players how they shall play, as the mob dictates to the demagogues how they shall speak. There was a time when cricket, like literature and the other arts, lived upon the generosity of patrons far too wise to prefer scandal to skill. In those days the game was free from the taint of professionalism. There was no gate-money when the enthusiasts met upon Broad Halfpenny to show what a single village might achieve against the united strength of England. If the "gentry" supported the game with their munificence, it was the villagers who defended the honor of Hambledon; and so keen were they for practice that they met on the downs every Tuesday, and drove (many of them) twenty miles for the chance of a game.

Their spirit was matched by the interest of wise amateurs. At a close finish between England and The Club there was always a quiet enthusiasm. "There was Sir Horace Mann," writes Nyren of one such scene, "walking about, outside the ground, cutting Blackwood's Magazine.

down the daisies with his stick-a habit with him when he was agitated; the old farmers leaning forward upon their tall old staves and the whole multitude perfectly still." The "multitude," we may be sure, was not large, nor did it come with shillings in its hands. Yet we would far rather that the scene described by Nyren could be matched upon the cricket fields of today than that we should be pestered by the bad feeling and false deductions of the Olympic Games. If fashion and sensationalism drive the mob to sports of greater speed and danger, if a friendly contest between two neighboring clubs afford no interest to those who love to encourage international rivalry on tin-trumpets, let the mob follow its inclination. For whatever else it may be, cricket is not a circus, and it would be far better that it should be driven back to the village-greens, where it found its origin, than yield a jot to the petulent demands of idle spectators.

Punch.

The death of "General" Booth, which we announce with great regret, closes a strange career, one of the most remarkable that our age has seen, and will set the world meditating on that fervent, forceful character and that keen, though, as some would say, narrow intelligence. Born of unrecorded parentage, educated anyhow, he had raised himself from a position of friendless obscurity to be the head of a vast organization not confined to this country or to the British race, but well known over half the world, and yielding to him an obedience scarcely less complete than that which the Catholic Church yields to the Roman Pontiff.

The Salvation Army was the creation of one man, or rather of a pair of human beings, for the late Mrs. Booth was scarcely less important to its early development than was her husband. The root-idea of William Booth's religion, the object of his missionary work, was "the saving of souls." Translated into other language, this means the establishment of a conviction in the minds of men, women, and children that they were reconciled to God, saved, and preserved to all eternity from the penalties of sin. We do not propose to enter on the delicate ground of theological discussion, or to argue for or against the truth or value of

such a conviction. The interesting point, in relation to "General" Booth's ideas and personality, is to note how this belief is worked into the system of "the Army" in the official programme, fantastically called the "Articles of War," which has to be signed by every candidate for enrolment. This curious document, which will greatly interest future social historians, consists of three parts-a creed, as definite as any taught by the Churches; a promise to abstain from drink, bad language, dishonesty, etc.; and a colemn promise to obey the lawful orders of the "officers," and never on any consideration to oppose the interests of the Salvation Army. The last part, the promissory part, is made much stricter in the case of candidates for the position of officer; these solemnly promise not only to obey the "General," but to report any case they may observe in others of "neglect or variation from his orders and directions." Membership of the organization thus depends on absolute obedience and on a profession of faith in salvation in the definite sense formulated in the "Articles of War." The two are inseparably conjoined. When we reflect upon what human nature is, in the class from which so many of the members of the "Army" have been drawn, when we think how difficult it is to reconcile the hand-to-mouth existence of the casual laborer with any high standard of conduct, let alone of religion, "General" Booth's success, partial though it has been, is an astonishing fact. It implies a prodigious strength of character and a genius for seeing what would appeal to large numbers of humble folk.

Will that success continue now that "General" Booth is dead? Everywhere we hear that the Army is not bringing in recruits as fast as of old. Its novelty has worn off; its uniforms are no longer impressive; its street services, though they provoke no oppo

sition, do not seem to attract the wastrel and the "rough" as they did at first. We can readily believe that the work goes on more or less as before; but the gatherings, we suspect, are mostly composed of those who have long frequented them and of a certain number of new members drawn rather from existing sects than from persons till now untouched by religion. Then, with regard to the other side of the Army's work, the social schemes outlined in "Darkest England" have met with only moderate success, as all cool observers foretold in 1890. They have, at least, provided no panacea for poverty. Probably Mr. Booth felt this during the last years of his life; but he has been spared the sight of the still further decline of his projects which to most of us seems inevitable. Of course, some persons are more confident: they argue that Napoleon's system did not disappear after Waterloo, nor Wesley's system with the death of its founder, and that the Roman Catholic Church is as strong as ever, though Pope after Pope disappears. That is true, but for the very reason that these systems were elaborate organizations, based on the facts of life. The Code Napoléon and the Methodist Connection were much too well adapted to human needs to disappear with their authors. On the other hand, movements and systems which depend wholly upon one man do not often prove to be more than ephemeral. But none would deny that there is much to be learnt from the Salvation Army and from the earnest, strenuous and resourceful personality of the man who made it. Let us hope that, if the Army as an organization should ultimately fade away, the great lesson of its even temporary success will not be forgotten: the lesson that any force which is to move mankind must regard man's nature as spiritual as well as material, and that the weak and humble, the poor and the

"submerged," share in that double nature as much as those who spend their

lives in the sunshine of worldly prosperity.

The Times.

Ever since the publication of President Monroe's famous message the meaning and application of the Monroe Doctrine has from time to time interested the Governments of the Old World. According to the aspect in which it is regarded, it has appeared a claim to the ultimate dominion over the South American Continent, or a recognition of responsibility for the acts of States enjoying a large measure of independence. It is in this latter aspect that it has of late years gained most attention. The annexation of the South American communities can hardly have any attractions for the most ambitious Americans of the North. The advantages are too doubtful; the drawbacks too certain. But if the United States has no wish to incorporate South America in the Union she is resolved not to tolerate any transfer of sovereignty to a foreign Government. The part played by France in Mexico was only made possible by its coincidence with the War of Secession, and at one moment in 1896 a difficulty in settling the boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana almost brought the United States and Great Britain within sight of war. In 1823, indeed, the declaration that "the American Continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power" had reference to a very different condition of things from that which exists now. It was associated with the recent recognition of the independence of Spanish-American republics, and was directed in the first instance against any possible attempt on the part of Spain to recover

possession of them. But the prohibition of future colonization has become of far greater importance since that day. All the Great Powers have under their rule a large number of intending emigrants, and Great Britain alone has an American colony in which they find a ready welcome. The Monroe Doctrine, though it has never been accepted in its fullest sense by the European Powers, has never received any other interpretation at Washington, and there is little doubt that, if the meaning were challenged, the Government of the United States would reassert it beyond the possibility of mistake.

The United States Senate has gone a step further in the traditional direction of American policy. It has resolved, by fifty-one votes to four, that "when any harbor or other place in the American Continent is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or safety of the United States the Government could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power of control for national purposes." The resolution is somewhat cumbersome in its wording, but its meaning is perfectly clear. There was a report current in the spring that negotiations were in progress for the purchase of land round Magdalena Bay in Colombia, and that the Japanese Government had some interest in the project. Very possibly the last half of this rumor was quite

unfounded, but it pointed to a contingency which might easily be realized in the future. A shipbuilding firm, for example, might find it convenient to have a part of its works on American ground, and so long as it had no political connections and built ships for all buyers there would be no need for the United States Government to take alarm. But supposing that this firm were associated in any special way with its own Government, a reason for uneasiness might present itself at very short notice. The works and the harbor in which they were situated might conceivably admit of being speedily fortified in a rough way, and if they were protected by ships of their own nationality the once innocent shipyard might become for the time an enemy's outpost in or near the territory of the United States. Something of this kind may be what the Foreign Relations Committee had in view when they instructed Mr. Lodge to move his resolution. It is the offspring of an alarm which, however remote the justification of it may be, cannot be called unreasonable. A large amount of foreign capital is already invested in the United States, and more is likely to go there. There is no reason why in the great majority of cases this immigration of capital should not find a ready welcome and attract no special notice from the Government. But it is easy to imagine exceptions to this rule. Such a company may, as the Times puts it, "be to all intents and purposes a foreign company, and conceivably an instrument of a foreign Government or under its control." Mr. Lodge appears to have defended the resolution as calculated to prevent a request for the withdrawal of such a company having to be addressed to a foreign Power, "when that withdrawal could not be made without humiliation." It seems improbable that a commercial enterprise of this rather questionable

kind should be embarked in by any Government, but if there is any uneasiness felt at Washington on this head it is well that it should be at once relieved. It is well within the purpose, if not within the actual words, of the original Monroe declaration. Foreign corporations and foreign Governments are not identical things, but in certain circumstances the one may easily be turned to the use of the other.

From the point of view of Great Britain this action of the Senate need cause no uneasiness. With the principle of the Monroe Doctrine we are familiar, and Mr. Lodge's resolution does not really go beyond it. It is hardly possible that it should injure any one in this country, and it certainly serves as a protection against a real danger. The vast area of South America is divided among several communities whose interests are not always the same as our own, and when the two are antagonistic they are capable of making our political relations highly inconvenient. The Monroe Doctrine offers a way out of these difficulties. It constitutes the United States a kind of buffer between the contending parties; it provides a means of reconciling our interests and theirs without demanding an unconditional surrender on either side. But it does not do this without laying a very real burden on the United States. It makes her in a sense a mediator between the European and the South American Powers. France, or Germany, or Great Britain is offended by some act of a South American State. Were it not for the Monroe Doctrine, she might assert her interests in a high-handed fashion which would soon bring the offender to his knees. But the effect of the doctrine is to plant the whole strength of the United States in the way of carrying out this policy. The aggrieved European Government may be fully assured of the justice of its claims, and