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upon to obey. The attorney-general, to do him justice, had already pointed out that Mr. Hawkesley could have further privilege than Mr. Rhodes had. And Mr. Hawkesley, to do him justice also, had frankly admitted that Mr. Rhodes could allege no ground of privilege at all.

pass the matter over without a formal division recording the names of those who voted. The committee clerk, however, was demanded and sent for, and the names were taken down.

Then came a still more audacious coup. It was obvious to all the world that Mr. Hawkesley's examination was not concluded. It was admitted by everybody that certain members of the committee had not yet had an opportunity of exercising their obvious and parliamentary right to cross-examine an important witness called before a committee of the House. The government, however, with the astounding support of the Opposition Front Bencu, resolved that this also was inexpedient, and the motion that Mr. Hawkesley should go back into the box, in order that his cross-examination might be same two completed, was lost. The gentlemen alone voted for it. amaze

What was the result? The story will hardly be believed, and yet it is true. The Opposition members of the committee had been meeting, of course, from time to time to consider their action. Upon this question they were agreed. At a meeting, we believe in Sir William Harcourt's room, upon one of these eventful days, they declared loudly, and none more loudly than Sir William Harcourt himself, that the attempt on the government side to keep back the cablegrams was scandalous and intolerable, and that their production must be forced. To the ment of at least certain members on that side of the committee, when the committee met to consider as to re

porting Mr. Hawkesley's refusal to the House, Sir William Harcourt declared for the opposite course. The ostensible argument was that to take proceedings upon Mr. Hawkesley's, or rather Mr. Rhodes's, defiance of the committee, would involve delay, and that it was extremely important to present a report upon the raid immediately. It was answered that this, to put it plainly, was nonsense, since there was nothing to prevent the committee from reporting on the raid, after having invited the House to deal with Mr. Hawkesley, or with those behind him. Resistance, however, was useless. The proposal that Mr. Hawkesley should be reported only secured, as has been already stated in the Times, two votesthose of Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake. Others, such as Mr. Sydney Buxton, remained puzzled. It was clear that the government had suddenly, by some means unknown, cured the support of Sir William Harcourt, and presumably his more of cial colleagues, to the policy of silence. An attempt, we believe, was even made to

se

Now let us see for a moment what

one ap

Mr. Hawkesley had to say. There is not the slightest indication in his evidence that he is concealing anything from the committee, and no pears to allege that he is anything but an honorable and truthful person. He told the committee, on May 25, quite frankly, that when Mr. Rhodes came to England "to face the music," in the first days of February, 1896, he instantly saw him, and as they travelled together from Plymouth to London, on the very day of the great man's arrival, a conversation of the utmost importance took place. It may be that Mr. Rhodes was complaining that the Colonial Office was dealing hardly with him, considering the communications that had passed beforehand. Probably the Colonial Office, under the circumstances, could not help itself, in view of the international situation which then existed; but let that pass. We have it from Mr. Hawkesley that Mr. Rhodes told him then about these cables which he had received from England in 1895. He evidently said that he had been by these cables assured that the Colonial Office was "in it." He told Mr. Hawkesley, to use the

careful language of that solicitor, that
these cables "had been considered by
him and communicated by him to oth-
ers," "that they had been acted upon,"
"that he had used them"-as support-
ing his action-"and had communicated
them to those whom it concerned." In
point of fact, Mr. Hawkesley makes it
clear that in the train from Plymouth
Mr. Rhodes assured him, not that he
held possible blackmailing documents,
but that he had documents on the faith
of which he, Mr. Rhodes, had secured
the co-operation of various persons in
the Jameson Plan, because these docu-
ments made it clear to the persons in
question-and, presumably, to Mr.
Rhodes himself-that the Colonial Of-
fice was cognizant of what was going
on. It is not probable, in any view,
that Mr. Rhodes was lying to his solic
itor. It is, to say the least, improbable
that when he made this communication
he was telling of things which he and
his agents had deliberately faked up
in order to defraud third parties into a
Office was
belief that the Colonial
never
cognizant of plans which had
been in any way disclosed to
Even Mr. Rhodes's worst enemies will
hardly think him capable of that. It
would be at least as foolish as it would
be criminal, and it is wholly inconsist-
ent with the general facts of the situa-
tion. Some other explanation must be
found.

them.

Now the missing cables are undoubtedly the most important part of the communications referred to in the conversation disclosed by Mr. Hawkesley. It is for that very reason that Mr. The case, Hawkesley speaks of it. however, does not stop there. Mr. Hawkesley goes on with equal frankness to say that he thereupon advised Mr. Rhodes to communicate these cables to the Colonial Office. What this meant is plain. It meant that as Mr. Rhodes was about to have his decisive interview with Mr. Chamberlain as to the consequences of the raid and its collapse, he should first of all explain to Mr. Chamberlain that the communications in question, suggesting the previous knowledge of the Colonial Office,

were not merely in Mr. Rhodes's pos-
session, but had, as a matter of fact,
the support of
been used to obtain
other persons in Africa. This was not
If we assume
necessarily blackmail.
for the moment that the Colonial Office
was "in it," it was sufficiently proper
once that
that they should be told at
others say, for example, some of the
Johannesburgers and all the military
officers that accompanied Jameson-
had been induced to go into this emi-
nently risky enterprise by the knowl-
edge that Mr. Chamberlain was cogni-
zant of what was going on. As a mat-
ter of fact, everybody understands that
Sir John Willoughby and the other of-
ficers holding the queen's commission
were induced to enter the Transvaal on
the theory that the queen's government
did not object, and that strong repre-
sentations have since been made that
on that account it was unjust to de-
prive them of their commissions.

The result of the conversation in the
train was curious and interesting. By
his chief's authority, Mr. Hawkesley at
once saw Mr. Fairfield, with whom he
was on personal terms. What passed
is not a matter of recollection, because
he produces two letters which make it
clear. He told Mr. Fairfield that some
of his "various clients" had "sent tel-
egrams, about Mr. Chamberlain or the
that some-
Office," to the Cape, and
thing which Mr. Chamberlain and the
Office were "supposed to have said”
had reached five or more persons sup-
Fairfield
posed to be important. Mr.
this to Sir R. Meade,
communicated
and they both agreed that they must
tell Mr. Chamberlain. He asked for
copies of the telegrams and for infor-
mation as to how much of the contents
"reached the
of these telegrams had
five, or whatever number it was, and
if so, whether it was in substance or
in words." Mr. Fairfield also adds this
careful phrase: "He does not recollect
saying anything anent the insurrection
which was supposed to have been im-
pending which he would greatly care
about if it became public." These are
Mr. Fairfield's words. It seems obvi-
ous that they implied that the Colonial

Office had supposed a revolution to be impending, and that Mr. Chamberlain himself had said something about it which might have been communicated in the way Mr. Hawkesley alleged. All it asserts is that Mr. Chamberlain would not greatly care if anything he had said in that line were made public. Mr. Hawkesley's reply is equally interesting. He relieved Mr. Chamberlain's mind about the existence of other documents by the statement that all "the information given to the people in Johannesburg had been oral." Thereby we learn that apart from the military officers, or any other persons who may have been pacified by information about the attitude of the Colonial Office, such information had actually been used to help to raise the bogus insurrection. Mr. Hawkesley, evidently under further instructions from Mr. Rhodes, elected to drop the discussion at that point. He did so with another significant phrase: "Mr. C. knows what I know, and can shape his course with this knowledge." As to what that meant, we shall be better able to form our opinion when we see the cables themselves.

The

The matter was revived in May. Apparently it must have been revived in some connection with the question, what was to be done about the officers and their commissions. The evidence so far given does not give us any clear light as to the exact circumstances under which the copies were ultimately asked for, and sent to Mr. Chamberlain on June 6 by Mr. Hawkesley. fact that by the highly irregular action of Mr. Chamberlain and his friends the opportunity for cross-examining Mr. Hawkesley was refused, precludes the public for the present from inquiring further into this interesting point. We do know that, after the officers had been sentenced, Mr. Hawkesley prepared a statement to the War Office, which is in evidence, in which it was directly stated, on the honor of Sir John Willoughby, that he and his officers were induced to ride in by being informed "that the steps are taken

with the knowledge and assent of the Imperial Authorities." We can only presume that Mr. Hawkesley considered that the copy cables he had submitted to the Colonial Office at an earlier stage tended in the same direction. Whether the sending of them is to be considered as a general ́ "blackmailing" effort to obtain terms by a threat of publication, or as a legitimate effort to show the government that their alleged dabbling in the business had led others into it, the result is the same. If there was really no foundation for the charge, Mr. Hawkesley and the whole group were guilty of incredible stupidity. Quis credat?

One word only need be added upon another branch of the same subject. It concerns Miss Flora Shaw. She was, as we all know, a habitué of the Colonial Office. She had the run of it, as the Colonial authority on the Times. She was also deep in the Rhodesian ring, and was beyond doubt personally devoted to Mr. Rhodes. She knew, she says, what Doctor Harris knew. She also communicated her views directly and indirectly to her chief at the Cape. It is needless to repeat the well-known and somewhat comic references to her in the published cables. It is sufficient to say that they indicate that it was fully supposed in the group of which she formed part that the Colonial Orfice was neither ignorant or hostile. The extraordinary telegram of Doctor Harris, "I have already sent Flora to convince J. Chamberlain support Times newspaper," has not so far been seriously explained by anybody. Yet it must have had a reason at the time. Probably it meant "to convince him of the support of the Times." If so, it is a pretty item. Miss Shaw herself stated in reply to Mr. Labouchere that in her remarkable cablegrams as to the expediency of hurrying up the revolution, she "could not" have said that the Colonial Office thought it desirable that it should come off at once, because she did not know it. But she added, "I could have said that probably if it was to happen they would like it soon." Her

---

position in the matter remains somewhat enigmatical, but it will hardly be suggested by any one that it is likely that she would have been a party to mislead persons in South Africa by false information as to the attitude of Mr. Chamberlain.

The position, then, stands thus. . The Colonial Office conceals its own documents. From none of its officials, have we had any detailed or frank statement as to their relations to South African affairs during the critical period. The high commissioner himself has not been examined. Mr. Rhodes has been allowed to go without any serious inquiry into this branch of the case. The most important cables are refused by Mr. Rhodes's order, and the committee decline to exercise their power to compel the production of them. The story, in fact, so far as it concerns this question of the truth or falsity of the allegation that Mr. Chamberlain was "in it," is being smothered up, with an audacious disregard of the principles which guide all ordinary tribunals. The last steps in this proceeding have been taken with the direct assent of the leader of the Opposition. Everybody, therefore, is inquiring what reason can have induced Sir William Harcourt to execute this startling change of front.

can,

that There is only one reason with any probability, be assigned-that is, that some member of the government has made a "Front Bench communication" to the leader of the Opposition, indicating to him explicitly that there are "reasons of State" for stopping the disclosures. There can be little doubt that this is what has happened, and conjecture, not only in this country but elsewhere, will naturally be keen to know what the nature of this momentous disclosure was.

If Mr. Chamberlain was as absolutely free from knowledge of the Jameson plan as he has professed to be, it is hard to see how full disclosure could do any damage to the empire, or could do anything but good to the colonial secretary himself. Mr. Chamber

lain, of course, professes in words his private desire that everything should come out. He has not, however, assisted in the attainment of that result. The consequence is that a national and international question of very grave importance has arisen. It is said, in well informed, that circles usually when the raid occurred, it became necessary to give assurances to foreign governments, and in particular to Germany, that the queen's government was in no way compromised. These assurances, it is said, were given. It is even said that they were given of the pressly in the name Something of this kind may well have happened; but it is hard to see how, if it did happen, and if the Colonial O1fice was as innocent as it claims to be, the disclosure of the facts can do the anything but confirm queen's

word.

exqueen.

That documents exist which are supposed to be compromising, and which the very authors of them allege to be compromising, is a fact past hiding. It casts, unless it is cleared up, a damning doubt. Therefore it would appear to be the duty of all honest men, and, above all, of the Parliament of Great Britain, to see that an immediate end is put to a policy which may be aptly described as "thimble-rigging,"

and

Mr.

that the truth, whether it suits Rhodes or Mr. Chamberlain, or neither of them, must be told at last.

This is a high question of privilege, and the whole House is concerned in it. It is for the House to act.

QUESITOR.

From The Nineteenth Century.

ON CONVERSATION.

The art of conversation has suffered in England from the example of its most famous professor. Dr. Johnson understood it theoretically, but even so only to a limited extent. He was supposed to form his view of it in ac

cordance with the rule of Bacon.

sides the unseemliness, drive a man either

to stammering, or nonplus, or harping on that which should follow; whereas a slow speech conformeth the memory, addeth. a conceit of wisdom to the hearers, besides a scemliness of speech and countenance.

In all kinds of speech, whether pleasant, else, and sometimes affected to despise grave, severe, or ordinary, it is convenient it. When Boswell asked him, in his to speak leisurely, and rather drawlingly importunate fashion, what was the than hastily, because hasty speech conuse of meeting people at dinner, where founds the memory, and oftentimes, bemembering, "Why, to eat and drink tono one ever said anything worth regether," replied the Doctor, "and to promote kindness; and, sir, this is better done when there is no solid conversation; for when there is, people differ in opinion and get into bad humor, or some of the company are left out and feel themselves uneasy; it was for this reason that Sir Robert Walpole said he always talked indecencies at his own table, because in them all could join." It is certain that this was the kind of conversation most in vogue with our ancestors, and in "the good old times," such as the days of chivalry, there was probably little else.

This does not strike one as a model for him who would be either brilliant or agreeable, and excludes naturalness, which is one of the greatest charms of conversation.

SO

That Johnson did not slavishly follow Bacon's precept is very certain. So far from being "leisurely," he jumped down the throats of all who disagreed with him. 'You may be good-natured, sir," said Boswell, with unusual spirit, "but you are not goodhumored (which the doctor had just plumed himself on being). I believe you would pardon your opponents if they had time to deprecate your vengeance; but punishment follows quick after sentence that they cannot escape." The idea of his ever being at a nonplus is ridiculous indeed, though he was sometimes at a loss for a repartee from sheer indignation. The rights of his little passage of arms with Adam Smith are much disputed. That he remarked: “You are a liar," seems tolerably certain, but whether the other philosopher did retort in the quite unprintable and by no means pertinent words that are attributed to him is doubtful. At all events, the whole affair was not a good example of polite conversation. Johnson's great mistake was in confounding it with monologue. "We had good talk this evening," he said on one occasion, when returning from a party where scarcely any one had been able to get a word in edgeways except himself. If he had said: "I had good talk," the observation would have been faultless, but of conversation such as he sincerely believed had taken place there had been none. He could define it of course as he could everything VOL. XV. 782

LIVING AGE.

Later on, and even to some extent today, the essence of good conversation was thought to be contest. Even that graceful-minded and sweet tempered writer, Robert Louis Stevenson, falls into the error when discoursing on this subject. With Johnson, opposition was the very salt of life, and his best sayings were evoked by it. When ill one day and unable to exert himself, on Burke's name being mentioned, he suddenly exclaimed: "That fellow calls forth all my powers. Were I to see Burke now it would kill me.”

Antagonism of all kinds is, however, inimical to social enjoyment, and even argument should be employed but sparingly. The object of good conversation is not to convince-we are not pleading at the bar, or preaching in the pulpit-but to exchange ideas, expressed in the most attractive form, to ameliorate, to interest, or to amuse. It is a mistake to suppose that a change of society is necessary for its enjoyment. When friends are found to our mind, we do not tire of their talk. It is not likely, though it is quite possible, that a stranger may be an acquisition, and a company of intelligent persons who meet one another are independent of recruits.

Goldsmith, who never wrote a fool

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