pains in the theoretical education of the staff officers and those of the scientific arms, and in obtaining at any cost the best of materiel. Although in practice it may not be as successful as it wishes in the production of highly educated officers, in numbers sufficient for the vast forces requiring direction, it is clear, from the discussions and arguments noted in this paper, that there are means of supreme guidance not to be surpassed in any country.

The Russian administration may possibly go to unnecessary expense in Krupp ordnance and iron defences, but it is evident that it proceeds with a settled purpose, that purpose being to insure to the armies of Russia the best implements and tools, and not to rest satisfied unless they be afforded. It is difficult to suppose, with their absolute way of doing things, that the Russian administration have more difficulties to encounter in such matters than we have, or that ultimately Russia will prove slower in putting her military affairs on the widest and firmest footing, according to new and modern conditions. Russia may now be said to be in a transition state. But it is the state of execution after the decision has been passed-in short, of action subsequent to discussion.

According to information before us, on the accuracy of which the reader may rely, the total active' strength of the regular Russian army may be taken as follows:

Total 584,500, with 1,128 guns. To this must be added the force stationed in the Caucasus, the total then standing at 688,000 combatants, with 1,304 guns.

The above represents merely the combatant or 'active' army. But if we would estimate the real fighting power of Russia, and its capacity for extension, we must not omit from the computation the reserves (depôts), the irregular troops, the staff, ambulance, hospital, commissariat, transport, and chancellerie service; and lastly, the development of the principle of reserve, according to which the number of trained soldiers available for service but residing at their homes will be eventually not very far from the equivalent of those actually with the standards. Allowing, for a large margin of casualties, it is clear that on the due emergency arising the combatant forces of Russia might be swelled to at least 1,200,000 men at

VOL. CXXXIV. NO. CCLXXIII.

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short notice, which, when the new systems shall have been fully worked out, will attain larger and more startling dimensions. According to the general disposition of the troops as mentioned by the Minister of War, the forces in the western district and in that of St. Petersburg, which may be considered available for service in Europe and are in easy communication with one another, amount to sixty per cent. of the Russian active army. The lines of railway now in course of execution will soon give the military district of Moscow a like character. The number of combatants thus available for immediate operation on foreign territory at the outbreak of European war would certainly not be overrated at 400,000

men.

Such are the facts of the Russian frontier forces as standing face to face with her neighbours of Austria, Germany, and Turkey. A few words, the result of recent close observation on the part of British officers, may be added. This is highly confirmatory of the Russian authority to which we have previously referred. Thus it is said that Russia will have difficulty in finding able and experienced general officers to whom to intrust the direction of her enormous forces. Imperial protection and many unworthy causes have filled the higher ranks with incapacity and perhaps corruption. The latent military talent can hardly come to the surface, owing to the evil system of promotion, actuated as it is by the personal feelings, the favour, or the prejudices of the Emperor. Vast numbers of officers, generals, and others are for ever being drafted into the civil service. This more particularly affects the staff and the scientific corps. The most capable officers, allured by the higher emoluments of the civil administration, are apt to disappear from the ranks of the army, in which they retain their titles of rank and their claim to promotion. The officers of the staff and the scientific branches are highly educated, and efforts to improve them in theory and practice are unintermitting; but the infantry officers are badly paid, poorly instructed, of little zeal, dissatisfied, and careless of their career and the future. They are declared to rise but little in intelligence above the men they command. The cavalry is good in appearance, in horses, and equipment, and the individual readiness of the soldier but it is not thought that the Russian cavalry would be equal in intelligence to the German, or competent to the performance of such duties as we have lately seen skilfully executed in the advance of the armies of the Prussian royal commanders. Το this we might perhaps reply that such duties can alone be

;

learnt in actual war, and in the application of the energy of the troops by able superior command, such as that of Prince Charles Frederick. A very short term of actual practice under such command would transmute the most sluggish of cavalry. The strength of Russia in this arm, as before observed, lies in her races of born horsemen, and the number of them she is able to call out and apply. The infantry soldier still forms the real strength of the Russian army; but his lot has of late years been entirely changed. He is now as well treated as the infantry of other countries, including better diet, better clothing, medical supervision, gymnastics, schooling, the abolition of corporal punishment except by sentence of courtmartial. The consequence is an improvement visible to every one. The Russian infantry soldier now really takes rank as an intelligent being; this marked change is visible in his gait and demeanour, in the outward appearance of independence and selfreliance. Owing to the amelioration in his lot and the shortened service, the peasant no longer dreads the conscription. Even in Poland it is not feared as it used to be; and the draft for the men is determined by lot with the strictest impartiality. It is sometimes said that the Russian soldier, while thus gaining in intelligence, has lost in discipline. It occurs to us that the absence of servility may easily but unfairly take the aspect of a lax discipline in the eyes of the old Russian officers bred under Constantine and Nicholas, but that the intelligent soldier who has a career of seven years of regimental service must become amply professional in his habits of thought. He cannot fail to gain from the rule of discipline all the advantage it affords in the interest of the whole. Stiffness and stolid servility were long mistaken for the only military form worth preserving. In Russia the form lasted longer than in other countries. Combative and moral power alike can hardly fail to gain in proportion to the intelligent method observed by the Ministry of War in the introduction of change and civilising influences. In future wars Russia may be found to begin with a new strength accordingly.

It is the complaint of General Fadejew that a slack notion of conduct has crept in among the officers. We find this view confirmed in other quarters. With relaxation of discipline has come occasional disloyalty. It has long been known that democratic ideas were more especially prevalent among the artillery and engineers. Such ideas were protected and propagated by the late Minister Miliutin, the brother of the general who is now the War Minister. The onward step to disloyalty in a country so constituted as Russia is not a wide one, and it has

been observed to have taken place accordingly. Facts illustrative of such feelings and tendencies were shown by the investigation following on the attempt on the life of the Emperor a few years back. This matter has probably but little importance at present; but it is a sign of the times which is far from uninstructive. There is another indication as affecting Foreign Powers, which has, perhaps, a greater significance. The press and public opinion thoroughly go along with every detail of army reform and reorganisation. In military matters public opinion is in advance of the Government. The progress in military strength is no longer urged from above-it is rather stimulated from below. The ancient military policy of extension was imperial--the modern now rests on popular influence and public opinion. The reigning Emperor is believed to be really a man of peace. His son, the heir-apparent, is, on the contrary, understood to be ambitious, not without military ardour, and to be disposed towards war. He is anti-German in his politics, and would not unwillingly yield to the stimulus afforded by the National Party.

The German press warns us of the barefaced and cynical exposition of design afforded in Russia in support of the enunciation of her general principles. The old jealousy of race between German and Tartar, between Teuton and Sclave, thus does service to Austria and to Germany, and is an element of strength in the defence of what is most worth preserving in Europe. This jealousy, which lay dormant in Prussia for half a century, is again excited. There may be at times unholy cravings after the German provinces of Austria, but a real feeling of insecurity is prompted by the action and the public opinion of Russia. The very successes of Germany cause the people of the new Empire to be impatient of projects and developments on their eastern frontiers which interfere with the sense of safety and tranquillity. The North Germans inquire with some reason what would be thought of the practice of any other Government or country if general officers of high position permitted themselves to preach wholesale war and spoliation of neighbouring countries. Yet this is exactly the conduct pursued by General Fadejew in his articles in the Exchange Gazette' of St. Petersburg, which meets with but little real opposition from authority : *—

The diplomatic denial of complicity on the part of the Government cannot be held to be worth much so long as the Russian press teems to overflowing with animosity towards Austria and with zeal for

* See Silesian Times of January 27, 1870.

Pansclavist agitation among the southern and western Sclaves, and while the avowed and secret activity of even the Government organs is ever engaged in the corroboration of similar tendencies.'

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Of the force of the argument of 'race' we have other interesting evidence. The letter addressed to the Emperor Alexander II. by un Slave' was published at Brussels early in this year. This publication is clearly the production of one conversant with Russian and Polish administration. The anonymous writer apparently belongs to the party that demands justice and self-government for Poland with the intention of causing her to form a substantial support of the Russian Empire. The policy he advocates is that of the Marquis Wielopolski. He seeks to attract the Emperor to a consideration of the wrongs and evil administration under which Poland suffers, but his reason is that it is wise to meet the antagonistic designs and tendencies of the Germans, and to insist on the solution of the great Sclave question in a Russian sense. He tells the Emperor that the Sclaves are surrounded by a wide circle of Germanism, from Revel in the North to the Black Sea, where a Hohenzollern reigns at the mouth of the Danube. In the extreme west Poland affords a strong position of defence which gives check to the shores of the Baltic and is an advanced post towards the Sclavonic population of the west and south. Poland in Russian hands is a constant menace to Austria and Prussia. The latter would gladly come back to the arrangements of 1793. We have ourselves seen this view confirmed by articles in German newspapers. It is sometimes. alleged by the German press that if there be no other alternative, a bulwark should be erected in Poland against Russia. Against thisun Slave' protests, not because of any mischief arising to Poland were such a policy adopted, but because Russia would lose her position in Europe and her contact with the rest of the Sclavonic world. Apart from moral obligation Russia is under the strongest political necessity to make peace with Poland on a lasting and equitable basis. • Such a peace should be the point of departure towards a real union ' in future. It is the foundation of the strength, of the 'grandeur, and of the prosperity of the great Sclavonic Empire.' It would seem that the ideas thrown out by un Slave' are participated by others, some of whom are in a position of authority, and not disinclined to give them effect. The notion gathers strength from the fact that the Russian press has very recently adopted a similar tone respecting some sort of sition with Poland. This province has nearly recovered from the events of 1863, and Polish influence is said to be again

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compo