rial forces should have been disposed in the army of the West, and so will it be in the future.'

The important part proposed by General Fadejew to be assigned to the Militia in the case of another general war, in which the resources of Russia should be made available against a formidable alliance, points to the necessity of placing this body on a more highly organised basis than has hitherto been admitted. When we read the discussion of this matter from the modern Russian point of view, to which, however, the Ministry of War does not fully give its adhesion, we can almost imagine that we are passing our own affairs under examination, so similar are the language and the argument held to what we have been accustomed at any time during this century. Thus there are discussions as to whether the Militia should be enrolled and drilled for three weeks en masse, or that only the youngest class-the men of twenty years of ageshould be thus treated; or thirdly, that the men should be summoned but for two or three days in the year on certain holidays; and fourthly, that in time of peace they should not be summoned at all. The better opinion seems to be that a system founded on the first of these alternatives should be firmly established, a system not unlike that adopted by ourselves in our counties. It is observed that were this fairly set up, not only would the force of 480,000 men, whose duties have been illustrated, be forthcoming when they might be wanted, but that those duties are too important to be possibly intrusted to raw levies. It is suggested that to maintain a sufficient standing army to meet the contingency of war, with regard to the functions indicated for the temporary or resident troops, is out of the question. It follows then that the latter must have had a certain rude preparation, the habits of assembling, of some slight acquaintance with their officers and with one another, and an elementary habituation to the life of the barrack-yard, and to the rules of discipline. It is added that an economy may be found in the complete organisation of the militia-system in enabling the Government to part with bodies of local and garrison troops. These now swell the expenditure without any adequate return. It is a cardinal condition of State economy, that the 'standing active army' should be disposable for duty everywhere; that its constituents should not be transferred in crowds, from all ranks, to non-military business, a condition that is nowhere so much forgotten as in Russia. Oblivion of this condition, and the violation of the first principles on which it rests, are the fruitful sources of corruption in all classes, it may be said without

exception, and cannot fail to be one cause of the shortcomings in point of numbers, and of the collapse in the efforts of the Government when the demand arises for real soldiers in proportion to the strength of the armies appearing in the official rolls.

By throwing in time of war all local and garrison duties on the militia, the local and garrison troops proper being, on the other hand, incorporated with the active army; by inflexibly asserting that there shall be henceforth no deduction from the active ranks for the civil duties of administration as a further consequence of a wholesome and wide-applied system of militia, uncertainty with reference to her resources will vanish from the mind of Russia, and the great national result will have been obtained, which may be expressed in these words— The organised militia of a people numbering eighty millions does not protect the State from the possibility of defeat in offen'sive war, but it does protect the country from the conse6 quences of such defeat.'

In passing to the consideration of the regular troops, or what has been called the active army, it may be observed that although the imagination of Western Europe has been constantly excited since the Napoleonic wars in the early part of the century by the potential capacity of Russia for aggressive war, a greater power has been attributed to her than has hitherto been warranted by fact. Thus in these wars she was great in defence, and she ruined the Grand Army by the vastness of her area, the rude climate of her plains, the scantiness of provision to be found on them by an invader. But her military institutions only helped towards this, and they failed even at home to array sufficient numbers by which to stop the advance of the French hosts. In the other wars of that period, whether as shown in the career of Suwarof in Italy, in the campaigns of Austerlitz, of Preuss-Eylau, and so on, and later in the final advance on Paris, the Russians never fought with the advantage of numbers, or with the support of many reserves, unless they formed one of a band of allies.

The same was generally remarked in the struggles with Frederick the Great of Prussia, his ultimate safety having indeed more than once depended on the apparent inability of Russia to meet his sharp and heavy blows by successive armies, to obliterate the effects of his daring conduct of the war in the face of unexampled difficulties, by the advance of such masses as might feel a wound, but could not sustain defeat as a whole. The achievements of Prussia, the example of the wars of the last ten years, the numbers at the disposal of her conterminous

neighbours in the west and south, are sufficient evidence to Russia that the strength of the organised military forces of a very recent past can no longer suffice for the future. It has been shown that the popular element of the militia or opoltschenie must be called in to relieve the country of the intolerable burden of a standing army adequate to all the contingencies of the empire, and to enable the mobilisation of the active troops to take place with effect, with reference alike to mere defensive war, or to the consequence of success in defence, the passage to counter-attack and the assumption of a bold offensive. The estimate of 900,000 men has been set down for the purpose of a standing or active army. It does not seem excessive, if measured by the most recent experience, to which allusion has been already made.

The problem is then before Russia, how these great demands are to be met; how to enable her armies to suffice for the strong probability of a hostile European alliance being directed against her; how to encounter, with something approaching to equality, the 350,000 men who might be arrayed by Austria, and the like number of troops which might take part on the side of Germany after the latter had provided for her western border and against the hatred and desire of revenge of France; and how, thirdly, to be prepared with a southern army to stand opposite to the renovated forces of the Sultan.

The solution of the problem is sought by Russia in measures similar to those which are now proceeding experimentally in the organisation of the British army. It is proposed to have recourse to a condition of short service in ordinary times, to trust to a system according to which a large portion of the trained military power of the country should exist in seasons of general peace in the form of reserves at small expense to the State, the active army during such seasons being recognised as the national school for the due preparation of the reserves thus hidden away from observation, but ready to spring to arms in their proper places on the alarm of war being sounded.

It is argued that the greater the difference between the peace and war footing of a country, the more powerful are its ultimate combative resources. The power which is most feared is not that which is always apparently armed to the teeth; but it is that which sparing expense.so far as may be in time of peace, is in a position to assert its strength suddenly, and on occasion to arm with rapidity. Modern reliance is placed in the capacity of a 'people to take up arms in the form of trained soldiers, rather than in what is visible as a standing army in camp and garrison.

Important as attention is to the quality of the troops, to the individual training of the men to the rules of discipline and to the use of arms, the production of the men in imposing numbers when they are required for the real purposes of the country, is of far more consequence than the instruction and the polish of smaller forces. It is now indispensable that the active armies of a country should be so organised that to the largest possible numbers should be united the best possible quality under the circumstances of the time, this being the reverse of the proposition that troops of the highest quality should be as numerous as they can be, but that no others are fit for use. In modern wars we depend on masses and the intelligent direction given to them rather than on nice manœuvres and the operations of slender bodies. Given a fair administration and tolerably equal ability of command on both sides in a great contest, superior numbers must carry with them the fortune of a campaign. Hence the disposition everywhere to add to numbers, to operate in vast masses, to cover the mishaps and losses of isolated battles by the general advance of the whole which ignores petty disasters in the execution of large movements-just as a battalion proceeds without taking count of its casualties. Accidents may determine the fate of skirmishes and sometimes of great battles, but the fortune of large and continuous campaigns has little to do with chance, if the numbers be adequate to a comprehensive military directionin short, if the numbers be in proportion to the area operated on. If any exceptional circumstances of government and administration, as lately seen in France, be put aside, there should never be such a difference between the troops of European countries as to compensate for very inferior numbers.

It is evident that the relations of the quality to the quantity or numbers of the troops are of a very important character. There is a point at which elasticity is lost when the numbers are too much stretched with reference to the means at hand for organisation. If a certain limit of quantity be transgressed in this sense-if there be insufficient time to train the recruits of the armies which are engaged-if they are deteriorated by an excessive shortening of the period of service-if the battalions be left without a sufficient leaven of old soldiers, of the example and the training to be alone afforded by experienced comrades-it is clear that the armed body is in danger of sinking from the rank of an army to the character of an untrained mob. It is then sure to disappoint the country, to ruin the generals placed in command, to be more dangerous than useful. Of the results of the proper application of national resources

after the most salutary preparation we have the most telling example in the conduct of Prussia before and after the recent war. In France we have seen a fatal illustration of the danger incurred by a country that puts on foot vast bodies of armed men and then calls them armies. In the consideration, then, of the complex questions now under discussion, reformers of ancient military institutions cannot too resolutely bear in mind that there is a point at which the rival exigencies of quantity and quality meet. The greatest care is required for the determination of the exact relative conditions according to which the development of the active national forces' on a popular basis can take place without deterioration of the necessary quality, but without too pedantic a restriction of the niceties of training and of the parade which characterised the armies of the last century.

The peculiarities of the population concerned must be carefully studied. There should be no slavish imitation of the institutions of other countries. Nearly every one has advantages not possessed by others, and on the contrary includes germs of weakness from which its neighbours may possibly be free. Thus the Russian, so brave and so obstinate in the field, so patient of fatigue, so active on the march, takes a longer time to train and educate than the German and the Frenchman. Russia has in her riding populations, in her nomad tribes, in the mountaineers of the Caucasus, natural elements for comprehensive military organisations of varied character which are denied to other countries. The irregular cavalry is obtained by the simple process of massing together the people of considerable provinces who are born riders, and whose martial disposition is thoroughly to be depended on. These same irregular horsemen are easily convertible into firm regular cavalry. In like manner the mountaineer of the Caucasus asks but for improved arms, to be without training or instruction the best of sharpshooters.

Hitherto there has been too much of imitation in the Russian institutions. With the best natural cavalry in the world for immediate use, the German model of Frederick the Great has been followed with great exactness but with much loss of time and power, in placing the Russian peasant on horseback with infinite labour. The example of the old Prussian army was resorted to in the construction of the Russian standing army. No appeal was made to national spirit. Soldiers were caused to serve for the term of twenty-five years, practically for life. Numbers were restricted not by the capacity of the country for the supply of men, but by the means available for