Expressing the World: Skepticism, Wittgenstein, and HeideggerOpen Court Publishing, 2003 - 262 pagina's Skepticism, the view that reliable knowledge is beyond our grasp, has defied refutation throughout the history of philosophy. Professor Rudd argues that skepticism cannot be avoided as long as knowledge is considered purely as an intellectual matter, but that genuine knowledge can be established if it is thought of as being essecially tied to patterns of practical activity and to our emotional live. He outlines a provisional defense of skepticism, then relates it to work by Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Skepticism about "other minds" is dealt with by developing Wittgenstein's approach, with the result that we have to reject the assumption that true knowledge requires a detached observer. Finally, the author considers whether our knowledge of the physical world can be understood in a way analogous to our knowledge of other minds. Here he suggests that there are important similarities between Wittgenstein's reminders of the "expressive" character of our experience and Heidegger's account of ways in which we can experience the physical world "expressively." |
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Inhoudsopgave
60 | 41 |
Conclusion to Part I | 91 |
Skepticism about Other Minds | 97 |
Wittgenstein on Other Minds | 105 |
Expressivism and the Mind | 125 |
Knowing Other MindsCriticisms and Replies | 141 |
44 | 145 |
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
ability agnosticism antiskeptical appearance argued assumptions attempt attunement Augustinean behaviour beliefs brain Buber Cambridge University Press Cartesian causal Cavell chapter claim Coleridge concept conscious context course criteria Dasein direct realism distinction doubt emotional empirical entities Epistemology everyday existence explain expressive perception expressivism expressivist external world external-world externalist feelings Fogelin give global skepticism Heidegger Heidegger's human hypothesis Ibid idea infer inner involves Kant Kant's Kantian knowledge language language-games London manifest meaning mental mentalistic Merleau-Ponty metaphysical metaphysical realism mind nature notion noumenal ontological other-mind skepticism Oxford University Press pain perceive phenomenal phenomenological philosophical philosophical realism philosophical skepticism philosophy of mind physical world practices present-at-hand Private Language Argument problem question radically recognise reject relation response rience Romantics Routledge scientific seems sensations sense simply skeptical arguments someone sort suppose talk theory thought tion transcendental truth understanding Wittgenstein Wittgensteinian