the realni be grown too strong, England, Scotland, and Ireland are at the stake. Neither doth it concern the state only, but our church other kings, Papists, content themselves to maintain their religion, in their own dominions; but the kings of Spain run a course to make themselves protectors of the Popish religion, even amongst the subjects of other kings: almost like the Ottomans, that profess to plant the law of Mahomet by the sword; and so the Spaniards do of the pope's law. And, therefore, if either the king's blood, or our blood, or Christ's blood be dear unto us, the quarrel is just, and to be embraced. of the gentleness of Spain, which suffered us to go and come without any dispute. And for the latter, of Cales, it ended in victory; we ravished a principal city of wealth and strength in the high countries, sacked it, fired the Indian fleet that was in the port, and came home in triumph; and yet to this day were never put in suit for it, nor demanded reasons for our doings. You ought not to forgot the battle of Kinsale in Ireland, what time the Spanish forces were joined with the Irish, good soldiers as themselves, or better, and exceeded us far in number, and yet they were soon defeated, and their general D'Avila taken prisoner, and that war by that battle quenched and ended. For the point of sufficient forces, the balancing of the forces of these kingdoms and their allies, And it is worthy to be noted how much our with Spain and their allies, you know to be a power in those days was inferior to our present matter of great and weighty consideration; but state. Then, a lady old, and owner only of Engyet to weigh them in a common understanding, land, entangled with the revolt of Ireland, and her for your part, you are of opinion that Spain is no confederates of Holland much weaker, and in no such giant; or if he be a giant, it will be but like conjuncture. Now, a famous king, and strengthGoliath and David, for God will be on our side.ened with a prince of singular expectation, and in But to leave these spiritual considerations: you the prime of his years, owner of the entire isle of do not see in true discourse of peace and war, that we ought to doubt to be overmatched. To this opinion you are led by two things which lead all men; by experience, and by reason. For experience; you do not find that for this age, take it for 100 years, there was ever any encounter between Spanish and English of importance, either by sea or land, but the English came off with the honour; witness the Lammas day, the retreat of Gaunt, the battle of Newport, and some others: but there have been some actions, both by sea and land, so memorable as scarce suffer the less to be spoken of. By sea, that of eighty-eight, when the Spaniards, putting themselves most upon their stirrups, sent forth that invincible armada which should have swallowed up England quick; the success whereof was, that although that fleet swam like mountains upon our seas, yet they did not so much as take a cock-boat of ours at sea, nor fire a cottage at land, but came through our channel, and were driven, as Sir Walter Raleigh says, by squibs, fire-boats he means, from Calais, and were soundly beaten by our ships in fight, and many of them sunk, and finally durst not return the way they came, but made a scattered perambulation, full of shipwrecks, by the Irish and Scottish seas to get home again; just according to the curse of the Scriptures, "that they came out against us one way, and fled before us seven ways." By land, who can forget the two voyages made upon the continent itself of Spain, that of Lisbon, and that of Cales, when in the former we knocked at the gates of the greatest city either of Spain or Portugal, and came off without seeing an enemy to look us in the face. And though we failed in our foundation, for that Antonio, whom we thought to replace in his kingdom, found no party at all, yet it was a true trial Britain, enjoying Ireland populate and quiet, and infinitely more supported by confederates of the Low Countries, Denmark, divers of the princes of Germany, and others. As for the comparison of Spain as it was then, and as it is now, you will for good respects forbear to speak; only you will say this, that Spain was then reputed to have the wisest council of Europe, and not a council that will come at the whistle of a favourite. Another point of experience you would not speak of, if it were not that there is a wonderful erroneous observation, which walketh about, contrary to all the true account of time; and it is, that the Spaniard, where he once gets in, will seldom or never be got out again; and they give it an illfavoured simile, which you will not name, but nothing is less true: they got footing at Brest, and some other parts in Britain, and quitted it: they had Calais, Ardes, Amiens, and were part beaten out, and part they rendered: they had Vercelles in Savoy, and fairly left it: they had the other day the Valtoline, and now have put it in deposit. What they will do at Ormus we shall see. So that, to speak truly of latter times, they have rather poached and offered at a number of enterprises, than maintained any constantly. And for Germany, in more ancient time, their great Emperor Charles, after he had Germany almost in his fist, was forced in the end to go from Isburgh, as it were in a mask by torch-light, and to quit every foot of his new acquests in Germany, which you hope likewise will be the hereditary issue of this late purchase of the Palatinate. And thus much for experience. For reason: it hath many branches; you will but extract a few first. It is a nation thin sown of men, partly by reason of the sterility of their soil, and partly because their natives are exhaust by so many employments in such vast territories | causes of poverty and consumption. The nature as they possess, so that it hath been counted a of this war, you are persuaded, will be matter) kind of miracle to see together ten or twelve thousand native Spaniards in an army. And although they have at this time great numbers of miscellany soldiers in their armies and garrisons, yet, if there should be the misfortune of a battle, they are ever long about it to draw on supplies. They tell a tale of a Spanish ambassador that was brought to see their treasury of St. Mark at Venice, and still he looked down to the ground; and being asked the reason, said, "he was looking to see whether the treasure had any root, so that, if that were spent, it would grow again; as his master's had." But, howsoever it be of their treasure, certainly their forces have scarcely any root, or at least such a root as putteth forth very poorly and slowly; whereas, there is not in the world again such a spring and seminary of military people as is England, Scotland, and Ireland; nor of seamen as is this island and the Low Countries: so as if the wars should mow them down, yet they suddenly may be supplied and come up again. A second reason is, and it is the principal, that if we truly consider the greatness of Spain, it consisteth chiefly in their treasure, and their treasure in their Indies, and their Indies, both of them, is but an accession to such as are masters by sea; so as this axle-tree, whereupon their greatness turns, is soon cut a-two by any that shall be stronger than they at sea. So then you report yourself to their opinions, and the opinions of all men, enemies or whosoever; whether that the maritime forces of Britain and the Low Countries are not able to beat them at sea. For if that be, you see the chain is broken from shipping to Indies, from Indies to treasure, and from treasure to greatness. of restorative and enriching; so that, if we go roundly on with supplies and provisions at the first, the war in continuance will find itself. That you do but point at this, and will not enlarge it. Lastly, That it is not a little to be considered, that the greatness of Spain is not only distracted extremely, and therefore of less force; but built upon no very sound foundations, and therefore they have the less strength by any assured and confident confederacy. With France they are in competition for Navarre, Milan, Naples, and the Franche County of Burgundy; with the see of Rome, for Naples also; for Portugal, with the right heirs of that line; for that they have in their Low Countries, with the United Provinces; for Ormus, now, with Persia; for Valencia, with the Moors expulsed and their confederates; for the East and West Indies, with all the world. So that, if every bird had his feather, Spain would be left wonderful naked. But yet there is a greater confederation against them than by means of any of these quarrels or titles; and that is contracted by the fear that almost all nations have of their ambition, whereof men see no end. And thus much for balancing of their forces. For the last point, which is the choice of the designs and enterprises, in which to conduct the war; you will not now speak, because you should be forced to descend to divers particulars, whereof some are of a more open, and some of a more secret nature. But that you would move the House to make a selected committee for that purpose; not to estrange the House in any sort, but to prepare things for them, giving them power and commission to call before them, and to confer with any martial men or others that are not of the House, that they The third reason, which hath some affinity shall think fit, for their advice and information: with this second, is a point comfortable to hear in and so to give an account of the business to a the state that we now are: wars are generally general committee of the whole House. CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING A WAR WITH SPAIN. INSCRIBED TO PRINCE CHARLES, ANNO MDCXXIV. YOUR highness hath an imperial name. It was a | if the king shall enter into it, is a mighty work: Charles that brought the empire first into France; it requireth strong materials, and active motions. a Charles that brought it first into Spain; why He that saith not so, is zealous, but not according should not Great Britain have its turn? But to lay to knowledge. But, nevertheless, Spain is no such aside all that may seem to have a show of fumes giant, and he that thinketh Spain to be some and fancies, and to speak solids: a war with Spain, great overmatch for this estate, assisted as it is VOL. II.-26 and may be, is no good mintman; but takes | positively and resolutely; that it is impossible an greatness of kingdoms according to their bulk and elective monarchy should be so free and absolute currency, and not after their intrinsic value. as an hereditary; no more than it is possible for Although, therefore, I had wholly sequestered my a father to have so full power and interest in an thoughts from civil affairs, yet, because it is a new adoptive son as in a natural; "quia naturalis obcase, and concerneth my country infinitely, I ob- ligatio fortior civili." And again, that received tained of myself to set down, out of long con- maxim is almost unshaken and infallible; "Nil tinued experience in business of estate, and much magis naturæ consentaneum est, quam ut iisdem conversation in books of policy and history, what modis res dissolvantur, quibus constituuntur." I thought pertinent to this business; and in all So that if the part of the people or estate be somehumbleness present it to your highness: hoping what in the election, you cannot make them nulls that at least you will discern the strength of my or ciphers in the privation or translation. And if affection through the weakness of my abilities: it be said, that this is a dangerous opinion for the for the Spaniard hath a good proverb, "De suario pope, emperor, and elective kings; it is true, it is si empre con la calentura;" there is no heat of a dangerous opinion, and ought to be a dangerous affection, but is joined with some idleness of brain. opinion, to such personal popes, emperors, or To a war are required, a just quarrel; sufficient elective kings, as shall transcend their limits, and forces and provisions; and a prudent choice of become tyrannical. But it is a safe and sound the designs. So, then, I will first justify the quar- opinion for their sees, empires, and kingdoms; rel; secondly, balance the forces; and lastly, and for themselves also, if they be wise; "plenipropound variety of designs for choice, but not tudo potestatis est plenitudo tempestatis." But advise the choice; for that were not fit for a the chief cause why I do not search into this writing of this nature; neither is it a subject point is, because I need it not. And in handling within the level of my judgment; I being, in the right of a war, I am not willing to intermix effect, a stranger to the present occurrences. matter doubtful with that which is out of doubt. For as in capital causes, wherein but one man's life is in question, "in favorem vitæ❞ the evidence ought to be clear; so much more in a judgment upon a war, which is capital to thousands.. I suppose therefore the worst, that the offensive war upon Bohemia had been unjust; and then make the case, which is no sooner made than resolved; if it be made not enwrapped, but plainly and perspicuously. It is this " in thesi." An offensive war is made, which is unjust in the aggressor; the prosecution and race of the war carrieth the defendant to assail and invade the ancient and indubitate patrimony of the first aggressor, who is now turned defendant; shall he sit down and not put himself in defence? Or if he be dispossessed, shall he not make a war for the recovery? No man is so poor of judgment as will affirm it. The castle of Cadmus was taken, and the city of Thebes itself invested by Phoebidas the Lacedæmonian, insidiously, and in violation of league: the process of this action drew on a re-surprise of the castle by the Thebans, a recovery of the town, and a current of the war even unto the walls of Sparta. I demand, was the defence of the city of Sparta, and the expulsion of the Thebans out of the Laconian territories, unjust? The sharing of that part of the duchy of Milan, which lieth upon the river of Adda, by the Venetians, upon contract with the French, was an ambitious and unjust purchase. This wheel set on going, did pour a war upon the Venetians with such a tempest, as Padua and Trevigi were taken from them, and all their dominions upon the continent of Italy abandoned, and they confined within the salt waters. Will any man say, that the memorable recovery and defence of Padua, when the gentle Wars, I speak not of ambitious predatory wars, are suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's justice, where there are no superiors on earth to determine the cause: and they are, as civil pleas are, plaints, or defences. There are therefore three just grounds of war with Spain: one plaint, two upon defence. Solomon saith, "A cord of three is not easily broken:" but especially when every of the lines would hold single by itself. They are these: the recovery of the Palatinate; a just fear of the subversion of our civil estate; a just fear of the subversion of our church and religion. For, in the handling of the two last grounds of war, I shall make it plain, that wars preventive upon just fears are true defensives, as well as upon actual invasions: and again, that wars defensive for religion, I speak not of rebellion, are most just though offensive wars for religion are seldom to be approved, or never, unless they have some mixture of civil titles. But all that I shall say in this whole argument, will be but like bottoms of thread close wound up, which, with a good needle, perhaps, may be flourished into large works. For the asserting of the justice of the quarrel, for the recovery of the Palatinate, I shall not go so high as to discuss the right of the war of Bohemia; which if it be freed from doubt on our part, then there is no colour nor shadow why the Palatinate should be retained; the ravishing whereof was a mere excursion of the first wrong, and a super injustice. But I do not take myself to be so perfect in the customs, transactions, and privileges of that kingdom of Bohemia, as to be fit to handle that part: and I will not offer at that I cannot master. Yet this I will say, in passage, verified by a number of examples; that whatso- men of Venice, unused to the wars, out of the Thus much for the first ground of war with Spain, being in the nature of a plaint for the recovery of the Palatinate: omitting here that which might be the seed of a larger discourse, and is To proceed therefore to the second ground of a war with Spain, we have set it down to be, a just fear of the subversion of our civil estate. So, then, the war is not for the Palatinate only, but for England, Scotland, Ireland, our king, our prince, our nation, all that we have. Wherein two things are to be proved: The one, that a just fear, without an actual invasion or offence, is a sufficient ground of a war, and in the nature of a true defensive: the other, that we have towards Spain cause of just fear; I say, just fear: for as the civilians do well define, that the legal fear is "justus metus qui cadit in constantem virum" in private causes: so there is "justus metus qui cadit in constantem senatum, in causa publica;" not out of umbrages, light jealousies, apprehensions afar off, but out of clear foresight of imminent danger. were but specious and popular. "Verissimam pest: "Ut barbari pugiles dimicare solent, ita vos bellum geritis cum Philippo: ex his enim is, qui ictus est, ictui semper inhæret; quod si eum alibi verberes, illo manus transfert; ictum autem depellere, aut prospicere, neque scit neque vult." "As country fellows use to do when they play at wasters, such a kind of war do you, Athenians, make with Philip; for with them he that gets a passed; and if you strike him in another place, thither goes his hand likewise: but to put by, or foresee a blow, they neither have the skill, nor the will." Clinias the Candian, in Plato, speaks desperately and wildly, as if there were no such thing as peace between nations; but that every nation expects but his advantage to war upon another. But yet in that excess of speech there is thus much that may have a civil construction; namely, that every state ought to stand upon its guard, and rather prevent than be prevented. His words are, "Quam rem fere vocant pacem, nudum et inane nomen est; revera autem omnibus, adversus omnes civitates, bellum sempiternum perdurat." "That which men for the most part call peace, is but a naked and empty name; but the truth is, that there is ever between all estates a secret war." I know well this speech is the objection and not the decision, and that it is after refuted; but yet, as I said before, it bears thus much of truth, that if that general malignity, and predisposition to war, which he untruly figureth to be in all nations, be produced and extended to a just fear of being oppressed, then it is no more a true peace, but a name of a peace. being grown great, to the terror of the Lacedæ- | fencing-school, that never ward till the blow be monians, did impose upon them a necessity of a war: but the causes that went abroad in speech were these, &c." Sulpitius Galba, consul, when he persuaded the Romans to a preventive war, with the later Philip, King of Macedon, in regard of the great preparations which Philip had then on foot, and his designs to ruin some of the confederates of the Romans, confidently saith, that they who took that for an offensive war, un-blow straight falleth to ward, when the blow is derstood not the state of the question. "Ignorare videmini mihi, Quirites, non, utrum bellum an pacem habeatis, vos consuli, neque enim liberum id vobis permittet Philippus, qui terra marique ingens bellum molitur, sed utrum in Macedoniam legiones transportetis, an hostem in Italiam recipiatis." "Ye seem to me, ye Romans, not to understand, that the consultation before you is not, whether you shall have war or peace, for Philip will take order you shall be no choosers, who prepareth a mighty war both by land and sea, but whether you shall transport the war into Macedon, or receive it into Italy." Antiochus, when he incited Prusias, King of Bithynia, at that time in league with the Romans, to join with him in war against them, setteth before him a just fear of the overspreading greatness of the Romans comparing it to a fire that continually took, and spread from kingdom to kingdom: "Venire Romanos ad omnia regna tollenda, ut nullum usquam orbis terrarum nisi Romanum imperium esset; Philippum et Nabin expugnatos, se tertium peti; ut quisque proximus ab oppresso sit, per omnes velut continens incendium pervasurum:" "That the Romans came to pull down all kingdoms, and to make the state of Rome a universal monarchy; that Philip and Nabis were already ruinated, and now was his turn to be assailed; so that, as every state lay next to the other that was oppressed, so the fire perpetually grazed." Wherein it is well to be noted, that towards ambitious states, which are noted to aspire to great monarchies, and to seek upon all occasions to enlarge their dominions, "crescunt argumenta justi metus;" all particular fears do grow and multiply out of the contemplation of the general courses and practice of such states. Therefore, in deliberations of war against the Turk, it hath been often, with great judgment, maintained, that Christian princes and states have always a sufficient ground of invasive war against the enemy; not for cause of religion, but upon a just fear; forasmuch as it is a fundamental law in the Turkish empire, that they may, without any other provocation, make war upon Christendom for the propagation of their law; so that there lieth upon the Christians a perpetual fear of a war, hanging over their heads, from them; and therefore they may at all times, as they think good, be upon the prevention. Demosthenes exposeth to scorn wars which are not preventive, comparing those that make them to country fellows in a As for the opinion of Iphicrates the Athenian, it demands not so much towards a war as a just fear, but rather cometh near the opinion of Clinias; as if there were ever amongst nations a brooding of a war, and that there is no sure league but impuissance to do hurt. For he, in the treaty of peace with the Lacedæmonians, speaketh plain language; telling them, there could be no true and secure peace, except the Lacedæmonians yielded to those things, which being granted, it would be no longer in their power to hurt the Athenians, though they would: and to say truth, if one mark it well, this was in all memory the main piece of wisdom, in strong and prudent counsels, to be in perpetual watch, that the states about them should neither by approach, nor by increase of dominion, nor by ruining confederates, nor by blocking of trade, nor by any the like means, have it in their power to hurt or annoy the states they serve; and whensoever any such cause did but appear, straightways to buy it out with a war, and never take up peace at credit and upon interest. It is so memorable, as it is yet as fresh as if it were done yesterday, how that triumvirate of kings, Henry the Eighth of England, Francis |