Again :

When our divine Lord said, "Blessed are ye poor," he did not indeed bless those only who were poor in this world with external poverty. He gave this beatitude to all those, in whatsoever state they are, who are poor in spirit. It matters not what may be their outward state. They may possess in safety their wealth, their broad lands, their noble houses, their great titles, their prerogatives, royal or imperial, if only their hearts are poor before God, if they are detached from the world and detached from self. All that they possess externally will not hinder their sanctification any more than the external poverty of the poor will insure their sanctification. The richest and the noblest may be perfectly detached from this world, poor in spirit in the midst of all it heaps upon them; and, if so, their will is sanctified, and they are among the saints of God.

Let us take examples of saints who by these seven gifts renounce the world:

One held an honorable and useful office in Rome. In the midst of the Pontifical Court, with all its lawful splendor, he found the atmosphere too dangerous for him. He therefore renounced it and became a priest, and spent his whole life in charity for the salvation of souls.

You may carry a penitent will, even under the soft raiment that you wear, because your station in life demands it. Go through the world unnoticed, if you can. Those that make themselves singular in their dress or manners are seldom free from vanity. Those who make outward show of their austerities or their penances are the least likely to persevere, because singularity generates self-consciousness, and self-consciousness generates pride. Secret privations, secret sacrifices of your own will, which will never be known until all things are revealed, are surer instruments of perfection than chains and shirts of hair.

To sum up, we heartily admire Cardinal Manning's geniality and intellectuality. We may not go to hear him preach ourselves; but, if he were in this country, we have no doubt we should. The Catholic Church is to be warmly congratulated on having such a brilliant and able preacher and writer, and the world on having such an active and earnest citizen.

JULIA R. ANAGNOS.

HERBERT SPENCER'S THEORY OF MORALS.

In the preface to his Data of Ethics, Mr. Herbert Spencer says, "Now that moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the secularization of morals is becoming imperative." That is, I suppose, since religious faith is darkened in the hearts of so many in our time, and people are becoming sceptical as to the ultimate authority of their moral intuitions, it is very necessary that they should be made to see what right and wrong are in themselves, and what sufficient reason there is for right conduct.

Mr. Spencer's theory is contained at least in outline in his Data of Ethics, and claims to establish the meaning of right and wrong in such a way that no reasonable man can deny its truth, and at the same time to show how every other theory is either hopelessly astray or else a half-way house to his completer theory.

It appears to me, however, that the new theory, or perhaps I ought to say the new presentment of a very old theory, misses the very essence of morality, and, so far from correctly interpreting the phenomena of our moral consciousness, reduces them by mistaken analysis to unmoral. elements, and so explains them away.

It is not that the result of following this theory would be necessarily at all disastrous to a man of generous nature and already thoroughly imbued with high moral ideas; for the substance of the resultant teaching in practical morals is quite unexceptionable: there are few men who would uphold so lofty a moral ideal as Mr. Spencer. But the reason that is given for an action explanation of the meaning of its manner in which we come to quality of conduct, are by no the evolution of morality had depended entirely on the conditions which Mr. Spencer indicates, I am inclined to think that there would have been no morals to explain. The grounds of his opinion I will now attempt to show.

being right, and the rightness and of the feeling of the moral means so satisfactory. If

the

The key-note of the theory is found in the following statements: "Taking into account immediate and remote effects on all persons, the good is universally the pleasurable (Data of Ethics, p. 30). "Conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful” (Ib., p. 28). When we speak, therefore, of good and bad conduct, we mean simply this: that it is conduct which is or is not conducive to the happiness of ourselves and other people. This conclusion is arrived at by a process of reasoning which starts from the conception of life as a development of functions becoming constantly more and more complex. Pleasurable feeling accompanies the perfect fulfilment of any function, and intensifying life tends to develop it further; and, as the end of evolution is plainly the development of the most complete and complex forms of life possible and pleasurable feeling in one form or another is what all men desire, whatever results in happiness and the consequent furtherance of life, or whatever results in the completer fulfilment of the functions of life and the consequent happiness, is good. It is true we only speak of moral good in connection with the conduct of responsible human beings, but nevertheless that conduct is not different in kind, but only in degree from the very simplest motion of animal life, in which there can be no thought of purpose in the agent. So that, when we speak of the moral quality of an action, it does not indicate anything unique, which gives the act an altogether different meaning from that of any act which is not moral. Since the agent has now entered into a new sphere of life with different aims, it is merely a different name we give to the more complex conduct which has become necessary for the attainment of the same perfection of function and the same resultant happiness, owing to our having come to live together in society and in some way having become responsible for our conduct.

It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that we as responsible human beings can have any other ultimate aim in life than the other animals. Any ideal standard of rectitude, which we may imagine to be the real aim of our life, on

analysis proves to be only a means to the great end of pleasurable feeling. If there was not this in the background as the insured reward, no one would care for morality. Righteousness in itself is nothing: it is merely the most convenient disposition of our conduct for the securing of happiness; and what we imagine to be a sense of obligation to obey an ideal law is merely the necessity of new circumstances, which determine our search for happiness in a new direction. There has been much mistaken passion spent in allegiance to the moral ideal, much unnecessary pain in the presence of failure to be true to that ideal; for sin is only an unfortunate mistake! It was foolish of the man to forego a much better chance of happiness for a worse. If he had been wiser and had understood his interest better, it would not have happened! And, after all, it is rather unbecoming to speak in such lofty terms of righteousness and self-sacrifice and holiness of life; for they are nothing so very grand, but only a most prudent speculation, which will secure the largest returns in happiness at last!

That this really represents Mr. Spencer's mind with reference to these things, I do not for a moment suppose; but it seems to me the logical outcome of the theory: nothing else can rightly be deduced from the given data. Unless it is acknowledged that in our responsible human life we recognize the presence of a law of duty, which would have us give ourselves to the service of righteousness for its own sake and for no ulterior reason whatsoever; unless it is acknowledged that in right conduct there is a distinct quality, which is not merely an implicit insurance of pleasurable feeling, but is due to the fact that we have consciously acted up to the highest standard of excellence that has been revealed to us, and thus are obeying the solemn monitor within, it seems vain to speak of virtue; and, in all ordinary moral language implying obligation and praise and blame, we are under a delusion, and are using beautiful and solemn words for what are, after all, rather ignoble things.

We find it stated by some philosophers who deny any in

tuitive moral insight to man that the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or, according to others, the principle of universal justice, must be the aim of conduct, and the standard by which it is to be judged. Such phrases must be understood in one of two ways. They either mean that we recognize the right of every man to as complete a life as possible and all the happiness he can get, so that every individual is bound to have some regard for the welfare of others, not for his own sake, but for theirs. In which case, contrary to the theory, there is assumed a sentiment of justice; that is, a certain moral insight in man. Or else they mean that it has been found by experience that the individual cannot get the most happiness out of life by caring only for himself; and is obliged in his own interest to check his immediate desires and help others to their gratifications, so as to insure his own ultimate profit: in which case, the supposed altruism which poses as a noble moral quality is only selfishness in disguise. And in a system which starts from the principle that the morally good is the pleasurable, and from this fundamental thought seeks to build up a system of morality, there seems no choice but to conclude that every altruistic principle mentioned is only so much egoism in borrowed plumes. If you start with nothing but pains and pleasures as the things to be shunned and aimed at in life, nothing else can be got out of them. Compound them in the most complex fashion, disguise them as you will, let men conceal their real motives from one another and even from themselves, and give them new and deceptive names, life is still only a great struggle on the part of every individual to get as much pleasurable feeling for himself as possible. A man may seem to care for others; but it is only because their pleasure gives him pleasure, and what he really cares for is his own pleasure in them. There can be no genuine self-forgetfulness and no true submission to a constraining law of righteousness, such as are the fruits of real moral life. For that, a new influence must make itself felt in the hearts of men.

If, therefore, I treat the language of Mr. Spencer's theory