the German population not only bids fair to outnumber the French, so as to make a French victory well-nigh impossible in a duel between the two Powers, but the expanding force of such a population is more than likely to overflow westward. Now the military weakness of Britain has driven her Government to seek safety behind the French Army, so that in practice a defensive alliance exists between Paris and London. This alliance was within an ace of going to war with Germany in September, 1911, and at any moment a dispute involving the vital interests of France might plunge our country into war, for it would be madness to allow France once again to be overwhelmed while we have no armed forces to defend us on land. The coast of France would speedily become a base for a joint attack on the British Isles.

Not only, then, is the maritime, naval, and commercial rivalry, with all that is implied thereby, the cause of enmity between the British and German peoples, but also British support to the most probable and most inveterate enemies of the German Empire. British statesmen declare that at any cost they must remain supreme in the contest of naval armaments. So long as that costly competition continues bitter ill-will between the two peoples, who are becoming exasperated by the pressure of taxation, must continue also. It may be possible for astute diplomacy to conjure up a superficial calm, but while the causes of quarrel are so vital and so deep-seated it is plain that such an accommodation must be the merest truce. To re-establish friendly relations between Britain and the Central Powers of Europe postulates a redressing of the balance of military power on the Continent, and such a redressing can only be effected by the revival of the military power of the British people.

If the problem be examined from another standpoint, it will at once be understood how differently the nations would regard one another if the British Army recovered the reputation it held in 1815. It is quite doubtful whether the bid for the command of the sea would ever have been made by the Germans if England had held on to her historic policy of maintaining sufficient land forces to maintain the balance of power in Europe as stated in the preamble of the Annual Bill which legalized a standing army. The experiment would have been full of peril, because if English susceptibilities had been aroused the dreaded combination of superior land forces against the defenders of Germany might have taken place at any moment. The war party in France would hardly have failed to profit by such an opportunity. An ultimatum from London to discontinue the naval programme would have placed the Empire in jeopardy, with no appreciable prize in case of victory and utter destruction as the alternative. German strategists only look to decisive war and its fateful results. They are prepared to hazard their navy and commerce if necessary; they will not run any unnecessary risk of defeat on land.

Simple and self-evident as this conclusion must be to all who comprehend the historical and strategical training of Continental soldiers, it has never been digested by the directors of British policy. At any rate, they act as if naval superiority in the North Sea guaranteed the safety of King George's dominions, which is a fallacy. This school of thought has been wittily designated as the "strategy of the unsinkable ship."

It is generally accepted as an axiom in our country that the defeat of our battle-squadrons in the North Sea would lay the country open both to invasion and starvation, but neither of

these conclusions should be received without qualification. German strategists would not detail a powerful army for the invasion of England unless several unlikely conditions were realized. They would not, for example, send any of their precious army corps across the sea unless they were sure of keeping open communications by sea to keep them supplied and to withdraw them if necessary. Still less would they detach considerable forces while the issue of a land struggle between the French and German main armies remained undecided. The result of a naval struggle is hard to forecast, but it seems quite improbable that it will speedily end in the utter destruction of either adversary. Partial success for one or the other is far more likely. To blockade the British Isles so as to starve the inhabitants into submission implies, not only victory of the blockading squadrons in the North Sea, but also the capture by our foes of a base west of Dover whence the trade routes could be dominated. Probably nothing less than the adherence of Ireland to England's Continental enemies could render such a blockade effective, even after a decisive German victory in the North Sea, unless France and Belgium were leagued with Germany against us. Among British politicians it is usual to argue in the most slovenly and inaccurate manner on this question, which depends on the most precise calculations in order to arrive at any reasonable conclusion. But the most distinguished strategists on the Continent have frequently stated as their opinion that Germany can attempt nothing serious against our country until she has united against us the countries which lie between the Rhine and the coasts of England. Were such a combination effected, our situation would resemble the time when Napoleon ended the peace of Amiens, and which, in spite of Trafalgar, he had re

vived when he embarked on his fatal campaign against Russia. The destruction of the French Army, and not the defeat of the French Fleet, gave the victory to Britain in the longdrawn-out struggle.

While the cost of a war of naval construction is already very great, and is annually becoming more intolerable, it produces a very small addition to the permanent wealth of the country in maintaining men of the best type for its future protection by comparison with the personnel of an army. A navy costing fifty millions in the year will keep about 150,000 officers and men, without counting the men employed in the dockyards and in kindred industries, who may perhaps be reckoned at 50,000 more. But three-fifths of that sum would maintain, or nearly maintain, twice as many troops, if three millions were laid out with moderate economy. Our army expenditure is the most wasteful and the least productive in human power of any military budget in the world. Parliament has completely failed to carry out the duties of supervising this expenditure and controlling the executive, which it usurped from the King. The present result is that while Germany gets the utmost value out of the money raised for military purposes, and while every department of the military machine is subjected to the most jealous and critical scrutiny by officers who in reality as well as in theory are responsible to the Emperor, the House of Commons expends all its energies on the congenial game of party warfare. Our army estimates are smuggled through without consideration, and no real criticism or control of the executive exists at all.

For more than six years our War Office has been directed by an eminent lawyer with the aid of an Army Council. These six years will probably be

quoted in history as a most critical period, because they gave the necessary interval to reform the most glaring abuses in our military system, and to inaugurate an economical system of administration. Costly as our army is, and vast as are the sums annually voted by the House of Commons, it remains by far the worst found in essential war material of any in Europe. The British Army suffers from a dangerous lack of horses; its motor transport, on which all rapid manoeuvring will depend in contemporary war, is still unorganized; the tactical organization of the infantry may be suitable for gendarmerie duties in India and Egypt, perhaps even for coercing Ulster, but it was found to be fatally defective even against the irregular levies we met on the South African veldt. All Continental critics agree that for European purposes it is simply ridiculous, and we have not yet nominated a War Minister who is capable of realizing how different European warfare and its problems are from Colonial wars. The difference is, at least, as great as between cricket and football. Although our armament costs far more in proportion than that of any other Power, our troops are still equipped with the worst rifle in use by the armies of to-day, the rifle which was adopted by Earl Roberts as late as 1904. We have now got to re-arm, which is a very serious and expensive undertaking. Our French allies have still the Lebel rifle, which, with its improved ammunition, has merited their confidence since 1889. Our organization of recruiting, length of service, and other conditions of the military calling, sacrifice everything to that half of the army which garrisons India and the Colonies, in contrast with the principle of the military nations, which sharply divide the organization of European and Oversea Forces, although the French, for example, employ a

very large army in their African Empire.

Thus, our army is too small, too expensive, too badly equipped, and the urgent reforms which might have been carried out during the last six years have been shelved, while the public attention has been concentrated on the Territorials, the second-line troops of which Viscount Haldane is so proud. Unquestionably he is entitled to some credit for the improvements which his Administration introduced into the Volunteers, for the Territorials are the Volunteers under a new name, and they are not a new army raised by Viscount Haldane, as that gifted statesman is in the habit of conveying to provincial audiences in his numerous and enlightening orations in support of recruiting. These improvements, however, are very far from justifying the theory advanced officially that a second-line army with such light training as our Territorials receive can ever be the match, at anything like equal numbers, for the first line of a Continental army. No soldier worthy of the name can be found to support so ridiculous a proposition. Training, discipline, leadership are more than ever necessary to give even the best general a fair chance of leading his troops to victory.

A perusal of the Army List reveals the unpleasant fact that the whole Army is short of officers, and that all the cavalry regiments suffer from deficiency of lieutenants and cornets. Why is this? It is not because the young Englishman dislikes the career of arms, nor because he hates riding. There is no difficulty in finding officers for the Indian cavalry. The explanation is that the situation of an officer is so unsound economically, his position in the service is so precarious unless he has interest among the superior staff officers at the War Office for the time being, rules of promotion are so arbitrary and full of hazard that no

sane parent will put his son into the Army if he can find a better profession or position for him, and the result is extremely grave from the point of view of the national safety.

It cer

Sir John French, the new Chief of the General Staff, commands the absolute confidence of the Army and can count on its loyal service. In his first important official utterance he made a very weighty pronouncement. He said that it was a strategical error to suppose that the decisive field of action for British forces would necessarily continue to be on the sea. He foresaw the day when the fate of the country might depend once more upon its Army, and doubtless he was thinking that had England supported France last autumn or last February with her Expeditionary Force, the fateful consequence of the trial of strength between the German Army and its western opponents would have been patent to the most optimistic strategists of the "unsinkable ship" school. The danger of that conflict has, we hope, been removed for the present. tainly has not been removed altogether. Even if England and Germany absolutely composed their present differences, the reign of perpetual peace on earth would be as far off as ever, and it should never be forgotten that all the great wars which have fixed the fate of mankind for long periods of time have come without warning from the most unexpected quarters. From the breakup of the Roman Empire to the rise of Japan, this lesson of history has often repeated itself. Therefore, the Chief of the Staff has done wisely and well in warning his countrymen that the unexpected and the apparently unlikely contingency is the one for which they should be prepared by training a due proportion of their manhood to arms. Whether this proportion should be the same as in Continental Europe and obtained by conscription, or whether a

smaller proportion will suffice for the island kingdom to be raised by payment of good wages and voluntary enlistment, is still a debatable question. It is, however, absolutely certain that the existing British system is as extravagant as it is ineffective, and that if we prolong the last six years' delay in facing the necessary measures of reform any longer, we shall suffer very severely for our supine attitude. Already we are suffering by the heavy taxation imposed for naval construction, and which would never have been forced upon us by any Continental Power had we retained the means of turning the scale in a land war, of maintaining the balance of power in fact, the prime object of all British policy since the defeat of the Spanish Armada.

In the summer of 1893 disputes of a serious nature took place between the British and French Governments. A Cabinet held office in London which was pledged to establish Irish Home Rule, and this fact did not tend to strengthen the hands of our diplomacy. At the same time, the relative position of the Great Powers created by the Treaty of Frankfort in 1871 had ceased to exist, and a new chapter in European international history had opened. In her disagreements with England, France received substantial support from her eastern neighbor, and the position of Britain in Europe in August and September, 1893, was almost perilous, for a Continental coalition against her was far from impossible. During the autumn negotiations between London and Berlin followed the patched-up agreement between London and Paris. The intention of the British Cabinet was then to establish an actual alliance, the lack of which had placed English interests in such serious jeopardy, and it was intended to enter into a compact with the Triple Alliance for the purpose. German statesmen

are probably not more deceitful or grasping than others of their kind, but they are not in the habit of making a bad bargain for their country. At that time, January, 1894, there was no apparent prospect of Germany entering into naval rivalry with England, and therefore our uncontested naval superiority might have been thought worth having. Lord Rosebery offered the guarantee of the British Fleet in return for the services of the German Army in case of war with France or Russia, or the two Powers allied. But Germans have been compelled to study history and strategy, sciences which at that time were not neglected in England, for they were totally ignored. It was pointed out to us that the fate of the Continent would never be settled by a naval blockade, but inevitably by the decision of a campaign on land and that if we desired to profit by the comradeship in arms of the Central Powers we must reorganize our land forces in such a manner as to bear our share of the decisive conflict. The Germans in 1894 demanded, in fact, no more than British statesmen had always voluntarily offered in former alliances, whether under William III., Anne, George II., or George III. The advisers of Victoria, however, could not bring themselves to face the question of Army reform, although the Army at that period cost little more than half of what it does now, and was numerically almost as strong. Liberal politicians were too busy with the farce of party politics to meddle with statesmanship, and the negotiations with Germany came to nothing.

Then followed the series of events which has produced the present impasse between Britain and Germany: the boom in Transvaal gold mines, the Jameson raid and Kruger telegram, the exasperation of France against England due to the Fashoda incident, and the Dreyfus agitation, followed

closely by the South African War, which revealed a solid hostility to the British Empire right through the length and breadth of the Continent. It was probably the refusal of France to make war on England which alone staved off a catastrophe in the first months of 1900, but in the meanwhile the rapid growth of the German fleet was introducing a new and all-important factor into the situation. To the far-seeing few it was already evident that Britain was not destined to retain for many more decades the monopoly of naval power which she had acquired in the war with Napoleon, and that even her superiority in European waters would shortly be challenged by a Power which had hitherto made good its pretensions whenever they were seriously put forward.

It is hard to say at what precise moment the rulers of Germany decided that friendship with England was likely to be impossible in the near future. It is probable that the continued neglect of our Army made it certain that we should be almost useless to Germany in a land war, and that the futile negotiations which followed our quarrel with France in Siam and elsewhere in 1893, began to open German eyes to the egotistic but short-sighted policy of Britain as framed by her party managers. Probably, too, the attitude of the British Cabinet towards Europe in general, and Germany in particular, during the Spanish-American war, finally brought home to German statesmen the necessity for achieving independence to the naval pressure which had been so wantonly exerted against them. The patriotic movement in favor of creating the German Navy increased by leaps and bounds, and it must be considered fortunate for us that the dispute between the Continental Powers over Morocco rendered it expedient for one of the two rival groups to seek our alliance. Otherwise we might