which are always at hand to be cast upon all who philosophize, of studying the sky, and the parts under ground, and not believing in gods, and making the worse appear the better reason. They do not, I fancy, like to say the truth, that they have been convicted of pretending to knowledge without having any. Being, however, jealous of their reputation, and being much in earnest, and many in number, and speaking with premeditation and in a plausible manner about me, they have filled your ears with false notions of me, from an early period. Of these people, Melitus, Anytus, and Lycon, are those who have now set upon me: Melitus to avenge the cause of the poets, Anytus that of the artificers and the politicians, Lycon that of the orators.* So that, as I said at first, I shall wonder if I am able, in so short a time, to expel from your minds a prejudice of such long standing.

This, O Athenians, is the truth; and I have said it, neither dissembling nor disguising any thing, great or small, although I know that to this very freespokenness I owe my enemies; which is a sign that I speak truth, and that the causes of the prejudice against me are those I have mentioned. And if, either now or hereafter, you examine into the matter, so you will find it.

To the accusations, then, which were brought against me by my first accusers, let this be a sufficient reply. I will now attempt to reply to Melitus, the good and patriotic, as he professes himself; and the rest.

เ

These being a new set of accusers, let us look at their charges, as we did at those of the others. Socrates,' they say, is guilty of corrupting the youth, and not acknowledging the gods whom the state acknowledges, but other new dauóvia,† (divinities, dæmons, or things relating to dæmons,) such is the charge and of this charge let us examine each separate part. He says, then, that I am guilty of corrupting the youth. But I, O Athenians, say that Melitus is guilty of solemn trifling; bringing men with so much levity before a criminal tribunal, and pretending to be earnestly concerned about things which he never paid the slightest attention to. That this is so, I will endeavour to prove to you. Come hither, O Melitus, and answer me: You are very anxious that the young may be as good as possible?

Melitus. I am.

Socrates. Come then, tell the tribunal, who is it that makes them good? for it is plain that you know, since you are so concerned about them. You have found who it is that corrupts them, you say, and have pointed him out and brought him hither: now point out who makes them better. Do you see, O Melitus, that you are silent and cannot tell? Is not this shameful, and a sufficient proof that, as I say, you have never concerned yourself about the matter? But say, my good friend, who it is that makes them better?

M. The laws.

S. That was not what I meant, O most excellent person. I asked what man? a man who in the first place, knows the very thing you mention, the laws.

*These were the three accusers of Socrates. The first was a tragic poet, the second a currier, of great wealth, and influence in public affairs, the third an orator. Melitus, the first of the three, was the ostensible prosecutor.

We give this word in the original language, because, as will presently be seen, the argument turns in part upon the vagueness of its signification. There is no word of exactly similar vagueness in the English language.

M. These, O Socrates, whom you now see; the judges.

S. How, O Melitus? Are these people able to educate the young and make them better?

M. Most certainly.

S. All of them? or only some?

M. All.

S. You say well, by Juno, and there is an ample supply of benefacAnd the bystanders? Are they also instructors of youth?

tors.

M. They also.

S. And the senators ?+

M. The senators likewise.

S. And the members of the assembly of the people? they do not corrupt the youth? or do they too, one and all, make them better? M. They do.

S. Then it seems, all the Athenians make the youth good and virtuous except me; I alone corrupt them. Do you assert this ?

M. Most certainly I do.

S. I am a very unlucky person, according to you. And tell me do you think this is also the case with horses? Are those who make them better, all mankind; and is there one single person who spoils them? Or is the case quite the reverse; one, or a very few (those who have attended to the subject) capable of making them better; the many, if they try their hand upon horses, spoiling them? Is it not so, O Melitus, both with regard to horses and all other animals? Certainly, whether you and Anytus say so or not. It would be a very happy thing for the youth if there were but one person who spoils them, and all others benefited them. But you have sufficiently shown, O Melitus, that you never bestowed a thought upon the instruction of youth; but have yourself been utterly indifferent to the matters about which you accuse me.

Tell us again, O Melitus; is it better to have good, or wicked people for our fellow-citizens? Answer, friend; the question I ask is not difficult. Are not the wicked always doing some evil to those who are nearest to them, the good always doing some good?

M. Undoubtedly.

S. Is there any one who would rather be hurt than benefited by those he associates with? Answer, most excellent person: for the law, too, bids you answer. Does any one wish to be hurt?

M. No, certainly.

S. Well, then do you bring me here on the charge of corrupting the youth, and making them wicked, intentionally, or unintentionally? M. Intentionally.

S. What are you, O Melitus, at your age, so much wiser than I at mine, that you know the wicked to be always doing some hurt, the good always some good, to those who are nearest to them; but I am so ignorant as not to know that if I make any of those with whom I associate wicked, I am in danger of suffering some evil from them, and, therefore, as you affirm, intentionally do this great evil? I do not believe this, O Melitus, nor, I think, will any other human being. Either I do not corrupt the youth, or if I do, it is * The principal Athenian court of criminal justice, the Heliæa, was a multitudinous assembly, consisting of more than 1000 citizens.

† Burai, the members of the council of five hundred.

unintentionally, and either way you are a calumniator. But if I corrupt them unintentionally, it is not the law to bring men here for such offences when unintentional, but to instruct them and admonish them in private ; for it is evident that what I do unintentionally, I shall cease doing if I am taught better. But you avoided conversing with me and instructing me, and have now brought me here, whither the law ordains to bring those who require punishment, not teaching.

What I affirmed, O Athenians, is already evident, that Melitus never gave himself a moment's concern about these matters. But yet tell us, O Melitus, how you say that I corrupt the youth? In the manner which you mention in the indictment, viz., by teaching them not to acknowledge the gods whom the state acknowledges, but other new δαιμόνια?

M. Most certainly, I affirm it.

S. By those gods, O Melitus, who are now in question, I pray you explain yourself more clearly. I cannot make out which of two things you say. Is it that I teach the youth to believe that there are gods, and am myself not altogether an atheist, but believe in gods, though not the same whom the state acknowledges, but others; and is this your charge against me, that I believe in other gods? or do you assert that I do not believe in any gods at all, and that I teach others the same?

M. That is what I assert; you believe in no gods at all.

S. Most wonderful Melitus, what is this you say! I do not, then, like the rest of mankind, believe the sun and moon to be gods?

M. No, by Jupiter, O Athenians: for he says that the sun is of stone, and the moon of earth.

S. You fancy you are accusing Anaxagoras, most worthy Melitus : and you have such a contempt for these judges, and think them so ignorant of letters, as not to know that the writings of Anaxagoras, of Clazomene, are full of this sort of doctrines. So, then, the youth learn from me, what they may buy sometimes at the theatre* for one drachma, and may then laugh at Socrates if he pretend that they are his, especially being so paradoxical. So you really think that I do not believe in any gods?

M. In none at all.

S. You are incredulous, O Melitus; you do not even give credence to your own word. This man, O Athenians, seems to me to be exceedingly self-willed and insolent, and to have brought this prosecution against me from self-will and insolence, and youthful levity. It looks like a trial of ingenuity; as if he had said to himself: Will the wise Socrates find out the inconsistency in what I say, or shall I succeed in cheating him, and the rest of them? For he contradicts himself in the very words of the accusation; saying, in fact, this Socrates is guilty of not believing in gods, but believing in gods.' This looks like a jest. Attend then, O Athenians, that you may know what I mean: and do you answer, O Melitus. You, O Athenians, as I begged you at first, remember not to be clamorous if I speak in my own usual manner.

*The commentators explain this passage as an allusion to the practice, not unfrequent with the dramatic poets, (especially Euripides,) of introducing on the scene sentiments borrowed from the writings of the philosophers.

Is there any one, O Melitus, who believes that there are human things, but does not believe that there are men? Answer, O Athenians, and do not clamour. Does any one believe that there are things relating to horses, but not believe that there are horses? or that there are things relating to music, but not musicians? Nobody, O best of men ; for if you will not answer, I will answer to you and to the judges. But answer the next question. Does any one believe that there are (cauóvia) things relating to dæmons, but not believe in dæmons? M. No.

S. How much good you have done, by answering with so much reluctance, and not until the judges obliged you. You say then, that I believe, and teach, that there are things relating to dæmons, no matter whether new or old. I therefore, according to you, believe in things relating to dæmons, and this you have sworn to in the indictment. But if I believe in the existence of things relating to dæmons, I must needs believe in the existence of dæmons: is it not so? It is: for as you will not answer, I consider you as assenting. But do we not regard dæmons as either gods or the offspring of gods? Do we, or not? M. Yes.

S. Then if I believe in dæmons, as you say; and if dæmons are a kind of gods, this is the riddle I said you were playing off upon us, saying that I, not believing in gods, do nevertheless believe in gods, since I believe in dæmons. But if dæmons are the offspring of the gods, by the nymphs, as they say, or in any other way, what human creature can believe that there exists offspring of gods, but no gods? It would be as absurd as to believe that there exists offspring of horses and asses, namely mules, but that there are no horses or asses. It is impossible, O Melitus, that you can have brought such an accusation for any purpose but to try us, or because you could find nothing true to accuse me of. That you should be able to persuade any person in his senses that the same person can think that there are things belonging to dæmons and gods, and yet no dæmons, nor gods, nor demigods, is impossible.

That I am not guilty, O Athenians, according to the accusation of Melitus, does not seem to need much proof: what I have said is sufficient. But what I have already told you, that I am in much odium, and with many persons, you well know to be true. And this is what will cause my condemnation, if I be condemned: not Melitus nor Anytus, but the prejudice and calumny in the minds of the many: which has been the cause of condemnation to many other and good men, and will continue to be so, and there is no fear that I shall be the last.

(To be concluded in our next number.)

SCENE I. A MILL ON THE BANK OF THE RIVER AVON.

A boating party about to embark.

The Master. ARE we all ready?

Omnes. All, all, all.

Old Ashford. Steady now, steady. One at a time. Put the boat nearer, boy, or we shall be sure to get into mischief.

Mary Anne. Into the water you mean, my dear sir.

Old Ashford. Gently, gently. Are you comfortably seated, girls? Master. One more on this side, if you please, to balance the boat.

Young Ashford. It must not be you, Mary Anne; you carry so much sail we shall be capsized at once.

Master. That will do. Now, lad, push off.

L. What a delicious day!

Young Ashford. There never was a finer for such an expedition. Mary Anne. I would not change with the Dey of Algiers, whatever his expedition might be.

Poet. On such a day did Phaeton, young and proud, Urge on the fiery coursers of the sun,

Till goaded into madness, they no more

Obeyed the curb, but chased the flying wind

Till heaven and earth grew hot at their mad speed.
L. On such a day the melancholy Jacques'

Did quit the garish sun' to lie along

Under an oak, whose antique root peeped out
Upon the brook that brawled along the wood.

Mignionette. On such a day, the story goes, d'ye see,
The fishes cried, My fins! how hot we be!'

Mary Anne. I shall be for calling upon

Shadows of beauty,
Shadows of power,

Up! to your duty;'

for I am sure this is the hour' when we want them. Mignionette. Why do you not go on?

Beautiful shadow '

And if Willie asks the cause of the invocation, say,

Omnes. Oh, oh!

'The-heat-it-is, boy!'

Poet. Why, Mignionette, I thought you had determined to reform. Mignionette. And I had begun to do so, only Mary Anne is corrupting me again.

Master. There are shadows above, I see-I hope they have no design upon us.

L. They make beautiful designs for us. Look at that floating train