to conceive any other origin of language, than divine institution. Whitby considers this so com pletely evident, that he thinks it forms in itself

and intermediate one, that of the Conceptualists, so called' from their distinguishing tenet, that the mind has the power of forming general conceptions by abstraction: This sect is represented by Brucker, as a modification of that of the Nominalists. "Nominales, deserta paulo Abelardi hypothesi, universalia in notionibus, atque conceptibus mentis, ex rebus singularibus abstractione formatis, consistere statuebant; ande Conceptuales dicti sunt." Hist. Phil. vol. iii. p. 908.With this sect Mr. Locke is ranked by Dr. Reid, (Essays on the Intell. Powers, vol. ii. p. 146.) and in the justness of this allotment, Mr. Dugald Stewart acquiesces: at the same time he observes, that, from the inaccuracy and inconsis→ tency of Mr. Locke's language, there is no small difficulty in assigning to him his true place; or rather, indeed, in de termining, whether he had any decided opinion on the question in dispute. (Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, pp. 191, 192.) It, certainly, cannot be contended, that Locke has conveyed his meaning upon this sub ject, with clearness, or consistency; yet no doubt can possibly exist, as to the class, to which he properly be lòngs. His placing the essences of the species altogether in the abstract ideas formed by the mind, indisputably deter mines him to the standard of the Conceptualist; notwith standing that the incompatibility of the elements of his abstract idea, (Essay, B. ii. ch. xi. §. 9. and B. iv. ch. vii. §. 9.) and the admitted necessity of the name, to bestow upon the idea its unity, that is, in other words, its existence as an idea, (Essay, B. iii. ch. v. §. 10.) mark the indistinctness of his views upon this subject; and ought, if he had examined his own notions consequentially, to have led him to adopt the party of the Nominalist.

1

a clear demonstration, that the original of mankind was as Moses delivered it, from the impossibility of giving any other tolerable account of

From what has been said, it appears, upon the whole, that the Nominalist and the Conceptualist, whilst they concur in rejecting the notion of the Realist, "that Universals be long to things, and that general terms denote certain genera and species established in nature by appropriate essences,"→→→ at the same time differ from each other, essentially, in this; that whilst the one attributes universality solely to terms, and the other to certain abstract ideas expressed by those terms, the latter admits the possibility of reasoning on general sub jects without the mediation of language, and the former maintains the indispensable necessity of language, as the in strument of thought in all general speculations.

If, with Bishop Berkeley, we are obliged to deny the pos gible existence of an abstract idea, there can be no difficulty in determining, to which of these two opinions we must yield our assent. In the sign alone, and in its potential applica. tion to a class of individual objects, is universality to be found; and consequently by language only, (meaning by this, the use of signs at large,) can we conduct our reasonings one single step beyond the individual object. There is, upon this subject, an excellent remark made by an elegant and perspicuous writer, which I cannot forbear transcribing. "Whether it might not have been possible for the Deity to have so formed us, that we might have been capable of rea soning concerning classes of objects, without the use of signs, I shall not take upon me to determine. But this we may venture to affirm with confidence, that man is not such a being."" It would be vain for us, in enquiries of this ffature, to indulge ourselves in speculating about possibilities. It is of more consequence to remark the advantages, which we derive from our actual constitution; and which, in the

Dr.:

the origin of language. (Sermons on the Attriba vol. ii. p. 29.) Bishop Williams, in his 2d Sermon, (Boyle Lect. vol. i. p. 167.) affirms, that though Adam had a capacity and organs admirably contrived for speech, yet in his case there was a necessity of his being immediately instructed by God, because it was impossible he should have invented speech, and words to be spoken so soon as his necessities required. Beattie endeavours to prove the human invention of language to be impossible. (Theory of Lang. 8vo. p. 101.) And Doctor Johnson is so decidedly of this opinion, that he holds inspiration. to be necessary to inform man that he has the faculty of speech, " which I think, says he, he could no more find out without inspiration, than cows or hogs would think of such a faculty." Mr. Wollaston contends, (Relig. of Nat. pp., 122, 123.) that language is the indispensable instrument* of thought: and even Herder, who

present instance, appear to me to be important and admi rable: inasmuch as it fits mankind for an easy interchange, of their intellectual acquisitions; by imposing on them the necessity of employing, in their solitary speculations, the same instrument of thought, which forms the established me dium of their communications with each other."-See p. 190, of Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, by Dugald Stewart.

* In the preceding note, the necessity of language, as the instrument of thought and reasoning, was particularly adverted to. In the judgment of many profound thinkers that neces

has laboured to prove language not to have been of divine appointment, admits that without it reason cannot be used by man.

sity is recognized. Lavoisier, in the preface to his Elements of Chemistry, expresses his coincidence in the maxim of Condillac, that "we think only through the medium of words:" and that "the art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged." (Kerr's translation, p. xiv.) Plato describes thinking as conducted by mental speech, T διανοείσθαι λόγον, ον αυτή προς εαυτην η ψυχή διεξέρχεται: and in the philosophy of the Greeks, reason and words are denomi nated by one and the same term λoyos.-Now, if this be just; if language be, in truth, the indispensable instrument of reasoning; is it too much to affirm, that language could not have been discovered by reasoning; or, in other words, that the operations of reasoning could not have effected that, by which alone its operations are conducted?

According to the Conceptualist indeed, who holds that the mind can contemplate its own ideas independently of words, the invention of language by the exertion of thought, is by no means inconceivable; since, on this hypothesis, reasoning may precede language, and therefore may minister to its discovery. And yet, when considered somewhat closely, it may not per. haps appear a very easy matter to imagine the practicability of such a process.

Reasoning, it is manifest, can be conducted only by própo sitions, or affirmations, either verbal or mental. A proposi tion, affirming of any individual thing, that it is itself, or that it is not another, is, (could we even suppose the mind in its first stage of thinking capable of forming such a proposition,) not to be ranked amongst the class of affirmations which belong to reasoning. The power of distinguishing individual objects pertains to the faculty of perception, and is necessary to reasoning, but can form no part of it. Nothing individual,

Now, if language be necessary to the exercise of reason, it clearly cannot have been the result of human excogitation: or, as it is put by Dr.

then, being an attribute, every affirmation, which can make a part of reasoning, demands the existence of a general sign. The formation of general signs must therefore precede all affirmation, and consequently every exercise of the reasoning faculty. The Conceptualist, who asserts, that general signs are supplied by the general ideas with which abstraction furnishes the mind, must of course contend, that the exercise of the power of abstraction must be antecedent to every act of reasoning, Now, in the first place, it cannot but be deemed extraordinary, that the very faculty, which is pro nounced to be the distinguishing characteristic of the rational species, should be called into action previous to the exercise of reason. If such a faculty can be exerted before the use of reason, why not exerted without it? And, in that case, why should not the tribes of irrational animals, whose perceptions of individual objects may be as distinct as those in the minds of men, pass from those individual perceptions to universal ideas, if such transition can be made without the exercise of reason?—But again, not to dwell upon this consideration, (since it may be pretended that it is abstraction itself which in its consequence produces rationality,) if we enquire, what it is, that can put an unreasoning mind upon this process of abstraction; a process, allowed by all to be difficult, and represented by some in such a light as makes it appear to embrace contradictions; it will not be very easy to give an answer. In contemplating things by classes, it is true, we both expedite the acquisition of knowledge, and facilitate its communication. But can these ends act upon a mind, which has not yet begun to reason? Can the anticipations of know ledge become a motive, where it has not yet been learned, what knowledge is; or can the desire of communication