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figure: and does not St. Peter treat it as a very "low thing in itself, 1 Pet. iii. 21, and shew, that living after the dictates of moral virtue is that "which saves us? As to the sacrament of the "Lord's Supper, there are but two ends mentioned "of it in the New Testament; the one, to do it in "remembrance of Christ; the other, that it is a sym"bol of love and friendship with one another.”

These are, some of them, bold positions, which Dr. Clarke would probably have hesitated to avow. They involved, however, matters of too great importance to be passed by unnoticed. The former part of Dr. Sykes's pamphlet called for no reply; the topics to which it related having been again and again considered on both sides. But in these concluding observations fresh ground of controversy was broken. Waterland felt it necessary again to encounter this keen opponent. Accordingly, within a short space of time, he published a tract, entitled, The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sacraments considered. 1730.

This is a short, but systematic and well-digested treatise upon a subject of deep interest with respect both to theology and morals. The question of the importance of the sacraments, necessarily involves the previous question respecting" the com"parative value, excellency, and obligation of mo"ral and positive duties." Dr. Sykes had rather assumed, than proved, that these latter duties were as nothing in comparison with the former; and consequently he regarded Dr. W.'s notions of the Eucharist, not only as extravagant and unwarrant

able, but even as injurious to the interests of moral virtue. To clear up a point of such magnitude, and to prevent misapprehensions detrimental, on either side, to truth and piety, were the objects which our author had in view.

It is Dr. Clarke's general principle, " that this and "all other positive institutions have the nature only "of means to an end, and that therefore they are never "to be compared with moral virtues." Dr. Waterland observes, that "to make the comparison clear, " and the opposition exact," it ought to have been between "positive duties and moral duties;" since otherwise it is comparing what is merely the external part of positive duties, the institution, with the internal part of moral duties, the virtue, the moral habit and disposition which accompanies their performance; which could not be intended; since "the opposition does not lie between outward acts and "inward habits, but between obedience, both out"ward and inward, to positive laws or rules, and "obedience, both outward and inward, to moral "commandments."

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This being premised, as necessary to a fair statement of the question, Dr. W. proceeds to examine the distinction between moral and positive duties. The distinction itself, however, (he observes,) is, perhaps, not the most proper. " Every law, properly so called, is moral, because it is a rule regulating the

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practice of moral agents. But in a more restrained "sense, it signifies the same with natural law, a "law derived from God, consonant to the nature "and reason of things, and therefore of as fixed and "unmovable obligation as the nature and reason of

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"things. Positive Divine law, in contradistinction "to the other, is not founded in the fixed nature or reason of things, or at least not known to be so; being considered only as prescribed, and depending on God's good pleasure either to remove or "continue it." Of several duties enjoined in Scripture, it may be difficult to say whether they are natural or positive; though of their importance and obligation there can be no reasonable doubt. Such are the duties we owe respectively to God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, in their several distinct capacities, as well as in their united characters as God. These we know from Revelation only, and from the Divine injunctions concerning them; yet they may justly be regarded as natural and moral duties, " since Scripture has discovered "to us what foundation they have in the nature and "truth of things." They thence become of unalterable and of universal obligation to all who know them; and do not partake of that character ascribed to positive duties only, that they are dependent upon circumstances and conditions liable to change or cessation.

Dr. W. proposes, therefore, to divide our duties into natural and supernatural: the former discoverable by the bare light of nature; the latter by Revelation. The supernatural may again be divided into constant and occasional; such as are of eternal and immutable obligation, and such as are temporary or changeable. Of these latter, which answer most correctly to the term positive duties, some were transient, as several occasional precepts given to the Patriarchs, to Moses, and the Prophets; some per

manent, as the ritual and many of the judicial precepts given to the Jews, to continue so long as the Jewish polity continued; and also the two Christian sacraments. And "though we are used to consider these merely as prescribed, and to resolve them commonly into the mere will and pleasure of the legislator, yet they are always founded upon rea"sons, known, perhaps, in part to us, but perfectly "known to God; and so they are ultimately resolv"able into infinite wisdom and goodness."

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Dr. Clarke's principle is thus shewn to rest upon a false presumption, a fundamental error, that of confounding external with positive," and of" not "considering that positive duties have both an in"ward and an outward part, both a formal and a "material constituent, as well as moral duties." Almsgiving, for instance, is a moral duty; but if done without a true principle of piety and charity, is no virtue, is nothing worth. Receiving the holy Communion is a positive duty; but if performed without faith, reverence, or repentance, is nothing worth: if performed as it should be, it is as truly an act of moral obedience, and as much an exercise of virtue, as almsgiving. "In positive duties, there"fore, though the matter, in itself considered, is in"different; yet the obedience is moral, the disobe"dience immoral." Hence they are as strictly obligatory, for the time being, as any other commands whatever. For, "all obligation arises from some "law; and it is the divine law that constitutes mo- "ral good and evil. Things may be naturally good "or bad, that is, may have a natural tendency to promote happiness or misery; may be materially

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"good or evil, that is, useful or hurtful, previous to

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any law; but they cannot be formally and morally good or evil, without respect to some law, natural "or revealed; for where no law is, there is no transgression." This shews, too, that the notion of an "obligation antecedent to all law, is a contradiction "and absurdity."

Again; there may be as great virtue, (or greater,) in obeying positive precepts, as in obeying moral ones. The positive command may require a greater degree of self-denial, as in the case of Abraham, whose faith and love of God were eminently proved in his implicit resignation to the Divine will. This implicit resignation is due to every command of God, whether we know the reason for it, or not. A positive precept may also aim at some benefit of greater value than any other. Such was the command, to preach the Gospel to every creature, extending to the salvation of all mankind; in comparison with which all other works or attainments are of inferior value. And there may be times and circumstances, in which other positive duties may be preferred to moral. By the same rule, there may be "greater impiety and iniquity in disobeying positive precepts, than in disobeying moral ones." Saul was reproved by Samuel for offending in this respect. Heavy penalties were appointed in the Jewish law for the breach of positive institutions.

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The comparative value, then, of any precepts or duties depends not upon whether they be positive or moral, but upon conscientious obedience, and upon a due consideration of the circumstances belonging to them with reference to the Divine will.