Truth has encompassed with falsehood every soul that he has made! -Has given up all mankind to a strong delusion, to believe a lie: yea, all his creation is a lie, all the natural and all the moral world." If so, you make GOD himself, rather than the Devil, (horrid thought!) the Father of lies; Such you doubtless represent him, when you say not only that he has surrounded us with illusion on every side; but that the feelings which he has interwoven with our inmost nature, are equally illusive! That "All these shadows which for things we take, Are but the empty dreams, which in Death's sleep we make !" And yet after this, you make a feint of disputing, in defence of a material world! Inconsistency all over! What proof have we of this, what possible proof can we have, if we cannot trust our own eyes, or ears, or any, or all of our senses? But it is certain, I can trust none of my senses, if I am a mere machine. For I have the testimony of all my outward and all my inward senses, that I am a free agent. If therefore I cannot trust them in this, I can trust them in nothing. Do not tell me, there are sun, moon, and stars. or that there are men, beasts, or birds in the world. I cannot believe one tittle of it, if I cannot believe what I feel in myself, namely, that it depends on me, and no other being, whether I shall now open or shut my eyes, move my head hither and thither, or stretch my hand or my foot. If I am necessitated to do all this, contrary to the whole, both of my inward and outward senses, I can believe nothing else, but must necessarily sink into universal scepticism. Let us now weigh the main argument on which this author builds. the melancholy hypothesis of Necessity. "Actions necessarily arise from their several motives: therefore all human actions are necessary." Again, "In all cases the choice must be determined, by that motive which appears the best upon the whole. But motives are not under our power. Man is passive in receiving impressions of things, according to which the last judgment is necessarily formed. This the will necessarily obeys, and the outward action necessarily follows the will. Let us take this boasted argument in pieces, and survey it part by part. 1. "Motives are not under our power. This is not universally true. Some are, some are not. That man has a strong motive to run his neighbour through, namely, violent anger. And yet the action does not necessarily follow. Often it does not follow at all; and where it does, not necessarily; he might have resisted that motive. 2. "In all cases the choice must be determined by that motive which appears the best upon the whole." This is absolutely false. It is flatly contrary to the experience of all mankind. Who may not say on many occasions, Video meliora? I know what I do, is not "best upon the whole ?" 3. "Man is passive in receiving the impressions of things." Not altogether. Even here much depends VOL. 9.-R r on his own choice. In many cases he may or may not receive the im pression in most he may vary it greatly. 4. "According to these, his last judgment is necessarily formed." Nay; this too depends much upon his choice. Sometimes his first, sometimes his last judgment, is according to the impressions which he has received and frequently, it is not. 5. "This the will necessarily obeys." Indeed it does not. The mind has an intrinsic power, of cutting off the connexion between the judgment and the will. 6. "And the outward action necessarily follows the will." Not so. The thing I would, I do not, and the thing I would not, that I do. Whatever then becomes of the chain of events, this chain of argument has not one good link belonging to it. 3. But allowing all he contends for, That upon such vibrations of the brain, such sensations directly follow, and indirectly, (as the various combinations and results of them,) all our judgments and passions, and consequently words and actions: yet this infers no necessity at all-if there be a GOD in the world. Upon this the whole. matter turns. And, "This circumstance the Doctor had forgot." And so indeed have almost the whole tribe of modern philosophers. They do not at all take GOD into their account: they can do their whole business without him. But in truth this their wisdom is their folly: for no system either of morality or philosophy, can be complete, unless GOD be kept in view, from the very beginning to the end. Every true philosopher will surely go at least as far as the poor Heathen Poet, Ἐκ Διο αρχώμεθα, και εν Δει λήγετε Μωσαι. Now if there be a GOD, he cannot but have all power over every creature that he has made. He must have equal power over matter and spirits, over our souls and bodies. What are then all the vibrations of the brain to Him? Or all the natural consequences of them? Suppose there be naturally the strongest concatenation of vibrations, sensations, reflections, judgments, passions, actions ; cannot He in a moment, whenever and however he pleases, destroy that concatenation? Cannot he cut off, or suspend, in any degree, the connexion between vibrations and sensations? Between sensations and reflections? Between reflections and judgments? And between judgments and passions or actions? We cannot have any idea of GOD'S omnipotence, without seeing, he can do this, if he will.. 4. "If he will, you may say, we know he can. But have we any reason to think he will?" Yes; the strongest reason in the world, supposing that God is Love: More especially suppose he is loving to every man, and that his mercy is over all his works. If so, it cannot be, that he should see the noblest of his creatures under heaven, necessitated to do evil, and incapable of any relief but from himself, without affording that relief. It is undeniable, that he has fixed in man, in every man, his umpire, conscience; an inward judge, which passes sentence both on his passions and actions, either ap proving or condemning them. Indeed it has not power to remove what it condemns: it shows the evil which it cannot cure. But the GOD of Power can cure it: and the GOD of Love will,—if we choose he should. But he will no more necessitate us to be happy, than he will permit any thing beneath the sun to lay us under a necessity of being miserable. I am not careful therefore about the flowing of my blood and spirits, or the vibrations of my brain: being well assured, that however my spirits may flow, or my nerves and fibres vibrate, the Almighty GOD of Love can control them all, and will (unless I obstinately choose vice and misery) afford me such help. as in spite of all these, will put it into my power to be virtuous and happy for ever. GLASGOW, May 14, 1774. THOUGHTS UPON GOD'S SOVEREIGNTY. GOD reveals himself under a two-fold character; as a Creator. and as a Governor. These are no way inconsistent with each other : but they are totally different. As a Creator, he has acted, in all things, according to his own sovereign will. Justice has not, cannot have, any place here; for nothing is due to what has no being. Here therefore he may, in the most absolute sense, "do what he will with his own." Accordingly, he created the heavens and the earth, and all things that are therein, in every conceivable respect, "according to his own good pleasure." 1. He began his creation, at what time, or rather at what part of eternity, it seemed him good. Had it pleased him, it might have been millions of years sooner, or millions of ages later. 2. He determined, by his sovereign will, the duration of the universe; whether it should last seven thousand, or seven hundred thousand, or numberless millions of years. 3. By the same, he appointed the place of the universe, in the immensity of space. 4. Of his sovereign will, he determined the number of the stars, of all the component parts of the universe, and the magnitude of every atom, of every fixed star, every planet, and every comet. 5. As Sovereign, he created the earth, with all the furniture of it, whether animate or inanimate; and gave to each such a nature, with such properties. 6. Of his own good pleasure, he made such a creature as man, and, in consequence of his spiritual nature, endued him with understanding, will, and liberty. 7. He hath determined the times for every nation to come into being. with the bounds of their habitation. 8. He has allotted the time, the place, the circumstances, for the birth of each individual. "If of parents I came, That honour'd thy name, 'Twas thy goodness appointed it so." 9. He has given to each a body as it pleased him, weak or strong, healthy or sickly. This implies, 10. That he gives them various degrees of understanding, and of knowledge, diversified by numberless circumstances. It is hard to say, how far this extends: what an amazing difference there is, as to the means of improvement, between one born and brought up in a pious English family, and one born and bred among the Hottentots. Only we are sure the difference cannot be so great, as to necessitate one to be good, or the other to be evil; to force one into everlasting glory, or the other into everlasting burnings. This cannot be, because it would suppose the character of God, as a Creator, to interfere with God, as a Governor: wherein he does not, cannot possibly, act according to his own mere sovereign will; but, as he has expressly told us, according to the invariable rules both of justice and mercy. Whether therefore we can account for it or not, (which indeed we cannot in a thousand cases) we must absolutely maintain, that God is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him. But he cannot re ward the sun for shining, because the sun is not a free-agent. Neither could he reward us, for letting our light shine before men, if we acted as necessarily as the sun. All reward, as well as all punishment, presupposes free-agency; and whatever creature is incapable of choice, is incapable of either the one or the other. Whenever therefore God acts, as a Governor, as a Rewarder, or Punisher, he no longer acts as a mere Sovereign, by his own sole will and pleasure; but as an impartial Judge, guided in all things by invariable justice. Yet it is true, that, in some cases, Mercy rejoices over Justice; although Severity never does. God may reward more, but he will never punish more, than strict justice requires. It may be allowed, that God acts as Sovereign, in convincing some souls of sin; arresting them in their mad career, by his resistless power. It seems also, that, at the moment of our conversion, he acts irresistibly. There may likewise be many irresistible touches, during the course of our Christian warfare: with regard to which every believer may say, "In the time of my distress, Thou hast my succour been, In my utter helplessness 66 But still, as St. Paul might have been either obedient or disobedient to the heavenly vision," so every individual may, after all that God has done, either improve his grace or make it of none effect. Whatever therefore it hath pleased God to do, of his Sovereign pleasure, as Creator of heaven and earth; and whatever his mercy may do on particular occasions, over and above what justice requires; the general rule stands firm as the pillars of heaven, "The Judge of all the earth will do right." He will "judge the world in righteousness," and every man therein, according to the strictest justice. He will punish no man, for doing any thing which he could not possibly avoid; neither for omitting any thing which he could not possibly do. Every punishment supposes the offender might have avoided the offence, for which he is punished. Otherwise, to punish him would be palpably unjust, and inconsistent with the character of God our Go vernor. Let then these two ideas, of God the Creator, the Sovereign Creator, and God the Governor, the Just Governor, be always kept apart. Let us distinguish them from each other, with the utmost care. So shall we give God the full glory of his Sovereign Grace, without impeaching his inviolable justice. THE QUESTION, WHAT IS AN ARMINIAN? ANSWERED. 1. To say, This man is an Arminian," has the same effect on: anany hearers, as to say, "This is a mad dog." It puts them into a fright at once: they run away from him with all speed and diligence: and will hardly stop, unless it be to throw a stone at the dreadful, mischievous animal. 2. The more unintelligible the word is, the better it answers the purpose. Those on whom it is fixed, know not what to do: not understanding what it means, they cannot tell what defence to make, or how to clear themselves from the charge. And it is not easy to remove the prejudice, which others have imbibed, who know no more of it, than that it is "something very bad," if not " all that is bad!" 3. To clear the meaning therefore of this ambiguous term, may be of use to many: to those who so freely pin this name upon others, that they may not say what they do not understand: to those that hear them, that they may be no longer abused by men saying they know not what and to those upon whom the name is fixed, that they may know how to answer for themselves. 4. It may be necessary to observe, first, that many confound Arminians with Arians. But this is entirely a different thing: the one has no resemblance to the other. An Arian is one who denies the Godhead of Christ: we scarcely need say, the supreme, eternal Godhead; because there can be no God but the supreme, eternal God, unless we will make two gods, a great god, and a little one. Now, none have ever more firmly believed, or more strongly asserted, the Godhead of Christ, than many of the (so called) Arminians have done, |