civilization, and a continued association* with out an associating tie, prove any thing else than their own extravagance; and by the prodigious difficulty and delay which even they attach to the invention of speech, whether they do not give strong confirmation to the Mosaic account, which describes man as destined for the immediate enjoyment of society, and consequently instructed in the art of speech; it is for the reader to judge.

Other writers again, Condillac, (in his Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge) Batteaux, (in his Principles of Literature) and

* Dr. Blair, in his Lectures on Rhetoric, (vol. i. p. 71.) makes the following just and apposite observations.--" One would think, that in order to any language fixing and extending itself, men must have been previously gathered toge ther in considerable numbers: society must have been already far advanced and yet, on the other hand, there seems to have been an absolute necessity for speech, previous to the formation of society. For, by what bond could any mul titude of men be kept together, or be made to join in the prosecution of any common interest, until once, by the intervention of speech, they could communicate their wants and intentions to each other? So that, either how society, could form itself, previously to language, or how words. could rise into a language, previously to society formed, seem to be points attended with equal difficulty. And when we consider, &c. difficulties encrease so much upon us on all hands, that there seems to be no small reason for refer ring the first origin of all language to divine teaching or inspiration."

Gebelin, (in his Monde Primitif,) maintain, that man is not by nature the mutum pecus he is represented by the Scotch philosopher: but that sounds, either excited by passions, or produced by imitation, would necessarily be formed, so as to constitute an inarticulate language; which would ultimately suggest the idea, and supply the elements of more perfect speech. The transition however from the simple sound to the diversified articulation, is still a wide chasm in each of these solutions. And whilst the range of the passions seems on the one hand to present a limit, which the powers of communication, derived from that source, cannot be conceived to transcend: the various sounds and motions in nature must, on the other, be admitted to exhaust the models, which alone could draw forth the imitative powers of the human voice. So that according to these theories, single tones, or cries, either excited by some passion ar formed in imitation of some natural sound, must in all just reasoning fill up the measure of human language. It is not easy then to discover any advantage possessed by these theories, over that of Lord Monboddo, and the antient Epicurean Philosophers. The latter but represent the human kind originally placed in the condition of Brutes; the former seem careful to provide that it should never rise above that condition.

1

As it may be matter of curiosity, to know in what manner these writers endeavour to explain the transition from mere vocal sounds to articulate speech, it may be proper to subjoin here a specimen taken from one of them, by no means the least distinguished in the literary world, the Abbé De Condillac. He admits the operation to be extremely tedious, for that "the organ of speech (in grown persons) for want of early use would be so inflexible that it could not articulate any other than a few simple sounds and the obstacles which prevented them from pronounc ing others, would prevent them from suspecting that the voice was susceptible of any further variation." Now it may be fairly asked, would not these obstacles for ever prevent any articulations, or even sounds, beyond those which the passions might excite, or other sounds suggest? How is this difficulty, which has been fairly admitted by the author, to be removed? He shall answer for himself. The child, from the pliancy of its vocal organs, being freed from the obstruc tions which incapacitated the parent, will accidentally fall upon new articulations in the endeavour to communicate its desire for a particular object; the parent will endeavour to imitate this sound, and affix it as a name to the object, for the purpose of communicating with the child: and thus by repeated enlargements of articulation in

successive generations, language would at length be produced.*

Such is the solution of the origin of language which human philosophy presents; sending us to

* It should be remarked, that were even all that is here contended for admitted to be practicable, language in the true sense of the word is not yet attained. The power of designa ting an individual object by an appropriate articulation, is a necessary step in the formation of language, but very far removed indeed from its consummation. Without the use of general signs, the speech of man would differ little from that of brutes: and the transition to the general term from the name of the individual is a difficulty which remains still to be surmounted. Condillac, indeed, proposes to shew, how this transition may be made, in the natural course of things. "Un enfant appelle du nom d'Arbre le premier arbre que nous lui montrons. Un second arbre qu'il voit ensuite lui rappelle la même idée; il lui donne le même nom; de même à un troisième, à un quatrième, et voilà le mot d'Arbre donné d'abord à un individu, qui devient pour lui un nom de classe ou de genre, une idée abstraite qui comprend tous les arbres en général." In like manner Adam Smith, in his Dissertation on the Origin of Languages, and Mr. Dugald Stewart, in his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, endeavour to explain this process, representing those words which were originally used as the proper names of individuals, to be successively transferred to other individuals, until at length each of them became insensibly the common name of a multitude. This however is more ingenious than solid. The name given to an individual, being intended exclusively to designate that individual, it is a direct subver sion of its very nature and design, to apply it to any other individual, known to be different from the former. child, it is true, may give the name of father to an individual

The

the accidental babble of infancy, for the origina tion of that which it confesses must exceed the power of the imagination to invent, and of the organs of the man to accomplish: inverting the

be

like to the person it has been taught to call by that name: but this is from mistake, not from design; from a confusion of the two as the same person, and not from a perception of resemblance between them whilst known to be different. truth, they whose thoughts are occupied solely about individual objects must be the most careful to distinguish them from each other; and, accordingly, the child will most peremptorily retract the appellation of father, so soon as the distinctness is observed. The object with those, whose terms or signs refer only to individuals, must naturally be to take care, that, every such term or sign shall be applied to its appropriate individual, and to none else. Resemblance can produce no other effect, than to enforce a greater caution in the application, of the individual names, and therefore has no natural tendency to lead the mind to the use of general terms. It may thought, indeed, that the idea of number, attaching to individuals of a similar appearance, might naturally lead to some general designation, whereby the aggregate of those individuals might be marked out. But it should be recollected, that the very notion of number, which seems one of the commonest and most familiar to the mind, does itself presuppose a class, since objects cannot be enumerated unless previously referred to some one genus or class, or, which is the same thing, unless: they are previously expressed by some common sign. Since, then, mere resemblance will not lead to the use of general terms; and since the notion of number actually presupposes the existence of general terms; it follows, that the transition from proper names to general terms cannot be accounted for. in the way, in which these writers have endeavoured to explain it.