DEDICATION. iii muft fall or flourish with it. This This is not the cause of faction, or of party, of any individual, but the common interest of every man in Britain. Although the King fhould continue to fupport his prefent fyftem of government, the period is not very diftant, at which You will have the means of redress in your own power. It may be nearer perhaps than any of us expect, and I would warn You to be prepared for it. The King may poffibly be advised to diffolve the prefent parliament a year or two before it expires of courfe, and precipitate a new election, in hopes of taking the nation by furprize. If fuch a measure be in agitation, this very caution may defeat or prevent it. I CANNOT doubt that You will unanimoufly affert the freedom of election, and vindicate your exclufive right to choose your reprefentatives. But other queftions have been ftarted, on which your determination should. be equally clear and unanimous. Let it be iimpreffed upon your minds, let it be inftilled. into your children, that the liberty of the prefs is the Palladium of all the civil, political, and religious rights of an Englishman, and that the right of juries to return a general verdict, verdict, in all cafes whatsoever, is an effential part of our conftitution, not to be controuled or limited by the judges, nor in any shape questionable by the legiflature. The power of Kings, Lords, and Commons is not an arbitrary power.* They are the trustees, not the owners of the estate. The fee-fimple is in US. They * This pofitive denial, of an arbitrary power being vefted in the legiflature, is not in fact a new doctrine. When the Earl of Lindley, in the year 1675, brought a bill into the house of lords, To prevent the dangers, which might arise from perfons difaffected to government, by which an oath and penalty was to be impofed upon the members of both houses, it was affirmed, in a proteft figned by twenty-three laypeers, (my lords the bishops were not accustomed to proteft). That the privilege of fitting and voting in parliament was an honour they had by birth, and a right fo inherent in them, and infeparable from them, that nothing could take it away, but what, by "the law of the land, muft withal take away their 66 lives, and corrupt their blood."-Thefe noble peers, (whofe names are a reproach to their posterity) have, in this inftance, folemnly denied the power of parliament to alter the conftitution. Under a particular propofition, they have afferted a general truth, in which every man in England is concerned. DEDICATION. They cannot alienate, they cannot waste. When we say that the legislature is fupreme, we mean that it is the highest power known to the conftitution that it is the highest in comparison with the other fubordinate powers established by the laws. In this fenfe, the word fupreme is relative, not abfolute. The power of the legislature is limited, not only by the general rules of natural juftice, and the welfare of the community, but by the forms and principles of our particular conftitution. If this doctrine be not true, we must admit, that Kings, Lords, and Commons have no rule to direct their refolutions, but merely their own will and pleafure. They might unite the legiflative and executive power in the fame hands, and diffolve the conftitution by an act of parliament. But I am perfuaded You will not leave it to the choice of feven hundred perfons, notoriously corrupted by the crown, whe.. ther feven millions of their equals fhall be freemen or flaves. The certainty of forfeiting their own rights, when they facrifice those of the nation, is no check to a brutal, degene rate mind. Without infifting upon the extravagant conceffion made to Harry the eighth, there there are instances, in the hiftory of other countries, of a formal, deliberate furrender of the public liberty into the hands of the fovereign. If Englan does not fhare the fame fate, it is becaufe we have better refources, than in the virtue of either houfe of parliament. I SAID that the liberty of the prefs is the palladium of all your rights, and that the right of the juries to return a general verdict is part of your conftitution. To preferve the whole fyftem, You must correct your legislature. With regard to any influence of the conftituent over the conduct of the representative, there is little difference between a feat in parliament for seven years and a feat for life. The profpect of your refentment is too remote; and although the last feffion of a feptennial parliament be usually employed in courting the favour of the people, confider that, at this rate, your reprefentatives have fix years for o fence, and but one for atonement. A deathbed repentance feldom reaches to reftitution. If you reflect that in the changes of adminiftration, which have marked and difgraced the prefent reign, although your warmest patriots have in their turn been invested with the law ful ful and unlawful authority of the crown, and though other reliefs or improvements have been held forth to the people, yet that no one man in office has ever promoted or encouraged a bill for shortening the duration of parliaments, but that, (whoever was minister) the oppofition to this meafure, ever fince the feptennial act paffed, has been conftant and uniform on the part of government.-You cannot but conclude, without the poffibility of a doubt, that long parliaments are the foundation of the undue influence of the crown. This influence anfwers every purpose of arbitrary power to the crown, with an expence and oppreffion to the people, which would be unnecessary in an arbitrary government. The best of our minifters find it the easiest and most compendious mode of conducting the King's affairs; and all ministers have a general interest in adhering to a fyftem, which of itself is fufficient to fupport them in office, without any affiftance from personal virtue, popularity, labour, abilities, or experience. It promises every gratification to avarice and ambition, and fecures impunity.-Thefe are truths unqueftionable.-If they make no impreffion, it is |