do Mr. JONAS. Did he sell any members of the conference anything, think? you Mr. ROBERTS. Well, I understand they felt that it was a very effective presentation. Mr. PINCUS. Is there any transcript of his remarks available? Mr. ROBERTS. I would be glad to do so. Hon. WILLIAM L. DAWSON, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives DEAR CONGRESSMAN DAWSON: In accordance with your request made at the hearings held on May 15, 1956, in connection with the employment of experts. consultants, and WOC personnel in the Department of Agriculture, there is attached a transcript of the talk given by Dr. George Dykhuizen. In this connection, we believe it will be helpful if the committee has a better understanding of the service rendered by Dr. Dykhuizen, and, for that purpose. we have attached an additional explanatory statement. There is also attached a copy of the program of the conference, in which you may be interested. Sincerely yours, Attachments. RALPH S. ROBERTS, Administrative Assistant Secretary. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE STATEMENT OF SERVICES RENDERED BY DR. GEORGE DYKHUIZEN, CONSULTANT, GS-12 The services of Dr. George Dykhuizen, who is currently professor of philosophy at the University of Vermont, have been utilized as a consultant on several occasions by the Commodity Stabilization Service and its predecessor agencies, Production and Marketing Administration and Agricultural Adjustment Administration, during the past 17 years. He has addressed conferences of State and county committeemen and has a published bulletin Soil Conservation, a Philosopher's Viewpoint which has been widely referred to. In January 1956 the Commodity Stabilization Service scheduled and approved a meeting in Washington, D. C., of the agricultural stabilization conservation State committeemen, State administrative officers, and farmer fieldmen from the 13 States of the Northeast area. At the field level, these workers are responsible for coordinating and directing the service to farmers on action programs made available through the Agricultural Stabilization Conservation County Committee system. Like many such meetings, training in program objectives, administration, and relationships with the public whom the Department serves through agricultural programs, was one of the fundamental purposes of the conference. In addition, we were specifically aware of an administrative problem which had arisen as a result of the reduction of acreage allotments in certain commodities, which called for a tactful, diplomatic, and personal approach in effectively administering the program with due regard to the individual farmer and his problems. In this connection, it was determined that the viewpoints and outlook of Dr. Dykhuizen would be of valuable assistance in educating and training the personnel attending the conference in the proper handling of this problem. As a part of the approved agenda of the conference which was held at the Burlington Hotel, Washington, D. C., January 24, 25, 26, 1956, Dr. Dykhuizen gave a talk on January 26, 1956, entitled "The Dignity of Man and Its Implications for Practice." This talk was geared to a training policy which emphasizes a recognition of the problems of the individual farmer, his individuality within the community closest to the programs administered by the agricultural stabilization conservation State and county committee system which reach down to the individual farms and farm families. The scope of the presentation, his consultative services during the panel, and floor discussions of the whole 1956 conference, and his personal, individual discussions with workers attending the conference, were geared to the fundamental public service policy of the Department of Agriculture with regard to the farm population. His active participation in this conference represented a valuable contribution which will be helpful in improving the effectiveness of field administration. THE DIGNITY OF MAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE (Talk delivered to the Northeast Area Conference, Commodity Stabilization Service, Washington, D. C., January 24, 1956, by Dr. George Dykhuizen, professor of philosophy, University of Vermont) The topic on which you have asked me to address you concerns one of the basic ideas of our western culture. We can go further. We can assert that the idea of the "dignity of man" is the most fundamental of all our moral and social concepts and that from it stem all the other great ideas which distinguish our civilization from others. Let us begin by asking, with the Psalmist, "What is man that thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that thou visiteth him?" The natural sciences have their answers. Physics tells that man is a combination of mass and energy and subject to all the laws that mass and energy everywhere are subject to. Chemistry informs that man is made of chemicals and chemical processes and that these are identical in kind with those found elsewhere in nature. Biology teaches that man is one of over 1 million animal species and is like them in all essential respects. He is born, he grows, he matures, he mates, he reproduces, he grows old, he dies. As a biological organism, man differs from other animals only in his erect posture, the structure of his hands, his arms that move in sockets in all directions, his large brain, and his complex nervous system. In short, the natural sciences teach that man is a part of nature, bone of her bone, flesh of her flesh, and is to be distinguished from other parts of nature only in degree and not in kind. Man as a merely physical-chemical-biological being, which he is from the point of view of the natural sciences, can scarcely be credited with "dignity." For by "dignity" we mean that quality in a person which inspires respect and reverence on the part of others. And man's physical, chemical, biological nature does not do this. The complexity of his structure, the intricate and harmonious interaction of its parts, the marvelous efficiency of its members elicit wonder and admiration but not reverence and respect. We can exclaim with the Psalmist: "I am wonderfully and fearfully made," but we cannot say with him: "Thou has made him a little lower than the angels, and has crowned him with glory and honor." Whatever respect and reverence we experience when we contemplate man's physical, chemical, biological being are awakened not by considerations of man's structure, but by considerations of the Power that made and preserved that structure. The natural sciences are not the only disciplines which study man. The social sciences and the humanities deal with him also. The social sciences study man as a creature living in close relations with other human beings. They teach that man differs from other gregarious animals in his developed speech or language, his tools and inventions, his ability to organize complex social groups, his recognition of social "problems," his possession of customs and traditions, cultures and civilization. The humanities teach that behind these outward social and institutional forms, and bringing them into existence, are human feeling, believing, hoping, and striving. Literature, drama, poetry, history, philosophy, religion reveal that man is a creature who in imagination transcends himself and nature, and views himself in his relation to the whole. They teach that man is a self-concious personality, a moral agent who distinguishes the better and the worse and who throughout his history has hoped and strived for the better. This has meant that man has had to fight against and subdue himself as well as his environment. For man is a creature of contrasts and contradictions. He is of the earth, earthy; he is also of the spirit, spiritual. He is a creature of paradoxhalf animal and half angel. Greek mythology pictured animals who are half beasts and half man. Centaurs had the heads of men but the bodies of animals. Plato speaks of the beast in each of us and of the God who resides there also. Christianity speaks of the struggle of the flesh and the spirit. The psychological and medical sciences today explain that many of the tensions and neuroses in 79325-56--12 human life are due to the pressures exerted by our original drives, appetites, and feelings against the standards and ideals imposed on them by our more distinctly human self. The story of the human species is the story of a creature who has sought to bring the animal in him under the guidance and control of the God within him; to bring his original passions, appetites, and drives under the dominion of his more uniquely human faculties—his reason, his sympathetic imagination, his sense of justice and of beauty. The very faculties which lift mankind above all other creatures can, when corrupted or debased, plunge man to depths not attainable by other species. Of all animal species, man alone can deliberately hate, envy, betray. The depth to which human nature can fall is reflected in man's religions which regularly have taught that in a netherworld there exists a special region to receive the unrepentant sinner. This persistent struggle for a more distinctly and ideal human existence alone exalts man above all other created things and invests him with a dignity not shared by any other earthbound species. Human dignity derives from man's steadfast attempt, through countless generations, to attain ideal ends. He may fail to attain his ideals, he may at times even betray them; but, in spite of repeated and tragic defeats, he has always persisted in the struggle and continued his quest. This is the feature of human nature which crowns him with glory and honor and makes him only a little lower than the angels. This is the element in man which commands our respect. The trait which exalts the species and lends it dignity exalts and gives dignity to its individual members. Man the individual, participating as he does in a common human nature and in a common human endeavor, shares with his fellows the dignity assigned to the species and merits the respect and reverence accorded it. The human individual, conceived as a moral agent striving to do the right and to attain the good, is a creature of dignity and commands our respect, however humble or lowly in the social scale he may be. Than individual man's hopes and fears, joys and sufferings, satisfactions and disappointments, beliefs and aspirations, there is nothing more significant or more ultimate. The individual human being, irrespective of birth, race, color, or creed, is the place where all values come to a form; his growth, the development of all that is highest and best in him, that is, his happiness, represents the ideal culmination of mankind's age-long struggle to fashion a better life on this planet. This is the proposition which western civilization accepts as axiomatic and on which it has built its political, economic and social ideologies. The idea of "rights" is the most fundamental of the ideas that grow logically out of the idea of the dignity of man. That the idea of rights is simply an extension of the idea of the worth and dignity of the individual is obvious when we note that rights derive their normal justification from the fact that certain of them are the indispensable condition of any human good whatever. The English philosopher, John Locke, spoke of the rights of life, liberty, and property; Jefferson referred to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the philosophers of the French Revolution proclaimed liberty, equality and fraternity. These rights were termed by the 17th and 18th century philosophers as "natural" or "God-given" rights; today philosophers tend to call them "moral" rights. In either case, the conviction is that these rights are not the arbitrary creations of some external authority such as the State, but belong to each individual by virtue of his being a moral agent, a human personality of infinite value and dignity. As such, these rights cannot be taken away from him. The idea of natural or moral rights contrasts with the idea of legal or civil rights. These latter are conferred on the individual by society or government, and can be withdrawn at the discretion of society. Civil rights are intended to reinforce natural rights and are morally justified only when they do this. That social institutions exist for the sake of the individual and not the individual for the sake of the institution, is another logical extension of the idea of the dignity of man. Italian fascism would make the state the supreme end and would manipulate individual human lives in whatever way would best serve the alleged interests of the state. German national socialism would make the Nordic race the thing of supreme value, and would compel individuals and members of other races to adjust their lives in a manner that would advance the interest of that race. Russian communism, under its dictatorship of the proletariat, elevates this dictatorship to a position of supreme authority and empowers it, in the name of the classless, Communist society of the future, to control individual lives as seems best to it. In sharp contrast, western culture considers man, the individual, as the only real political, economic, or social entity and therefore gives him primacy. An institution is regarded simply as a means for preserving and cultivating the dignity of the individual. The political, economic, and social philosophies which western peoples have devised attempt to make central the idea of the dignity and worth of the individual. The theory of government which emerges is the democratic one, the theory which holds that a government of the people, by the people, and for the people is most in keeping with the dignity of man and best adapted to protect his rights. Nondemocratic theories teach that authority and control should reside with the few and be imposed on the masses by those who are allegedly superior in wisdom and virtue. Democratic political theory teaches that authority and control should remain with those who are expected to live under it, namely the people themselves, and that government should be with the consent of the governed. Only under such a political arrangement can the individual submit to external authority and at the same time retain his dignity as a human being. The economic philosophy which became an essential part of western tradition was the laissez-faire theory of private, competitive, individual enterprise in which government plays the role of a passive policeman. This theory was judged to be most consistent with the idea of the dignity of man in that under a laissez-faire economy man would experience a maximum of freedom, opportunity, prosperity, and security in his economic activities. More recently, western man's thinking on economic affairs has been modified to include ideas of government control and even participation in business enterprises, public ownership, group organization and initiative, collective bargaining, etc. Similarly, western man's broader social philosophy has shifted from one in which matters of health, care of the needy, care of the aged, were judged to be the concern of private individuals and groups to one in which these are coming to be regarded as the responsibilities of the public. There are those who argue that the introduction of these concepts in western man's thinking is evidence that the idea of the dignity of the individual is no longer central. The truth is that the idea of the dignity of man does not commit one irrevocably to some economic or social "ism." The idea of the dignity of man requires that whatever economic or social philosophy is devised, whether it be individualism, collectivism, capitalism, or socialism, must give primacy to the idea of the individual and his rights and make its other ideas consistent with it. The idea of the dignity of man carries with it certain implications for our everyday practice. One of the most important of these is tolerance toward those who hold ideas or beliefs which differ from ours. Tolerance, in this connection, is more than a good-humored indifference to those who differ with us. Tolerance means a willingness to give them a fair hearing and to treat with seriousness the ideas they advance. The idea of the dignity of man implies, perhaps above all else, the individual's right to think critically and sincerely and to express his thoughts freely. An individual who has never developel his faculty of reason or who is prevented by external authority from exercising this faculty where it is developed, falls short of reaching his full stature as man. For man's reason is his most characteristic faculty and to fail to use it is to rob one's self of that element of human nature which, more than any other, endows man with dignity. Tolerance provides the occasion where an individual can think freely and sincerely and can communicate his thoughts to people who will seriously consider them. The idea of the dignity of man commits us to a careful scrutiny of the means employed to achieve an end as well as a careful examination of the end which requires for its realization the adoption of certain means. There are those who say that a good end justifies any means; that, however undesirable certain means may be, if they are directed to a good and worthwhile end, this in itself justifies them. Such a view recognizes that whatever justification there is in the means must be found in the end. But such a view overlooks that whatever justification there is in the end must be found in the means. An end which requires for its achievement the use of means which tread underfoot the dignity of human beings is an end which needs itself to be reconsidered and modified in the light of other means which respect the dignity of the people involved. In short, to justify means there must necessarily be present a worthwhile end. But the reverse is equally true. To justify an end there must necessarily be present justifiable means. The truth is that means and ends are not two distinct entities having different moral qualities. They are both aspects of one and the same process in which the means represent the earlier steps and the end constitutes the culmination. The idea of the dignity of man requires that, in devising means and setting up ends, the value and worth of the individual must be recognized at every stage of the process. Western man has adopted as a general standard of practice the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. In determining the greatest good," each man should count as one, and only one, the good of a pauper counting as heavily as the good of a king. This principle serves in the Western World as a guide in personal conduct as well as in group or government action, in which latter cases it is coupled with the principle of majority rule. When this principle first appeared in 18th-century England, it was quite properly hailed as one which recognized the rights of the masses as over against the special privileges of the few. Throughout its history, this principle has served as a potent weapon against entrenched privilege and vested interests. The idea of the dignity of man requires, however, that this principle be applied with caution. The good of the majority must never be attained at the expense of the dignity of those who comprise the minority. The greatest good for the greatest number must not tread wantonly on the basic human rights of the minority, even if that minority be a minority of one. Our Founding Fathers recognized the danger of majority rule and action even when this was done in the name of the greatest good for the greatest number, and provided a Bill of Rights which sets limits beyond which no majority can legitimately go. I wish we might have had the time to trace the origins of the idea of the dignity of man. Such a study would have shown that the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the classical Greek and Roman tradition, and the humanist tradition of the Renaissance all played important roles in the fashioning of it. Perhaps I can best close my remarks by stating again the question which engaged us at the beginning of our discussion and by quoting a passage from Shakespeare. "What is man that thou art mindful of him? And the son of man that thou visiteth him?" This is the question we originally asked. Shakespeare, speaking in behalf of Renaissance humanism, exclaims: "What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty; in form and moving how express and admirable in action! how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!" Mr. JONAS. Before you leave that, was it in that same sort of activity that he had been engaged before? Mr. ROBERTS. Yes. Mr. JONAS. From time to time? Mr. ROBERTS. Yes. Mr. JONAS. As a lecturer? Mr. ROBERTS. And discussion leader. Mr. JONAS. Discussion leader. Mr. ROBERTS. That is right-not necessarily as a lecturer. He met with smaller groups in local communities. Mr. PINCUS. And his philosophical approach involved payments for conservation practices under-what do you call it? It used to be the ACP program, I guess. Mr. ROBERTS. That is right. Mr. PINCUS. Is that the name? Mr. ROBERTS. Yes. Mr. PINCUS. It is the same program; the agricultural stabilization program? Mr. ROBERTS. Well, it is the agricultural conservation program. Mr. ROBERTS. His approach is not one of a particular program. Mr. PINCUS. That is what I am curious about. You made no reference to the program. Mr. ROBERTS. It is a question of relationships. |