General WAGNER. Our people in the medical arena have come up with biodegradable bone that can be formed to the shape of the jawbone. The screw also can be put in there because it is biodegradable and the bone grows to that. It allows a more rapid recovery from the wound and is more successful than we have achieved in the past.

These are things we think are important in the medical R&D and we have to keep that program going.

With that background, we are available for questions and I think Dr. Sculley has a statement.

STATEMENT OF DR. SCULLEY

Mr. CHAPPELL. Doctor, your statement will be in the record. Would you like to summarize or add anything to what the General said?

Dr. SCULLEY. Just for emphasis, I know General Wagner went into the details on his early charts, but I would ask that the committee look at the Army's research, development and acquisition request in its entirety rather than focus on the RDT&E request alone.

I say that because while we show real growth in RDT&E, it was a clear, conscious decision to show growth in the R&D arena at the same time of showing a negative growth of some five percent in the procurement accounts.

This was done again with great deliberation and not without pain. Our procurement request is some $5 billion less than we had projected at this same time last year and in your review of the Army's request, I would just ask that you look at it in its entirety.

GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS

Mr. CHAPPELL. What does Gramm-Rudman-Hollings do for you? Mr. SCULLEY. In our procurement accounts, the numbers are still in negotiation with the contractors. This year's request of $18.6 billion will show a real decline. Taken together the request for R&D and procurement shows zero real growth. I just ask that it be looked at in its entirety.

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: IT IS A PRIVILEGE FOR ME TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TO PRESENT THE FISCAL YEAR 1987 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE ARMY'S RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION PROGRAM.

FIFTEEN YEARS AGO WE RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO MODERNIZE IN ALL AREAS, BUT PARTICULARLY IN OUR PRINCIPAL WEAPON SYSTEMS. AT THAT TIME THE SOVIETS WERE DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING WEAPON SYSTEMS AT RATES WHICH INDICATED THAT THEY INTENDED TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OVER THE U.S. AND ITS NATO ALLIES IN TERMS OF MODERN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES.

THE SOVIET FORCES AND THOSE OF THE OTHER WARSAW PACT MEMBERS WERE THEN ALREADY NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR BUT INFERIOR IN THE QUALITY OF THEIR EQUIPMENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. AND OUR NATO ALLIES ENJOYED A SUBSTANTIAL QUALITATIVE SUPERIORITY. THE DETERRENCE OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES DEPENDED LARGELY UPON THE UNCERTAINTIES THAT THIS QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE CREATED FOR THE SOVIETS.

THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM UPON WHICH WE HAD EMBARKED IN 1970 WAS DESIGNED TO EXPLOIT OUR TECHNOLOGY AND TO USE IT TO FIELD NEW SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD MAINTAIN OUR MARGIN OF QUALITATIVE SUPERIORITY. WITH YOUR SUPPORT, THAT PROGRAM HAS GONE WELL. WE HAVE DEVELOPED MODERN SYSTEMS AND ARE NOW ACQUIRING THEM AND MODERNIZING OUR FORCE. GENERAL WAGNER WILL BE DISCUSSING IN SOME DETAIL OUR CURRENT STATUS AND WHAT OUR FISCAL YEAR 1987 REQUEST WILL ACCOMPLISH.

AS WE HAVE PROCEEDED WITH OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, THE SOVIETS HAVE MOVED MUCH MORE AGGRESSIVELY THAN ANY OF OUR ESTIMATES PREDICTED. THEY HAVE INCREASED THEIR NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE MORE THAN EXPECTED AND, MORE ALARMING, HAVE REDUCED AND, IN SOME CASES, REVERSED THE QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGE WE HELD. IN EUROPE THIS MEANS THAT SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT FORCES HAVE FIELDED A MODERN MOTORIZED AND ARMORED FORCE, A DENSE MULTISYSTEM AIR DEFENSE, MODERN ATTACK AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS, AND A GROWING CONVENTIONAL TACTICAL MISSILE THREAT. THUS, AT LEAST BY MANY OF THE MEASURES WHICH WE HAVE USED TO COMPARE OUR FORCES, WE HAVE INDEED LOST GROUND. IN THESE RESPECTS, THE UNCERTAINTIES FOR THE SOVIETS IN CONDUCTING A CONVENTIONAL CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE HAVE BEEN REDUCED AND SO, ACCORDINGLY, HAS THE DETERRENT POSTURE OF THE U.S. AND NATO FORCES.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS WORSENED. SOVIET MILITARY POWER AND INFLUENCE HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY PROJECTED THERE. IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, IN PARTICULAR, SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN USED TO ESTABLISH LARGE AND MODERN MECHANIZED AND ARMORED FORCES. THESE AND DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA CONFRONT US WITH A MILITARIZED THIRD WORLD IN WHICH THE PROSPECTS FOR U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY FORMIDABLE.

WHILE WE HAVE BEEN MODERNIZING, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN INCREASING THEIR NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE AND ELIMINATING THE QUALITATIVE GAP. IN THE AREA OF QUALITY, THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE THIS, AT LEAST IN PART, BY ACQUIRING OUR TECHNOLOGY. HAD WE DEPENDED ONLY ON EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION, OUR DIFFICULTIES NOW WOULD BE VERY SERIOUS, IF NOT EXTREME. HOWEVER, AS THESE SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS EMERGED, OUR MILITARY PLANNERS RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO MEET THEM, FIRST, BY DEVELOPING NEW DOCTRINE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF OUR NEW WEAPONS AND, SECOND, BY DEVISING NEW ORGANIZATIONS FOR OUR LIGHT FORCES, AS PART OF THE ARMY OF EXELLENCE PROGRAM, TO MEET OUR NEW AND INCREASING WORLDWIDE COMMITMENTS.

AIRLAND BATTLE IS A MAJOR ADVANCE IN DOCTRINE WHICH ADDRESSES THE BATTLE ACTIVITY IN THE REAR, CLOSE-IN, AND DEEP AREAS AS CONCURRENT, COORDINATED OPERATIONS. THIS DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT IS PARTICULARLY BOLD IN ITS CONCEPT FOR DEEP ATTACK, THAT IS, PROJECTING COMBAT POWER DEEP TO ATTACK THE SECOND AND THIRD ECHELONS OF THE ENEMY FORCE. THIS ASPECT OF AIRLAND BATTLE IS GENERALLY DESCRIBED AS PRODUCING DELAY, DISRUPTION, AND ATTRITION OF THESE ECHELONS BUT, BY DOING THIS, IT DOES MUCH MORE. DEEP ATTACK IN AIRLAND BATTLE PLACES THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF SOVIET CAMPAIGN OPERATIONS AT RISK. THUS, AS WE IMPLEMENT THIS DOCTRINE, WE WILL INCREASE GREATLY THE MARGIN OF UNCERTAINLY FOR THE SOVIETS REGARDING THE OUTCOME OF ANY CONVENTIONAL CAMPAIGN AND, THEREFORE, RESTORE THE DETERRENT POSTURE OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

AIRLAND BATTLE IS ALREADY BEING IMPLEMENTED WITH THE FORCES AND EQUIPMENT NOW IN THE FIELD. HOWEVER, THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER OF THIS CONCEPT DEPENDS CRITICALLY ON THE COMPLETION OF OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, THE EXPLOITATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN SENSORS TO SEE DEEP, IN SMART MUNITIONS TO STRIKE DEEP, AND IN DATA PROCESSING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO MANAGE THESE RESOURCES RAPIDLY. OUR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGY BASE IN THE U.S. POSITIONS US ALMOST UNIQUELY TO DO THIS AND, THUS, TO ESTABLISH A MAJOR ADVANTAGE OVER OUR ADVERSARIES IN EMPLOYING WEAPONS ON A MODERN BATTLEFIELD.

OUR PLANS FOR IMPROVING THE CAPABILITY OF OUR LIGHT FORCES ALSO REQUIRES AN AGGRESSIVE APPLIED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM. THE REORGANIZATION OF THESE FORCES UNDER THE ARMY OF EXCELLENCE PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE FOR GREATLY INCREASED DEPLOYABILITY. THESE FORCES, HOWEVER, WILL NEED GREATER FIREPOWER TO MEET MODERN MECHANIZED AND ARMORED THREATS, AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA ALSO REQUIRE AN AGGRESSIVE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM.

IN SUMMARY, TO MEET THE MILITARY CHALLENGE WE HAVE DESCRIBED, WE MUST DO THREE THINGS: (1) COMPLETE THE ACQUISITION PROGRAM NEEDED TO MODERNIZE ALL UNITS IN OUR FORCE, (2) EXPLOIT OUR ADVANTAGE IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO ADD VALUE TO THAT FORCE BY DEVELOPING THE SYSTEMS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT AIRLAND BATTLE AND IMPROVE THE COMBAT POWER OF OUR LIGHT FORCES, AND (3) CONTINUE OUR R&D TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES OUR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES PROVIDE TO CREATE NEW CAPABILITIES AND TO DEVELOP GREATLY IMPROVED SYSTEMS.

WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL ADVANTAGE WE HAVE OVER OUR ADVERSARY IS BASED ON TWO ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS: (1) THE EXPEDITIOUS AND EFFECTIVELY MANAGED COMPLETION OF OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, AND (2) THE BASE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE U.S. AND IN THE NATO NATIONS. IF WE DO NOT AGGRESSIVELY COMPLETE OUR MODERNIZATION WHILE PUSHING OUR R&D PROGRAMS TO EXPLOIT THIS ADVANTAGE, WE WILL RISK A SERIOUS LOSS IN THE DETERRENT VALUE OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.