France in the war lately terminated. This consideration has an extraordinary bearing on the object of the military development which will be touched on in a subsequent page.

The difficulty to be encountered by the invading armies in 1812 was, perhaps unconsciously, turned to account by the Allies who assailed Russia in 1854. The conditions of the strategical problem were, so to speak, then reversed. The Allies induced the Russians to fight out the battle in a cockpit on the Black Sea, situated at great distances from the reserves of men, materiel, and commissariat, with which the army engaged with the Allies had necessarily to be reinforced. Thus it happened that both in the transport of materiel and other supplies, and in bringing the reinforcements to the distant point, there was an enormous waste of resources of various kinds. Indeed, according to the information with which everyone was acquainted in the years immediately subsequent to the Crimean War, the loss of men by death and disease was alarming as a matter of humanity, whilst the waste in the country in excess of what was actually provided for the troops, was very feelingly described to us by many of the great proprietors whose estates had suffered both in men, horses, and the products of the land. Perhaps such causes, which fatally operated against the further prosecution of the war on the Russian side, were more potent towards compelling the Russians to sue for peace than any damage done by shot and shell in the small arena chosen for conflict by the Governments of the Allied Powers.

We cannot doubt, then, that to a certain degree the strategical conditions of the Russian Empire which consummated the ruin of Napoleon the First in 1812, militated against Russia in her contest with the Allies in the years 1854 and 1855. But since those dates things have changed in Russia. The military recovery might be delayed, but, as we have seen, the Government has never lost sight of the absolute necessity of so placing the railway communication of the country on a footing common to the other countries of Europe as to preclude the future possibility of having to contend with disadvantages resulting from the extent of the Russian dominions. If conflict again occur with an alliance directed against Russia, the Minister of War will have it in his power to push armies from one end of the empire to the other with the utmost despatch. The many reserves will thus be in immediate support of the front lines of the forces facing the enemy by means of the completed system of railways. This, then, is the great strategical change which has taken place since the Crimean War, and which is independent of the growth of her other resources and of the develop

ment of wealth. By means of this novel condition Russia has gained a new power for self-defence in the first instance and for aggression in the second, the value of which it is impossible to over-estimate. Illustration of this plain truth is needless. The experience of the great American War, and of the manner in which domestic railway communication has been turned to military account by France, Prussia, and Austria, in preparation for the act of stepping over a hostile border, gives a fair measure of the great increase of power which Russia has recently created for herself. The strategical purpose of Russia in her system of railways, part of which is completed and part in course of being laid down, is stated in detail with much clearness by Captain Brackenbury, to whose pages we invite a reference for the better understanding of the subject. The phrase has often been used that Poland, situated as she is with Russia in the rear, with Prussia on her right front, and with Austria to the south-west, forms a great bastion, which is directed against the peace of Europe. For Poland is not merely a bastion of defence, as such a work is held to be in a city which may wait for attack but which has no other purpose. Poland, on the contrary, is the military base from which the most formidable aggression may be directed, according to such policy as it suits the Government of Russia to entertain. view is held by all Russian politicians, generals, and engineers, in short, by everyone who is likely to be consulted with regard to the direction of the military forces of the empire. The celebrated Paskiewitch, whose name was venerated in Russia till the time of his death, very much as that of the Duke of Wellington among us, based his advice to the Czar Nicholas on this view. General Fadejew states the argument with regard to it more than once with much force and precision. He dismisses the notion that Turkey or the Black Sea can ever again be the theatre of a great struggle demanding the application of all the resources of Russia, as was seen in 1854 and 1855. He says, boldly, should the occasion arise of again pressing the Turkish question in the only sense in which that question has been conceived by the Russian Government since the days of Catherine the Great, that the operation against Turkey herself would be but a secondary affair. The real struggle would take place in central Europe.

This

In short, amidst the arrangements he contemplates with reference to the sea borders and the possibility of such dangers as might occur from the action of Maritime Powers, he clearly estimates the value of those Powers at something which we may perhaps measure by what has recently taken place. An

important experience was gained in the late war in the Baltic Sea. The French, with a loud flourish of trumpets, despatched a fleet for the purpose of operating, and doing such mischief as it might, against the German coasts and seaports of the Baltic. It was originally intended, before the early break down of Wissemburg and Wörth, that the French squadron should convey an army of debarkation of some 60,000 men, under the orders of the Comte de Palikao. The shipment of this force did not occur, because of the early disasters of the campaign, but the French fleet proceeded to the Baltic. As is well known, with the exception of shutting up the commerce, that fleet was able to effect nothing of substantial importance. The direction of the naval force of France has since then been somewhat hastily blamed. But it is tolerably clear that a fleet, unassisted by a very numerous army, and directed away from the general combination, where the real struggle is proceeding, cannot effect operations of a positive character against a seaboard such as that presented by Northern Germany. The isolated fleet may at great risk attack a harbour or two, engage in a duel with a fort, or cut out shipping. But such operations, while they may be pleasing to the vanity of the nation concerned, and applied by statesmen for the purpose of stimulating patriotic feeling, and maintaining warlike ardour, have no significant effect on the prosecution of a great war. Their results are almost null for the purpose of impeding the onward march of the armies which are charged with the duty of continuing the struggle on the vital point. This view was absolutely recognised in the leading military circles in Prussia, before the first shot was fired in 1870. It was, we believe, acted on in the councils of Count von Moltke when, owing to want of immediate preparation, the Germans were expecting the attack of France. Fadejew having reached similar conclusions proceeds to say that it is vain for Russia to waste large resources on the construction and maintenance of fleets. He makes no concealment of his opinion that the navy of Russia is but an artificial contrivance which, at all events under present circumstances, is little suited to the genius of her people in the prosecution of a large policy. The conditions of the Baltic Sea on the north, and of the Black Sea in the south, which since the springing up of the German power are not altogether unlike for the prohibition of Russian naval extension, afford a natural bar to the supremacy indicated by the designs of Peter the Great. Those designs have been steadily followed for a long time. Large fleets have been built and maintained; but no particular result of national power has

ensued. The Russian fleets have never added to the lustre or the prestige of Russian arms. If this has not happened hitherto, under the more favourable conditions of the Baltic on the one side, and of the Black Sea on the other in former times, a different result can hardly be expected now that Germany begins to appear on the political horizon as a naval Power. The latter is likely, at no distant date, to command the outlet of the Baltic. Turkey in the south has achieved a naval position of far greater importance than was ever known in her previous history. Had these views proceeded from an English or German critic, they might have been open to question, as issuing from a hostile source; but the pages in which we discover them, prompted as they are by the strongest desire for the development of the warlike power of Russia, and by the intention of an aggressive policy, are indeed beyond suspicion.

We have then the fact fairly before us, that the most enlightened generals and statesmen of the last generation are followed by those of the present time in considering that the vast mass of the Russian armies finds its place on the western frontier of Russia. From this the province of Poland stands forth as a great bastion of offence directed against the breast of Europe. It threatens alike Germany on the one side and Austria on the other. The consistency of policy, and the tenacity of purpose, which have characterised Russian government and administration since the days of Peter, are visible in the manner in which the theory thus stated is being executed in practice. The expenditure in support of the schemes for the strategical connexion of the provinces is without limit; this being apparent in the completion of the first-class fortresses, in addition to the railway system, which convert Poland, on an immense scale, into such a Quadrilateral as that which maintained Austria in a position of successful defiance towards Italy. For the details necessary for the full comprehension of this part of the subject, we must again refer the reader to Captain Brackenbury's pages. It may be mentioned that the Russian fortresses have received every improvement that could be suggested by the genius and experience of Todleben. Reasoning from the facts of modern gunnery, and from his own practice in the defence of Sebastopol, this distinguished engineer has applied what may perhaps be called the Todleben. system of fortification. This has been generally adopted in the fortresses of Russia. Mödlin is described by Captain Brackenbury as an ideal fortress. To use his striking language:

'It is not a fortified town but a fortress pure and simple. All the

people living in it are soldiers or those who live upon soldiers. Hence no starving families could torture a commandant with their prayers. No burghers ill-disposed to the Government could rise against the garrison. Huge, silent, and grim, Mödlin is almost untrodden by the foot of a stranger. In the ungracious exclusiveness and vast proportions, in the heterogeneous nature of her component parts, designed to threaten as well as defend, she represents not unfaithfully the heavy sullen Power of the North, which broods over Europe biding her time.'

The third point of natural power which has to be considered is the population of the country; and how far Russia may give cause of alarm to her neighbours, for reasons showing a difference under this head from other continental nations of Europe. We shall now give the cultivated Russian opinion, which must be taken quantum valeat by the reader; for our own part, we should say it is not far from the truth :

In her resources for war Russia has advantages not possessed by any country lying to the west of her frontier. There is no other great State which is not compelled to adhere by its historical conditions to some particular or exclusive military organisation. Thus England has her army dependent on voluntary enlistment. France relies alone on a standing army, Prussia on a popular militia, which has been disciplined and trained into all the conditions of an army not only capable of the defence of the country but, as has lately been seen, which is equal to the most formidable aggressive purposes. The army of Russia, on the contrary, is not tied down by its traditions or any special respect to customs or political exigency. On the contrary, no single exclusive system could suffice to meet the demands of the country. The sources of Russian national power are of such different kinds, that each requires a particular treatment for its development. It is in the combination of the numerous independent institutions, and in their proper application, that Russia can expect to obtain a full mastery over all the power to be found in her. Russia has not yet been shaken in her political wholeness and integrity. There is but one heart and one dynasty in the empire, and the heart beats in unison with the dynasty. The organisation of Russian life rests on public confidence, and requires no support from military force. The army of Russia is at present free from any connexion with police duties, the consequence being that the military organisation is entirely independent of alien considerations of a political nature. In this may be found, as compared with others, an inestimable advantage on her side. Since the emancipation of the serfs, the numbers, the organisation, and the hierarchical disposition of the standing army are determined alone by the living spirit of the mass of the Russian people, and by the statistics of her population. There is little occasion to think of careful combinations and measures of foresight with reference to the people. The whole interior portion of the empire, including four-fifths of the State, may, in case of a war, be absolutely divested of troops with the exception of the guards of the