* mony, and above all, a party-spirited opiniatrety, disgraced, and

vulgariz’d the oratory of the contending parties, who, like mere

atrornies, maintained their cue of talking eternally on one fide of the queltion, without knowing the value of making those • fair conceffions, those occasional acknowlegments of right,

even in their opponents, which are so great a grace, and form 26 such favourable prepossessions of the candor and wisdom of the

party who makes them. The prevalence of the chiefs of the parties, more than any concern for the public, engrossed the attencion, and zeal of the humble herds of their refpective followers; whilt fome lay perdue, in readiness to side with the congueror, as foon as it should be decided.

Quis nemori imperitet, quem tota armenta fequantur.


Yet, even in that wretched period, it is but fair to remark, that it was too often the cruel and unjust practice to accuse men ' in great employs, of dishonesty and corruption, whereas they

in truth, rather objects of the greated pity. Mere' want • of parts, or intellectual disability, after all, are misfortunes, and

never crimes.' And again farther on in these, o It may be obterved, that in a late confi&t of embattled parties, those unmeaning cant-words, his MojeAy's service, and the good of the country, which used to be fo falsely and undecently • treated as distinct points, and so emphatically resounded on * each side, worn out as they were to windowed raggedness,

were at last honestly dropped. A new æra now opened: a

more fair, if not a more modest system, took place of those • stale, and transparent impositions, by which the public had

been so long amused, and late, but at length, ceased to be • blinded. The leaders of the conflicting parties put their dis• fenfions openly and avowedly on the foot of personal pretenfron

to power. Court and country were equally out of the question: nor was there any otber matter for wrangling, so much as pretended, than whether John-a-Nokes or Tom.a-Styles should be the pay-master, and of course, implicitly the general of the mercenaries ; which, by the by, was a matter at bottom of about as much importance to the public, as which ideot of a horse-fancier should have won the last race at Newmarket; to that public I say, whom experience had long fatisfied, that

power might change hands, without changing maxims or mea• lures; and that it was still the same dull Itate-farce, with perhaps a little alteration in the cast of parts.'. He has also the following paffage in his last page

Never were those great resolutions, which have so often saved i nations on the brink of the precipice, mote necessary than

now. Firm, and high spirited measures, and those alone, planned with coolness, and executed with fire, may yet repair

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• that recent lofs and dishonour, for which thousands of fucti * worthless lives as his, whose crime in it, is more immediately in

fight, can be but a paltry atonemert to a națion fo deeply in• jured, and so juftly incensed : whilst probably those who were . in a great measure, and primarily the occasion of it, would not • be sorry to see the people opening in full cry, and hurting the * change, till they had run their resentment out of breath, or • evaporated it upon that pitiful obje&t.'

VI. Reafons humbly offered, to prove, that the Letter printed at the End of the French Memorial of Justification, is a French Forgery, and falily afcribed to his RoHssá 8vo. Is. Collyer.

What is said of a Witch's prayer, is true, when applied to this performance: With the face of an out-work to this FortRoyal, it is, in effett, a battery raised again it and it is no fault of the engineer who conducts the attack, and who seems to be tolerably well versed in his trade, if he does not lay it level with the ground,

His method of doing this is two-fold, we shall give a speci. men of each, and leave the Reader to his own reflections. First, undertaking to enumerate the great qualities of this great General, it is in this manner he makes out his lift.

First, no General so judiciously distinguishes what men ought • to be chosen for every kind of enterprize, either thots who are • to command, or those who are to obey.

Secondly, no Commander has ever been more intelligent, explicit

, and just in his orders, to all those whom he has appointed to command.

Thirdly, no man is more acquainted with the Geography, nature of the place, and nature of the enemy, againt whom • he fends an army, or plans an expedition, by what methods fuccefs ought to be puriged, or is mo& eally obtained.

Fourthly, no General is so well killed in all the precautions • which are necessary to prevent a furprize, or the spreading a panie amongst an army.

Fifihly, no General fo truly underftands the methods of segularly supplying an army wieh neceffary provifions, or how it may be transported from one part to another with the greatest facility to the foldiers.

• Sixthly, no Commander has ever equalled him in deftining < troops to the duties for which they are adaptedy from the raw• eft militia and irregulars, to the belt disciplined and veteran • forces.

« All thefe qualifications, being acknowleged, by nature and & ftudy, to be inherent in bissim, and Orders repugnant

to them in the Letter, it is easy to prove fyllogistically, that • he cannot be the author of it, in the following manner : Major. No great General can be author of ridiculous orders:




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Minor. The supposed R- Dictator is the greatett General in • the world. Conclufion. Therefore the R-1 Dictator is not the author of those Orders.? (This is almost as good logic as Dr. Free's.]

Secondly, in his analyfis of the Letter, the vein runs as fol. lows.

"Should the Ohio expedition continue any confiderable time, $ and Pls and sly's regiments be found enough to “ undertake, in the mean while, the reduction of Niagara, his RH fs would have

you consider whether


could go there in perfon, leaving the command of the troops on the • Ohio to some Officer on whom you might depend, unless you « should think it better for the service, to send those troops un“ der some person whom you have designed to command on the " Ohio; but this is a nice affair, and claims your particular at“ teption."

• Very farcaftical, indeed, Monfieur ; you have written this paragraph long since you have known that the Ohio expedition was finished in an hour, and that no Officer under Mr. Braddock was thought fit to be intrusted with the command in chief. Very fneering, indeed, you call that a nice affair to determine, whether a man Mall resolve to attack du Quesne, which cannot

affect Niagara ; or Niagara, which must cause the surrender of • du Quesne, reducing Braddock, and even his supposed R-- Re

commender, to a more despicable situation than the ass between two bundles of hay, which was suspended by the equality of the obje&ts'; whereas you have infinuated those Generals to be

held in suspense by unequal objects, the next paragraph declar. ing Niagara of the greatest consequence.

• This ungentleman-like infinuation seems designed to invalidate the force of the second military excellence also. Believe me, it is in vain; your army may as well take Gibraltar,' by

throwing eggs at it, as diminish the fame of him against whom • this whole malice is intended.

• Now follows another paragraph of Orders, equally malicious and impoflible.

If, after the Ohio expedition is ended, it shall be necessary " for you to go with your whole force to Niagara, it is the opie

nion of his R-H -{s, that you should carefully en" deavour to find out a shorter way from the Ohio thither, "than “ that of the Lakes, which, however, ye are not to attempt un“ der any pretence whatsoever, without a moral certainty of be" ing supplied with provifions, &c. As to your design of mak"ing yourself master of Niagara, which is of the greatest consequence, his RH -fs recommends it to you, to leave “nothing to Chance in the prosecution of that enterprize.

* This Order of finding a shorter way by land than through • the lakes, is another severe fneer upon the cutting down whole

forests to make a road to du Quesne, where the English army

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never ought to have gone; but as chat command has been al. ready proved imposible to proceed from the supposed great

Dictator's mouth, so must this for the same reason; besides ' which, the directing B k to find' á shorter way than through the lakes, is the grofielt afiront that ever was offered to

fo august a person. Can the R- General have imagined, • that there is a shorter way than a strait line between two points ? • Or would he have given such Orders, without observing, that • a line drawn between du Quefne and Niagara, must pass through • almost a hundred miles in length of the lake Erie?

A Command the like of this, is just saying, Go the farthiest way about, spend me two or three months in cutting roads for • a hundred miles through forests, otherwise in paffable, harrass

your men and horses to death with needless fatigue, lose your artillery in the road, lay yourselves open to inomentary am• buscade, fickness, and death, notwithítanding you can pass the • whole way by water in a few days, without labour or danger,

carrying all the ammunition, baggage, and provifion, with the greatest care to the whole army. This was contrived to de. ftroy the belief of the fourth article of military excellence. . As to the attempting the passage by land or water, without a moral Certainty of provision, it is moralig certain equally ridi• culous ; yet at the fame time a tenth part of the provision, • which is ten times as easily provided, will be fufficient by water,

which is necessary by land; because the journey will not take up a tenth part of the time.

The laft fentence is, however, eminently beyond all the former, it is only to be paralleled by itself, as has been already

most happily expressed and remarked, by former writers on • former occasions.

“ You are to leave nothing to Chance in prosecuting the fiege “ of Niagara."

• This, indeed, would have been most excellent advice, if, • like Harlequin's dead horse, it had not one small fauit attending it, that of never being capable to be of ufe.

For example, by what kind of fagacity, though the admonition was ever so • well recommended, could Mr. Ek have guarded againit • the Chance of being killed by a shot from the Fortification, if • he went to the fiege; the Chance of being beaten by a supe‘rior number of the enemy; the Chance of being out,generalled • by the antagonist Commander; the Chance of fickness and • death of him and his troop: ; the Chance of interception of * provision, and raising the fiege through want of fupplies ; and • the Chance of a thousand other accidents ? When such Orders

are given, without telling how they may be put into execution, • What is it but commanding impoflibilities ? And whoever had “-received this Command, to leave nothing to Chince in atrack. sing Niagara, ought to have considered it as a: aviolute prohi

bition from attempting it at all, the only nethod by which all Chance of miscarriage could have been avoided.'

VII. A serious Defence of some late Measures of the Administration, particularly with regard to the Introduction and Establishment of Foreign Troops. 8vo. 15. Morgan.

This is another ironical performance; and tho' not directed against any particular personage, is calculated to inflame the political Tetter, at present gathering and spreading, by the same kind of tickling irritation. Neither this, nor the former, it is reasonable to believe, are wholly the work of those Gentlemen, who, according to the City-watchmaker,* are Patriots through their Indigence ; fome particular marks of intelligence, which are to be distinguished in each, seeming to argue, that the documents, at least, in which they are founded, were furnished by persons who stood higher, and saw farther, than they can be supposed to do.

Two excerpts, taken out of different parts of this performance, will serve to give a tolerable idea of the political knowlege contained in it : viz.

• Though our misfortunes and disgraces in the Mediterranean, • have, of late, been the general topic of conversation, few or

none of my countrymen, so far as I observe, have reasoned upon them with propriety, or traced them to their proper fource ; but have contented themselves with assigning causes, which, when examined, do not appear adequate to the effect.

• Thus some have pleased themselves with throwing all the * blame upon the ministry at home, who have been accused of

want of abilities or want of honesty, of having neglected or betrayed their truft ; and it hath been no unusual fund of clamour

against them, that they deferred sending a fleet into the Medi• terranean, till it was too late to save our possessions there, and

at laft, fent it fo weak as to be unable to save them, even if ! it had failed much sooner. But Gentlemen who reason in this manner, are not aware that unanswerable arguments may be urged, to free che administration from any blame on this head. In a word, the French preparations for invading Britain, could not but alarm the wife patriots who preside in the cabinet.. ! For tho?: Admiral Hawke was sent to cruize off Brest, in the • beginning of March, with a fleet superior to that of the enemy blocked up


tho’a vaft fleet besides, lay at Spithead ready to defend our coasts ; and tho'it was well known, that

no ships were collected in any port of France for an embarka. tion of troops, except at Toulon ; yet as Maréchal Belleille, « who knew the road to Windsor, had been nominated General

upon the fea-coafts ; as the French ministers at foreign courts, ? who cannot be supposed to be politicians at the expence

of truth, made no fecret of the intended invasion of England ; • and as the Dutch Gazettes, remarkable for conveying authen.

tic intelligence, gave ys formidable accounts of French troops

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* See Art. II. of this Catalogue. Rev. Sep. 1736.


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