turning out the finished automaton, believed, till lately, to be alone capable of victory when opposed to foreign armies.

The man was forgotten in the machine called a soldier. What it might be in the power of the empire to effect by attention to the conditions of individuality and to natural advantages was submerged by professional habits, traditions, and prejudices. The bias of the establishment was more potent than any principle or mode of organisation which might quicken the national pulse by the attraction of national sympathies. The military state of things antecedent to the war in the Crimea was thus essentially a relic of the olden time. The late Emperor Nicholas had, it would seem, a certain glimmering of the truth of what ought to be the guide in the military institutions. In the year 1840 commenced the custom of giving unlimited leave to men of fifteen years' service, on the understanding that they should return to their standards if required for active service. While this privilege was granted there does not seem to have been any good system according to which the 'leavemen' could be suddenly and immediately assembled, or returned to the ranks of the regiments in which they had originally served. Thus were they deprived of much of their ability, and the first step towards a system of trained reserves in times of peace, who, while ready to double the number of the active standing army, should cease to be a charge on the treasury, was not a very decided success.

In the Times' of the 14th January, 1871, will have been seen the practical fruit of the discussions which have been long proceeding. The responsibility of the whole people for the duty of national self-defence is now proclaimed as the principle which is to rule Russian society henceforth. The abolition of serfdom is followed by the abolition of aristocratic exemption from participation in this duty. The peasantry were formerly transferred for military service at the will of proprietors according to the human rate which might be struck for the same. The rate will still be struck, but it will now include the owners of estates who were lately the proprietors of the peasantry also. The equality of all men in Russia for the discharge of the first of national obligations is thus practically recognised, and the recognition is about to be enforced by law. Would that we could have seen a like recognition in the United Kingdom and advantage taken by the Government of the excitement of the last twelve months, and the general accord of men of different parties in the theoretical justice of the argument in favour of the enforcement of the common obligation. We should then have depended in future for the

assertion of the power in the kingdom, whether in self-defence or the maintenance of her dignity abroad, on the security of law and Parliamentary sanction, instead of the fitful enthusiasm of certain members of the upper and middle classes, and the poverty and want of the lower ones. But it was not to be, and we must look to other countries for the example of national duty in this respect, which we are too weak to follow. France, in the midst of all her misfortunes, Italy throbbing with new national life, Prussia revelling in such success as has been rarely seen in the annals of the world, and now finally Russia, set forth the precept and act upon it, that for the discharge of duty in the truest national sense, the individual man, however great or however wealthy, must take his share with the humblest member of the community. The following is the first sentence in the draft of the new military law submitted by the Ministry of War and approved by the Czar :"The defence of his country is the sacred duty of every Russian.' The rest of the draft gives the details by which the foregoing precept is reduced to practice. In each year there will be a conscription to keep the army and navy on a proper footing, all young men being liable who have completed their twentyfirst year. The annual number of recruits will be determined by law, and distributed over the empire and the kingdom of Poland. The men destined to serve will be indicated by lot, such only as are physically incapacitated being exempt. Temporary exemptions are allowed, but within the most restricted limits. Substitutes and exemption by purchase are prohibited. The period of service in the army and navy will be seven years for enlisted recruits, of which time the men will remain with the colours so long as may be required to keep up the complement of the army; otherwise what remains of the seven years may be passed in furlough. After the seven years another period of eight years is passed in the reserve. If called out during the eight years, the young reserve men will be with the active army, and the older ones will reinforce the garrisons of fortresses. In order to enable the educated classes to free themselves from compulsory conscription and to provide officers, young men possessed of a certain degree of education may be volunteers for a short period of service according to rules we are familiar with in the Prussian army. Persons belonging to the reserve are exempt from service only in the case of illness or of employment in some public capacity. All ablebodied persons not entering the army can in time of war be called out to serve in the militia. Now as formerly military service will be performed by the Cossacks under special laws,

by the non-Russian inhabitants of certain portions of the empire, and by the population of the grand duchy of Finland.

In the second draft furnished by the Minister of War, General Miliutin, principles are laid down for the guidance of the special commission appointed to draw up a law for the organisation of the armed forces.

From this we gather that a militia may be formed for extraordinary contingencies if the safety of the country require it. The field forces retain their present organisation, their numbers being increased or diminished at the pleasure of the Government, by granting furloughs or calling back men from furlough. The reserve forces will be organised during the continuance of peace and independently of the army being put on a war footing. Garrison battalions will be stationed in the districts from which they draw their reserves at the rate of two reserve battalions to one garrison. The reserve forces are only formed for service in time of war, the cadre being supplied by the local garrisons. Much attention is to be paid to the assignment of generals and superior officers, for the due keeping in readiness of the arms and accoutrements, and to the sufficiency of points of formation on account of the reserve forces. Such provinces as have but a thin population do not participate in the institution.

In a further report General Miliutin elucidates the drafts of which we have given the sense. He appears to differ in grave particulars from General Fadejew, to whose pages we have had recourse for guidance in the discussion of the principles which have been submitted to the public of Russia. Thus the Minister at War would seem to attach a much less importance to the institution of the national militia than General Fadejew. The former evidently leans in preference on regular formations of reserve, depending entirely on military regulation and the rules of the establishment.

Whilst saying that a militia may be formed in great emergencies, he would seem to deny that the institution possesses much practical utility. In short, he treats the militia as if it must always show the shortcomings which displayed themselves during the crisis of the Crimean war. All this is contrary to the teaching of General Fadejew. The latter distinctly attributes a great value to the institution on account of the national spirit it fosters, the bar it might ultimately put to the improper or corrupt employment of military men in all ranks, either for the purpose of civil administration or in utter disregard of the objects of public expenditure. It is not for us to offer an opinion as to which of the two authorities is in the

right. It may be said that General Fadejew has brought a great knowledge and a very powerful argument to bear in support of his views, while perhaps those who have some acquaintance with Russian habits and thought would affirm that the Minister of War is not untrue to the official traditions in the midst of which he lives, and that he is therefore probably supported by the majority of Russian officers.

Putting aside this controversy, it must be admitted that the new institutions which are entirely in accord with all that has taken place since 1855, cannot fail to place new and large resources in the hands of the Russian Government. The military renovation is complete. The reform sweeps in all classes of society. The principle is fairly adopted according to which great attention is paid to the quality of the troops, whilst the quantity is multiplied according to the numbers presented by the population; that population being as we know double that of any other military Power. The second great principle has also not been forgotten in the designs of the new institutions; that being, that the visible standing army during peace represents but a fractional part of the resources of trained men immediately available on a declaration of war taking place. These reserves of trained men are no longer separated from the points of the assembly of the active army by months of laborious marching, but they will now be carried by railway to their destination from the most distant points in a few days. The problem, then, has been worked out, and we may look in a short time for the full execution of the measures so boldly projected in consequence. We learn in the public prints that these measures are in full progress.

Other changes have taken place of late years in the Russian army. We have it on the authority of Captain Brackenbury that the emancipation of the serfs and the policy of Count Miliutin have created a sense of individuality in the soldier which displays itself in various ways. The drill of the army has been changed and improved and adapted to the rifle and breech-loading arms. In terms of almost enthusiastic eulogy we are told by this writer of extraordinary results of discipline and training, and of the application of the troops in mimic war. It is said that if there be a loss in the appearance of weight and solidity in the Russian march, this is more than compensated by the improved fighting quality of the individual. We have always known that he was more tenacious and more obstinate in holding his ground than almost any other continental soldier. His powers of marching have also ever distinguished him very favourably. But we have been ac

customed to think chiefly of the Russian army in the mass, and but little of the advantage to be gained by the advance from stolid barbarism of the men composing it. In Russia, as elsewhere, it seems to be undoubted that as the national education makes progress, and the general intelligence is cleared accordingly, so the army partakes of the common improvement, and is likely to show this in an unmistakeable manner when it shall be engaged hereafter. In our estimation of these altered circumstances and the real solid effect on the efficiency of the Russian soldier, we should perhaps be careful to balance the somewhat enthusiastic opinions and accounts of the brilliant Times' reporter by the sterner valuation of the experienced Russian general, who, though an ardent reformer, is at the same time a strict and independent critic. The latter has actually served and commanded in the ranks to which the former has paid but a passing visit. Accordingly we do not find these glowing accounts of the British correspondent entirely supported by the native military critic. The latter alleges a want of discipline in the modern army of Russia. He points out how difficult it is for the Russian to acquire the élan of the French army, the accurate technical knowledge and skill in the use of arms of the Prussian and the Englishman. He shows that the special quality of the Russian forces lies in that power of taking punishment' and still standing_up for more, which caused such surprise and difficulty to Frederick in the last century and to Napoleon in this, after their previous experience of Austrian and other opponents. Thus owing to this cause, although Russian commanders have often failed and been defeated, the Russian soldiery are never thoroughly beaten. They may be destroyed, but they continue to come again and to show a front till the last extremity. On the other hand, there is great difficulty in teaching the Russian peasant the use of arms as compared with the recruits of other countries. It takes almost three years to turn out a soldier from the raw material. He is as inferior in the intelligence required for individual fighting in loose order as he is dangerous when in the mass of closely welded combatants. Consequently the introduction of the new rifle breech-loading arms has subtracted an advantage from the Russian army, the tactics required for the old unimproved arms being far more favourable to the Russian genius than those necessarily introduced on account of the more deadly character of the new patterns.

True to its traditions, the Russian Government spares no