CHAP. II. Meeting of the Imperial British Parliament-Speech from the ThroneAddress in Answer, moved in the House of Lords by the Earl of Bridgewater, and seconded by Lord Shelfield-Opposed by the Earl of St. Vincent-Some parts of the Address approved and some disapproved by different speakers.—Animadversions on the Address, particu larly in as far as it related to the Affairs of Spain and Portugal, by the Earl of Grosvenor, Lord Grenville, the Earl of Moira, and the Earl of Buckinghamshire.-The Address defended by the Earl of Liverpool-Agreed to in the House of Commons.-An Address moved by the Hon. Mr. F. Rohinson, and seconded by Mr. F. B. Lushington-Animadversions on the Address, particularly to what related to Spain, by Mr. Ponsonby-The Address defended in all its parts by Lord Castlereagh-Agreed to. HE session of the imperial to the form of a treaty of alliance. British Parliament which as- -Whilst his Majesty contemplatsembled on the 13th of Jan., was ed with the liveliest satisfaction the opened by commissioners who stat- achievements of his forces in the ed, in the name of his Majesty, to commencement of the campaign the Lords and Commons, the rea- in Portugal, and the deliverance of son that had determined him to re- the kingdom of his ally from the ject certain proposals, which were presence and oppressions of the directed to be laid before both French, his Majesty most deeply Houses, for a negociation with the regretted the termination of that governments of Russia and of campaign by the armistice and France. It had been required, that convention, of some of the articles his Majesty should consent to com- of which his Majesty felt himself mence the negociation by aban- obliged to declare his disapprobadoning the cause of Spain, which tion. His Majesty relied on the he had so recently and solemnly disposition of his parliament to enespoused. His Majesty continued able him to continue the aid afto receive from the Spanish go- forded by his Majesty to the king vernment the strongest assurances of Sweden. That monarch deof their determined perseverance rived a peculiar claim to his Main the cause of the legitimate mo- jesty's support in the present exinarchy, and of the national inde- gency of his affairs, for having condence of Spain; and so long as the curred with his Majesty in the propeople of Spain should remain true priety of rejecting any proposal for to themselves, his Majesty would negociation in which the governcontinue to them his most strenu- ment of Spain was not to be adous assistance and support. His mitted as a party:The corhmisMajesty had renewed his engagensioners had received his Majesty'a ments to the Spanish nation: which engagements had been reduced in command, most especially to recommend to parliament, in conside ration of the immense interests at stake in the war now carrying on, that they should proceed with as little delay as possible, to consider the most effectual measures for the augmentation of the regular army.* An Address to his Majesty, which was an echo to the Lord's Commissioners speech, was moved by the Earl of Bridgewater, and seconded by Lord Sheffield. But the Earl of St. Vincent rose, and said, That the Address just read was such, that no man who had a veneration for his sovereign, or a love for his country, could ever assent to. Some parts of it, which went to express a determined hostility to the common enemy, and a firm resolution to carry on the war against him, all must approve. But when he adverted to the manner in which that opposition to him had been conducted on the peninsula of Europe, it was wholly impossible not to express both sorrow and indignation. He would assert it in the face of the country, and in the face of the world, that it was the greatest disgrace that had befallen Great Britain since the days of the Revolution; and this he openly declared, whether he took into consideration the manner in which the war was carried on in Portugal, or the way in which our troops had been sent there. Transports were hired, and great merit was to be attributed, forsooth, to ministers in providing these transports. But the public ought to be undeceived upon that head; there was not a tittle of merit in the case; it was only going to market, and offering a little more than the market price, and transports were to be obtained in abundance. He wished, however, to notice the important services to which these transports were eventually applied; why truly," said his lordship, "they were at last employed to convey the rascally ruffians whom Junot commanded, to that part of France which was nearest the boundaries of Spain, that they might, as speedily as possible, be again brought into action, with more effect, against our soldiers. So that those devils," added his lordship, "are at this moment harassing the rear of our retreating army." The impolicy of sending British troops to Portugal he always disapproved; but the result of the war there he was disgusted with: and then the delay that prevailed before we sent a man from thence towards Spain, was disgraceful. In fact it would seem as if ministers had not even a geographic knowledge of the country through which our troops were to pass, insomuch that they ought to go again to school, to make themselves masters of it. But their ignorance of that species of knowledge, one would suppose, was official; for a "Heaven-born Minister," just after he first came into power, asked whether Port Mahon was in Europe or not? and the persons at present in power manifested just the same local ignorance, when they sent an army to traverse a wild and inhospitable country, at the very commencement of the rainy season, to drink new wine, and to be overwhelmed with disease as well as fatigue. • See the whole speech, State Papers, p. 738. So So little confidence did he place in these men, that he was decidedly of opinion, that unless they were removed, the country would be lost. The Convention of Cintra could not be considered, with out feeling sentiments of alarm, as well as indignation, rising in the mind; the more especially when he observed the cold-blooded treaty, that gave up a contest with the ships of an enemy, upon a compromise so unworthy the nation's character. There was a time, when such old-fashioned words as "sink, burn, and destroy," were understood and exercised: but now we are to negociate to be ships' husbands, and to take possession by bargain and barter, instead of by battles, by bravery, and by balls; we are to hold ships in trust by contract, and not in right by conquest. We had Princes of the blood, all of whom are bred to arms. Why, he asked, were not some of these illustrious persons employed to lead our armies; they had made the science of war their study from their childhood? If they were not to be employed, he was at a loss to ascertain for what purpose they were bred to arms. There was a dis'tinguished person near him (Earl Moira) who had the confidence of the people, who had the love of the soldiery, and who possessed the esteem of his majesty: why was not such a person as that nobleman employed? The reason was evident-it was because management prevented it. But was it to be supposed that because a Court of Enquiry had deemed no further investigation necessary, that therefore there ought to be no investigation? Whenever he looked at as the terms of the Convention; whenever he reflected on the decision of that court, he could not avoid exclaiming, that the decision so announced was a blot upon the country. Whenever he heard of councils of war being called, he always considered them cloaks for cowardliness; so said the brave Boscawen, and from him he imbibed the sentiment which time and experience had completely confirmed. At Vimiera we gained a victory, and in the moment that our soldiers were flushed with conquest, recourse was had to a council of war: that, he presumed, could only have been necessary, or indeed apologised for, in the moment of defeat. Upon what principle, therefore, such an expedient was resorted to, he, for one, accustomed to other methods, could not account. They only who acted in it could explain it. Just the same opinion he entertained of the Court of Enquiry; it was a shield to ward off investigation from ministers themselves; but he trusted that their lordships would not be prevented from making a scrupulous investigation of it in their own way. He knew the cha racter of the Portuguese exceedingly well. They, excepting the city of Lisbon, were as brave people as any upon the continent of Europe, and, officered with British soldiers, would have presented an undaunted front to Frenchmen. Why was not that expedient made use of? Ministers ought to have known their value, and if they did not, their ignorance was inexcusable. If that house did its duty, they would immediately proceed to the foot of the throne, and there tell the sovereign the bold truth truth, that if he did not remove them, he would lose the country. These were the sentiments of his heart; he spoke them as a solemn duty, which he found himself bound to express. It was probably the last time he should trouble their lordships, and with that, said the noble admiral, I wish your lordships a good night. (At these words the noble earl instantly walked out of the house.) The Earl of Grosvenor admitted that there was not much in the address to admit a diversity of opinion. He cordially approved of that part of the speech which expressed a determination to give all possible assistance to the Spaniards, so long as they should continue to be true to themselves. He did not despair of the Spanish cause, provided that the vast means of this country were employed in the manner best calculated to distres and embarrass the enemy. He also concurred in that part of the speech which expressed disapprobation of the Convention of Cintra. His lordship severely censur ed that millitary arrangement, by which a British army was sent into the heart of Spain, when it should have been sent to the foot of the Pyrenees. It should have been sent to a situation, where it could not be exposed to the possibility of being obliged to retreat. Lord Viscount Sidmouth approved of continuing to support Spain as long as any hopes remained. But he was not prepared to thank his Majesty for a treaty of the conditions and engagements of which he was wholly ignorant. Lord Grenville observed, that it was the constant practice, until the present administration came into office, to refrain, both in the speech and in the address, from calling upon parliament to deliver any decided opinion approving of past measures, the documents relating to which were not in the possession of the House, or expressing à determination to support any future system, the details of which had not been communicated. With respect to the policy of sending a British army to Spain, he did not mean to say, that there might not be circumstances under which it might be expedient to send British troops into Spain, but during the last summer there was no prospect that ought to have induced any reasonable man to send a British army into the interior of Spain. He did not mean, however, to apply his observation to naval co-operation, by sending fleets with troops to annoy particular parts of the coast, to keep the enemy in a constant state of alarm, and to obtain partial advantages. With the Pyrenees unlocked, and the road between Paris and Madrid as open as that between Paris and Antwerp, there was nothing that could justify our sending into the interior of Spain 30 or 40,000 British men to meet an army of 200,000. “I can compare such a measure," said his lordship, "only to the farfamed march to Paris, to which it is fully equal in its wildness and absurdity. It is perfectly clear that it must rest with the Spanish people themselves to maintain their independence, and that with •Recommended in 1793 by the present Earl of Liverpool, then Mr. Jenkinson, in the House of Commons. out out that spirit amongst themselves no army that we could send would be of any avail. They adopted a system, which was published in the early part of the summer, under the title of Precautions,' and which contained a most excellent plan of defence adapted to the peculiarities of the country, and calculated to harrass and annoy an invading army, and to wear them down by a continued system of partial attack, without incurring the risk which must necessarily attend a pitched battle with regular and veteran troops. This system was the best which could be adopted by that country, under its then circumstances, and might have produced a great effect upon the enemy, whose troops would have been continually harassed and fatigued, whilst the Spaniards, taking advantage of the peculiarities of their country, would have incurred little immediate risk, and would have gained a knowledge and attained a discipline which might have subsequently qualified them to contend in the field with the regular troops of France. This excellent system we forced them to abandon, by sending into the interior of the country a British army: it then became impossible for the Spaniards to leave our army to fight their battles by itself; our army would, of course, proceed in the manner and according to the usual routine of a regular army; and thus the Spaniards were forced on to engage in pitched battles, at a period when they were not competent, with regular troops, whilst the British army, too small to cope with the great superiority of troops brought into the field by France, can only retreat. In this way, my lords, I contend that the sending a British army into the interior of Spain has been actually injurious to the cause of the patriots in that country. In what manner have they afforded the aid of which they now so much boast? Setting aside for a moment the consideration of the general question of the policy or impolicy of sending British troops into the interior of Spain, it may be said, that there was a time when a British force of 30 or 40,000 men might have contributed to ob tain a great temporary advantage, which, whatever effect it might have had upon the ultimate fate of the war, would at least have enabled the Spaniards to arrange their defence, and to mature their preparations. It may be said that there was a period of the contest when the French having been driven from Madrid, and forced to take refuge in the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees, a British force, sent there at that particular crisis, might have driven the French beyond the Pyrenees, and placed in the hands of the Spaniards the keys of their country, which they might then have been enabled to defend under infinitely more advantageous circumstances than they had since been placed in. It might be said, that this case did, from peculiar circumstances, actually occur. Allowing it to be so, how was it taken advantage of? One might have supposed, that, to make the proper use of such an advantageous conjuncture of affairs, our troops would have been sent to the port nearest the scene of action, and from whence they might be marched, in the shortest time, to the spot where their services were most wanted. But, instead of the nearest |