the Russians reckon on the disaffection of the Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia and of the Sclave population in Moravia and Bohemia. The former are undoubtedly indisposed towards Austria, and might perhaps be expected to render military precautions necessary in the event of war. Popular disturbance and animosity towards the land proprietors would possibly make themselves apparent. Notwithstanding the persistency of the Russian intrigues in Bohemia and Moravia some few years back, and the entente sought to be established with the Czech population by the Moscow press, it is not probable that Austria sees cause for distrust of these provinces on war breaking out. Insurrection or aid to the enemy, under such circumstances, would be opposed to all their traditions. On the whole we may safely conclude, that for purposes of defence, Austria is stronger than she was in 1866. If Russia should yield to the temptation to aggressive war under which she is now labouring, her expectations of assistance from the disaffection of any one of the different provinces and races of which Austria is made up, are likely to be disappointed. Nevertheless, in such an event, the situation would be one of extreme peril for Austria if she were left alone to confront her giant neighbour.

Although after the pleasing excitement consequent on the diplomatic success of the movement commenced in October last, Russia may be now drawing towards Turkey, and that attempts may be made to separate the latter from Austria, the Porte can hardly forget that her interests are intimately bound up with those of that Empire which now confronts the great 'active' army of Russia. The Porte will continue to bear in mind the urgent counsel and warning afforded by those whose activity and aggressions are the settled policy of a hundred years. That counsel is contained in the modern Russian motto

The Eastern question can alone be solved at Vienna in a 'Russian sense.'

England should weigh the value of this maxim with reference not only to the Eastern question, but to the preservation of Eastern and South-eastern Europe from a Russian advance, and to the maintenance of the European peace. As a result of her action at the late Conference England should be prepared to take a view of her position for the maintenance of the law of Europe according to the principle acted on in August 1870, in the case of Belgium, and stated in the first protocol of the Conference. She must not shrink from the measures demanded for the protection not only of her old client Turkey, but of the Empire of Austria. It is rightly

said that the stipulation of the treaty of 1856 regarding the Black Sea, was not designed for the purpose of humiliating Russia, but as a material guarantee of Turkish independence and European peace. The question then arises whether the two objects supposed to have been secured by the arrangements of 1856 have been sacrificed. If it be impossible not to admit that the assurance of peace consequent on the Crimean War has been very rudely shaken by the abrogation of the material guarantees, we shall have to recollect hereafter that we have been parties to this action. The treaty of the 15th April 1856 between Austria, Turkey, and Great Britain which makes any attack upon the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire a casus belli to the Three Powers, is still in full force and binding upon us. We cannot, then, divest ourselves of the duty falling upon us of taking our share, it may be the lead, in a general European combination, which shall in another manner afford security to the objects obtained in 1856 but lost in 1871. The calmness and quiet dignity with which Lord Granville met what may be called the effrontery of the Russian Ambassador at the Conference will find their justification in such a course.

The country should understand that these opinions are not the advice that leads to war. They lie at the foundation of the measure demanded on all sides for the restoration of the law of Europe-the law which has of late years disappeared. In the reassertion of it can alone be found peace and rest for the populations whose security has been so rudely disturbed. Such counsels, resting on what is due to international equity, on the consciousness of the duty, the dignity, and the responsibility of Great Britain, which she cannot abdicate, are the true counsels of peace.

The part to be played by Prussia, or rather Germany, in the immediate future remains to be considered. Between that country and Russia no cordiality exists except in the minds of the two Emperors. The Russians avow that they have nothing to expect from Germany; and they would be satisfied with neutrality in a more or less benevolent' form if war were declared against Austria. Germany might, however, well be a party to a general arrangement for the maintenance of the peace without forgetfulness of gratitude on the part of the German Emperor. It becomes her to mount guard on the east of Europe, to assure the great German people, whether existing within her own borders or those of Austria, against Moscovite encroachment. Germany would thus take her proper place in the European family, according