required on their part so much reading and reflection, and the knowledge of so many facts, of which I believed most of them were ignorant, that no other way of overcoming the difficulty presented itself, than by their giving their undivided attention to what was said. I requested them, for the first hour, not to consider themselves as disputants in the cause, or called upon to marshal arguments and invent objections, while I was speaking; but to divest themselves, if possible, of all prejudices and prepossessions, and to conceive themselves as about to give an honest judgment in a cause, the evidence in which would be clearly laid before them. Or, if they would divest themselves of all feelings of interest, their judgment would be more impartial, could they consider the question in an abstract point of view; as one, for instance, of mere science or philosophy. After I had finished all my preliminary observations, I would pledge myself to refute every objection which could be made against the Scriptures, by showing that those objections were not founded on fact, but on assumptions, suppositions, and conjectures, or on mere propositions without proof. I said that the truth of the Scriptures was as susceptible of demonstration as any proposition in "Euclid," though by a different kind of evidence, and by a different process of reasoning; and that the truth or falsehood of the Scriptures would produce the same unerring conviction, provided we would, or could, study the evidence with the same coolness, and freedom from prepossession, with which a mathematical problem can be stated, and its falsehood or truth demonstrated. The force of evidence does not depend upon the statement of the evidence itself; for a chain of evidences might be stated with the utmost conceivable precision and accuracy: yet if the hearer listen to it with inattention, forgetting, or not hearing, some of its most important points, and yet set himself to give his opinion, it is obvious, that his being right or wrong in his judgment does not depend upon the pure exercise of his reason. Besides this, if the hearer be incapable, from want of attention or capacity, to comprehend the nature and force of the evidence presented before him; if his conclusion be erroneous, as it must of necessity be, we have no right to blame the faculty of reason, or accuse the evidence of imperfection or obscurity. The power of evidence, therefore, to produce conviction, depends not merely on its own nature, but also on that the Scriptures had almost disappeared from among them; and when the reading of them, where they could be found, was prohibited by authority, and confined to one class of the community, and the right of private judgment and interpretation condemned, under the pains of imprisonment and death: had the belief, and the lives, of nominal Christians, been sound and pure under such circumstances, we must have concluded, that any regard and attention to the Scriptures was unnecessary. When the Reformation took place, the Scriptures were restored to their proper rank and authority as the standard of all moral and religious truth, and the test by which opinions and actions were to be tried; and since that period, we find that, in proportion as their circulation has extended, and their doctrines and precepts have been understood and followed, has the happiness of mankind increased: thus affording, as well on the dark as the pleasing side of the picture, which the history of the past displays, a striking and important proof of the divine origin of the Scriptures.

The same principle will furnish us with the means of satisfactorily accounting for the differences which still subsist among eminent and good men, on many points directly connected with, or allied to, Christianity. In Christian countries, all are educated with prepossessions for the opinions and ceremonies, or want of ceremonies, of the sect to which they belong, and with a corresponding prejudice against the peculiar opinions and ceremonies of others. Some writers are influenced by a mixture of worldly motives, in their attempts to display powers of original observation; talents for profound speculation; their stores of erudition; their acuteness and strength of reasoning, or the charms of eloquent composition; and hence they are often led to the discussion of subjects, over which revelation has thrown a veil, and placed between us and them an impassable barrier. Some, are even destitute of the capacity requisite to elucidate the difficult subjects which their rashness prompts them to handle. Some, are formed by their peculiar education, and habits of thinking and study, to partial views of the Christian truth, and are, consequently, apt to underrate one part, and overvalue others. But whether these differences regard errors in doctrine of more or less importance, or relate to sound doctrine, elevated or depressed, out of its due proportion with others,一 whether they consist in unwarranted speculation, illogical inferences, in hostility and acrimony against others, or unreasonable boasting of themselves and their sect, we justly ascribe them to a want of the full, and perfect understanding of the Scriptures, and of that spirit of caution, humility, and mutual love, which they so beautifully, and so frequently, inculcate.

However varied, therefore, the view may be which we take of the past and present state of Christianity in the world; we find, when we reflect well and reason justly, that the authority of the Scriptures stands on its own grounds, unimpeached and unimpaired; and while we acknowledge the errors, and follies, and imperfections of Christians themselves, we must, on all occasions, but more particularly in fair and logical discussions with Sceptics or Deists, make a distinction between Christianity, as it is found in the Scriptures, and the errors, abuses, and imperfections of Christians themselves, and impute blame to that quarter alone where it is exclusively due. Here his lordship remarked, that "he always had taken care to make this distinction, as he knew enough of Christianity to feel that it was both necessary and just."