means with which to advance boldly from her position of mere defence to operations of counter-attack. To have been able to do this with safety, considering that in addition to English and Turks on both sides of the Black Sea, the Government of the Czar must have been provided with active armies to meet Austro-French forces, not less than 400,000 of trained troops in a state of mobilisation would have been required as distinguished from the depôts and garrison battalions. These forces, we are sure, were not at the disposal of Russia at that time. But what would be the demand now in the face of the enormous development lately given to other European armies, of the liberation of Austria from all care for Italy, of the concentration of the whole German power under the eagles of Prussia, of the appearance of the Italian army of 250,000 men as a new item in the military system of Europe? It is indeed true that under present circumstances, where 400,000 men might have been formerly enough, 650,000 men now disposable for this particular purpose would not more than suffice. Such speculations, which were perhaps matter of political speculation before the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, have lately received the stamp of certainty. The recent efforts of Germany must have indeed placed them beyond all doubt as regards the interests of Russia if she would retain her relative position in the international system in any future struggle. This, then, is the situation contemplated by the Russian statesmen. Russia is so strong in her geographical position and the number of her population, that no single Power is likely to risk a conflict with her. But a great European alliance may at any time be directed against her. The combative forces of the Empire must therefore be so arranged and reinforced as to enable her to meet this contingency. Otherwise these forces can only be considered insufficient for the national efforts, a disappointment of the expectations of the country, inadequate to her legitimate aspirations. No Russian attempts to conceal the opinion that his country has a great future before it, but that future is unattainable unless the proper and sufficient means should be provided. The people are very candid in the expression of their views. There are no qualms of national conscience as to the righteousness or sinfulness of war. wars are justified in the Russian's eyes, if they satisfy what he holds to be the legitimate aims of his country. At times such wars may be defensive as being the results of a too hasty or too ardent pursuit of the national objects. But they are more often aggressive, whether as directed against Hungary, by All which the weight of Russian influence was imposed on the domestic affairs of Austria, and therefore, to a certain extent, on Europe at large; as against the Turks in the passage of the Pruth; as against the tribes of the Caucasus till they were finally subdued; as in the never-ceasing extension in the East and South of Central Asia, where, as Nicholas observed, boundaries do not exist; or finally, as in the absolute reduction and thorough fortification of Poland, the great bastion of offence against Germany and Austria. The attitude of Russia is, then, one of constant menace to the nations on her eastern, southern, and western boundaries. It is meant to be so by her statesmen. The position is accepted with the utmost complacency and unanimity by her people. This attitude, unmistakeably evinced by her grasping and often insolent diplomacy, declaredly means aggressive war whenever that diplomacy may require to depend on something more than threats and influence. It is evident that with such views, which are shared alike by the people and the leading statesmen, there must be many and large precautions at home while the grand army on the western I border is massed in strength of 650,000 men. True it is that four-fifths of the Russian Empire can take care of themselves, that when a great struggle proceeds with Europe a vast portion of the country requires no troops except for the guard of fortresses and prisons. But there is nevertheless the other fifth which must be vigilantly watched, in which military precaution can never be relaxed, and this, notwithstanding that the process of Russification may have been successfully prosecuted in the provinces annexed, and that the latter may furnish numerous recruits to the armies. It is said, and apparently on undeniable authority, that the presence of very large forces was demanded in the Baltic Provinces during the Crimean War. The number of 200,000 was lately stated in an article by General Fadejew, published in the Exchange Gazette of St. Petersburg, and he alleges, that in case of general war, a like number would be again required in that quarter. This statement is probably an exagge ration, and we prefer to take the general estimate as appearing in the volume under review rather than in a controversial paper which is directed against the existing Ministry of War. With this passing observation, we believe we shall now best meet the wishes of the reader by an exact statement of the military wants, according to General Fadejew, as shown in his uate ceal but ient All he ich or re by * See 'Pall Mall Gazette' of April 12, 1871. 6 book in illustration of our more general remarks on the relative international position of Russia. It is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the Active' and the Resi'dent' armies when projecting the schemes of defence for the immense areas and the far-stretching frontiers and borders we are now contemplating. The former are the armies immediately fronting the enemy, the latter the troops to be left in occupation of the country when the active army is massed for action. When allusion is made to a division, it is to be understood that it comprehends 12 battalions of 1,000 men each. In the distribution of troops reference being made to infantry divisions, it is assumed that the subsidiary arms of cavalry and artillery will be in attendance in due proportion. Whatever enemy Russia may be called on to meet, it is tolerably clear that the concentration of the active Russian army will only take place on three points with regard to the well-known objects of a Russian military policy. The points are the kingdom of Poland, the banks of the Pruth, and the Turko-Asiatic frontier. Whether Russia be placed on the offensive or the defensive, concentration is alone possible on one or other of these points, or on all three at the same time. 'Between the kingdom of Poland, the Pruth, and the Turko-Asiatic boundary, and beyond the extremities of the lines, thus indicated, there are nevertheless hundreds of versts of open frontier and two great water basins, the Baltic and the Black Seas. The whole extent must be guarded from attack. An alliance against Russia, without the participation of a maritime Power, is most improbable. This fact of the participation of a maritime Power in an alliance against Russia, of which we have already had an example, places Russia in a position to which no other Continental Power is exposed. The absence of great naval forces wherewith to meet the contingency must cause a country with long open coasts to be ready to defend the latter against hostile disembarkation. The Empire of Russia presents coasts also which although belonging to Russia are nevertheless not Russian, such as Finland, Samogitia, and the Caucasus. On one of these coasts, besides, the capital is situated. The problem of defence thus presented can apparently only be solved by keeping ready considerable numbers of troops on each important point of the coast; that is, to occupy the coasts with extraordinary forces, which do not represent practical strength for offence but the performance of duties and of guard whilst the war lasts, and pending its duration such forces are immovable. In this manner would Russia have to garrison the coasts of the White, the Baltic, and the Black Seas, and in addition fourteen fortresses of the first rank and many smaller ones, which lie along the western and southern borders from Sweaborg in the north to Kertch in the south. The four great cities of St. Petersburg, Riga, Warsaw, and Odessa have then to be considered; and, lastly, beyond all, Russia must think of occupying with corresponding forces the kingdom of Poland, the governments in the west and in the Caucasus, and to maintain quiet everywhere. After this statement we see clearly how colossal must be considered the resident forces of Russia in order to allow of the movement of her active army. It is evident that no State could possibly afford to maintain a standing army in peace time as well as war, which should be sufficient after meeting the exigencies of the active forces to satisfy the vast demands entailed on those of resident character. In these resident forces will be found naturally the depôts and the reserves in which the recruits are formed. Certain dangerous points, more especially on the sea coasts, would also be occupied by regular troops, the same forming a reserve to the actual army. Beyond this, however, it is neither possible nor expedient that the masses destined to garrison the coasts, the fortresses, the insecure provinces and posts in the interior should consist of highly proved troops. Russia cannot ever be engaged in an exclusively maritime war. In a great war conducted on land, the enemy would be too much employed to be able to direct large armies for disembarkation against her coasts. Young troops well armed and animated by the love of country are in general amply sufficient to withstand attempts of a more insignificant character, to guard her coasts and fortresses, to put down occasional insurrections, as for instance in the kingdom of Poland, to afford garrisons for hostile regions. Thus by the employment of such young and temporary troops, can the active army of Russia be made available for its proper As a consequence of the peculiar geographical position of the country, Russia requires a larger proportion of these temporary troops than any other country. The details may be thus approximately stated: In Finland, for the garrison of the fortresses, the shore In Petersburg, Cronstadt, and the neighbourhood In the western provinces a garrison for the eight The Littoral of Lithuania In the basin of Black Sea, garrisons of the fortresses Protection of Bessarabia on side of the Danube :} 3 1 2 6 In the Caucasus, and to replace troops which would in time of war be abstracted from the Daghestan and Terio, and for the garrisons of the border fortresses and certain towns in the Musálman Trans-Caucasian districts The garrisons of the coasts of the White Sea Grand total 5 34 This total is equivalent to 400,000 men. To this General Fadejew would add, as a measure of precaution, the raising of an additional six divisions, or 80,000 men, to aid in the occupation of territory in the rear of the active army, the blockade of fortresses, &c. 'Thus would the total of troops hitherto called temporary, but really to consist of the militia of the people (or opoltschenie), amount in time of war to 480,000 men. These are the so-called resident troops, to whom the duty of holding their own country would be confided, while the active army was engaged in the front. 'It may now be said that had the last war against an European alliance been waged in 1868, it would have been necessary, with reference to the numbers at the disposal of Austria, France, Italy, Turkey, and England, to have placed 600,000 men of active troops in the army of the West; 100,000 in the army of the South, and 70,000 in the Caucasus, and on the coasts of the Black Sea and the Turkish frontier. Besides the resources above mentioned, it would probably have been expedient to occupy still more strongly the coasts of the Black Sea in rear of the army of the South, to have reserves at hand on the advance of the army of the West, and to ward off all chance of risk in the Caucasus by adding a division of active troops on the usual garrisons being withdrawn. With such additions the sum total of the active army in time of war, although a certain portion of it would not be in front, would amount to 900,000 men. To this add the 480,000 of opoltschenie, and we have a result of 1,380,000 men under arms, in addition to the regimental depôts. In the year of 1854, the army states showed much larger figures. But at that date three-fourths of the men were not really soldiers. They had been hastily brought together and were but half-organised bodies of the people who were provided by the State, cost as much as real soldiers, but who, for the want of the commonest instruction and elementary organisation, could not be led into the field.' Fadejew adds that the grouping of the active troops which has been thus illustrated, is not what would happen in an isolated case, but that it is the normal disposition of the Russian forces against an European alliance. 'Had the • Russian statesmen of 1855 struck really for victory in the Eastern War-and it must be admitted that the means for this purpose were not really wanting-four-fifths of the Impe |