THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES V. BOOK IV. THE expulsion of the French, both out of the Milanese BO O K 1524. states with respect to and Fran and the republic of Genoa, was considered by the Italians as IV. the termination of the war between Charles and Francis ; and as they began immediately to be apprehensive of the Views of emperor, when they saw no power remaining in Italy capa- the Italian ble either to control or oppose him, they longed ardently for the re-establishment of peace. Having procured the resto- Charles ration of Sforza to his paternal dominions, which had been cis. their chief motive for entering into confederacy with Charles, they plainly discovered their intention to contribute no longer towards increasing the emperor's superiority over his rival, which was already become the object of their jealousy. The pope especially, whose natural timidity increased his suspicions of Charles's designs, endeavoured by his remonstrances to inspire him with moderation, and incline him to peace. invade BUT the emperor, intoxicated with success, and urged on by Charles rehis own ambition no less than by Bourbon's desire of revenge, solves to contemned Clement's admonitions, and declared his resolu- France. tion of ordering his army to pass the Alps, and to invade Provence, a part of his rival's dominions, where, as he least dreaded an attack, he was least prepared to resist it. His most experienced ministers dissuaded him from undertaking such an IV. 1524. BOOK enterprise with a feeble army, and an exhausted treasury: but he relied so much on having obtained the concurrence of the king of England, and on the hopes which Bourbon, with the confidence and credulity natural to exiles, entertained of being joined by a numerous body of his partizans as soon as the Imperial troops should enter France, that he persisted obstinately in the measure. Henry undertook to furnish an hundred thousand ducats towards defraying the expense of the expedition during the first month, and had it in his choice either to continue the payment of that sum monthly, or to invade Picardy before the end of July with an army capable of acting with vigour. The emperor engaged to attack Guienne at the same time with a considerable body of men; and if these enterprises proved successful, they agreed, that Bourbon, besides the territories which he had lost, should be put in possession of Provence, with the title of king, and should do homage to Henry as the lawful king of France for his new dominions. Of all the parts of this extensive but extravagant project, the invasion of Provence was the only one which was executed. For although Bourbon, with a scrupulous delicacy, altogether unexpected after the part which he had acted, positively refused to acknowledge Henry's title to the crown of France, and thereby absolved him from any obligation to promote the enterprise, Charles's eagerness to carry his own plan into execution did not in any degree abate. The army which he employed for that purpose amounted only to eighteen thousand men; the command of which was given to the marquis de Pescara, with instructions to pay the greatest deference to Bourbon's adThe Impe- vice in all his operations. Pescara passed the Alps without opposition, and entering Provence, laid siege to Marseilles. Bourbon had advised him rather to march towards Lyons, in the neighbourhood of which city his territories were situated, and where of course his influence was most extensive ; but the emperor was so desirous to get possession of a port, which would at all times secure him an easy entrance into France, that by his authority he overruled the Constable's opinion, and directed Pescara to make the reduction of Marseilles his chief object". rialists en ter Provence. August 19. a Guic. 1. xv. 273, &c. Mem. de Bellay, p. 80. IV. 1524. measures FRANCIS, who foresaw, but was unable to prevent, this B O O K attempt, took the most proper precautions to defeat it. He laid waste the adjacent country, in order to render it more difficult for the enemy to subsist their army; he razed the Prudent suburbs of the city, strengthened its fortifications, and threw of Francis. into it a numerous garrison under the command of brave and experienced officers. To these, nine thousand of the citizens, whom their dread of the Spanish yoke inspired with contempt of danger, joined themselves; by their united courage and industry, all the efforts of Pescara's military skill, and of Bourbon's activity and revenge, were rendered abortive. Francis, meanwhile, had leisure to assemble a powerful army under the walls of Avignon, and no sooner began to advance towards Marseilles, than the Imperial troops, exhausted by the fatigues of a siege which had last- ists forced ed forty days, weakened by diseases, and almost destitute to retreat. of provisions, retired with precipitation towards Italy þ. Ir, during these operations of the army in Provence, either Charles or Henry had attacked France in the manner which they had projected, that kingdom must have been exposed to the most imminent danger. But on this, as well as on many other occasions, the emperor found that the extent of his revenues was not adequate to the greatness of his schemes, or the ardour of his ambition, and the want of money obliged him, though with much reluctance, to circumscribe his plan, and to leave part of it unexecuted. Henry, disgusted at Bourbon's refusing to recognize his right to the crown of France; alarmed at the motions of the Scots, whom the solicitations of the French king had persuaded to march towards the borders of England; and no longer incited by his minister, who was become extremely cool with regard to all the emperor's interests, took no measures to support an enterprise, of which, as of all new undertakings, he had been at first excessively fonde. If the king of France had been satisfied with having de livered his subjects from this formidable invasion, if he had b Guic. 1. xv. 277. Ulloa Vita dell Carlo V. p. 93. Imperial Sept. 19. Francis elated with his success. IV. 1524. Malanese. BOOK thought it enough to show all Europe the facility with which the internal strength of his dominions enabled him to resist the invasion of a foreign enemy, even when seconded by the abilities and powerful efforts of a rebellious subject, the campaign, notwithstanding the loss of the Milanese, would have been far from ending ingloriously. But Francis, animated with courage more becoming a soldier than a general; pushed on by ambition, enterprising rather than considerate; and too apt to be elated with success ; was fond of every undertaking that seemed bold and adventurous. Such an undertaking, the situation of his affairs, at that juncture, Resolves to naturally presented to his view. He had under his cominvade the mand one of the most powerful and best appointed armies France had ever brought into the field, which he could not think of disbanding without having employed it in any active service. The Imperial troops had been obliged to retire almost ruined by hard duty, and disheartened with ill success; the Milanese had been left altogether without defence; it was not impossible to reach that country before Pescara, with his shattered forces, could arrive there; or if fear should add speed to their retreat, they were in no condition to make head against his fresh and numerous troops; and Milan would now, as in former instances, submit without resistance to a bold invader. These considerations, which were not destitute of plausibility, appeared to his sanguine temper to be of the utmost weight. In vain did his wisest ministers and generals represent to him the danger of taking the field at a season so far advanced, with an army composed chiefly of Swiss and Germans, to whose caprices he would be subject in all his operations, and on whose fidelity his safety must absolutely depend. In vain did Louise of Savoy advance by hasty journies towards Provence, that she might exert all her authority in dissuading her son from such a rash enterprise. Francis disregarded the remonstrances of his subjects; and that he might save himself the pain of an interview with his mother, whose Appoints counsels he had determined to reject, he began his march his mother before her arrival; appointing her, however, by way of ing his ab- atonement for that neglect, to be regent of the kingdom during his absence. Bonnivet, by his persuasions, contri regent dur sence. IV. 1524. buted not a little to confirm Francis in this resolution, That BOOK favourite, who strongly resembled his master in all the defective parts of his character, was led, by his natural impetuosity, warmly to approve of such an enterprise; and being prompted besides by his impatience to revisit a Milanese lady, of whom he had been deeply enamoured during his late expedition, he is said, by his flattering descriptions of her beauty and accomplishments, to have inspired Francis, who was extremely susceptible of such passions, with an equal desire of seeing her d. in the Mi lanese. THE French passed the Alps at Mount Cenis; and as Operations their success depended on dispatch, they advanced with the greatest diligence. Pescara, who had been obliged to take a longer and more difficult route by Monaco and Final, was soon informed of their intention; and being sensible that nothing but the presence of his troops could save the Milanese, marched with such rapidity, that he reached Alva on the same day that the French army arrived at Vercelli. Francis, instructed by Bonnivet's error in the former campaign, advanced directly towards Milan, where the unexpected approach of an enemy so powerful, occasioned such consternation and disorder, that although Pescara entered the city with some of his best troops, he found that the defence of it could not be undertaken with any probability of success; and having thrown a garrison into the citadel, retired through one gate, while the French were admitted at another e. THESE brisk motions of the French monarch disconcerted Embarras all the schemes of defence which the Imperialists had form- of the Imsing state ed. Never, indeed, did generals attempt to oppose a for- perialists. midable invasion under such circumstances of disadvantage. Though Charles possessed dominions more extensive than any other prince in Europe, and had, at this time, no other army but that which was employed in Lombardy, which did not amount to sixteen thousand men, his prerogative in all d Oeuv. de Brant. tom. vi. 253. e Mem. de Bellay, p. 81. Guic. 1. xv. 278. |