a stone, are in God, as the form of a candlestick is in pewter; to be a candlestick is only a manner of being of the pewter. The motion of bodies and the thoughts of men are in God, as the accidents of the peripatetics are in the created substance; they are entities inherent in their subject which are not composed of it, and which make no part of it.

I am not ignorant that an apologist of Spinoza maintains that this philosopher does not ascribe a material extension to God, but only an intelligible one; but if the extension of the bodies we see and imagine, is not the extension of God, whence comes it? How has it been made? If it has been produced out of nothing, Spinoza is orthodox, his new system signifies nothing. If it has been produced out of the intelligible extension of God, it is still a true creation; for the intelligible extension being but an idea, and not having really the three dimensions, cannot form the matter of the extension, which formally exists out of the understanding. Besides, if we distinguish two sorts of extension, one intelligible belonging to God, the other imaginable belonging to matter, we must also admit two subjects of those extensions distinct one from another; and then the unity of substance will be destroyed, and the whole structure of Spinoza falls to the ground. We may therefore say that his apologist does not resolve the difficulty, and raises greater ones.

The Spinozists may take advantage of the doctrine of transubstantiation, for if they consult the writings of the Spanish schoolmen, they will find many subtleties to answer something to the arguments of those who say, that one and the same man cannot be a Mahometan in Turkey and a Christian at Rome, sick at Rome, and well at Vienna; but perhaps they will at last find themselves obliged to compare their system with the mystery of the Trinity, to clear themselves from the contradictions that are objected to them. If

they do not say that the modifications of the divine substance, Plato, Aristotle, a horse, an ape, a tree, a stone, are as many personalities, which though identified with the same substance, may be each of them a particular, determined, and distinct principle of the other modifications, they will never be able to answer the objection grounded upon their overthrowing this principle; two contradictory terms cannot belong to the same subject at the same time. Perhaps they will say some time or other, that as the three persons of the Trinity without being distinct from the divine substance, as divines teach, and without having any absolute attribute that is not the same in number in each of them, have nevertheless each of them some properties that may be denied of others; so Spinoza may have admitted in the divine substance an infinite number of modalities or personalities, one of which does a thing which others do not. This will not be a true contradiction, since divines acknowledge a virtual distinction, in ordine ad suscipienda duo prædicata contradictoria, with respect to the susceptibility of two terms that contradict one another. But as the subtle Arriaga judiciously observes upon metaphysical degrees, which some will have to be susceptible of two contradictory propositions, should we transfer to natural things what revelation teaches us concerning the nature of God, it would entirely destroy philosophy, for it would make way to prove that there is no real distinction between the creatures. How little are we beholden to Spinoza! He deprives us of the most necessary principle; for were it true that one and the same thing may be at the same time, what it is and what it is not, all our meditations and reasonings would be insignificant.

I conclude by observing, that the part of Spinoza's system which I attack, is that which the Spinozists are less willing to defend. I have confuted Spinoza's supposition, that extension is not a compounded being,

but one numerical substance, and I have pitched upon that part of his system, because I knew the Spinozists say the difficulties do not lie in that; they think they are much more perplexed when they are asked how thought and extension can be united in one and the same substance. There is something odd in it; for if it be certain that thought and extension have no affinity one with another, it is still more evident that extension consists of parts really distinct one from another; and yet they are more sensible of the first difficulty than of the second, and call the latter a trifle if compared with the other. I thought therefore it was necessary to give them occasion to argue thus: if that part of our system can hardly be defended, which we took to be proof against all attacks, how shall we defend the weak parts of it?

I have been told that the doctrine of Spinoza even considered without a relation to religion, appears very contemptible to the greatest mathematicians of our days, which may be easily believed if these two things be considered: first, that no man ought to be more fully persuaded of the multiplicity of substances, than those who apply themselves to the consideration of extension; secondly, that most of those gentlemen admit a vacuum. But there is nothing more contrary to Spinoza's hypothesis, than to assert that all bodies do not touch one another; and there never were two systems more opposite than his and that of the atomists. He agrees with Epicurus in rejecting providence, but in all other things, their systems are like fire and water.-Art. SPINOZA.

STRENGTH.

(Singular Instance of.)

ANDREW EBERHARD RAUBER, of Talberg and Weineek, lord of the fortress of Petronel, a German knight, and one of the council of war to the emperor Maxi

milian II, was very famous, not only for his great strength and high stature, but also for his beard, which was of an extraordinary length. He was descended from the very ancient and noble house of Rauber, in the duchy of Carniola, which the emperor Maximilian I. promoted to the dignity of barons. This Andrew Eberhard Rauber was in the service of Maximilian II. from his youth, he travelled with him into foreign countries, he was always in the favour of that emperor, who made him one of his council of war, and gave him his first wife, Helena Scharseginn, his natural daughter, but he was first obliged to purchase her by a combat with his rival, which was pleasant enough, and without loss of blood. On this occasion he gave most remarkable proofs of his strength. One of these exhibits a very diverting method of gaining a lady, and so very uncommon that I dare say it is not to be found in any romance. The writers of such books do indeed tell us, that heroes used formerly to gain their mistresses by tournaments, duels, and combats with giants and dragons, and a thousand other fancies of this sort, but the method that Rauber used was never known to any of them. When he asked the emperor's daughter in marriage, he found at court a Spanish gentleman of great quality, who also endeavoured to become the emperor's son-in-law. The reputation of the valour of the Spaniard, as well as the height of his stature, which exceeded Rauber's, recommended him very much. The emperor, being unwilling to give either of them the mortification of a denial, agreed that they should decide the affair by a trial of strength. He then caused to be given to each of them a sack that was sufficient to contain his antagonist, and promised that he who should put the other person into the sack, should have his daughter. The two lovers engaged in the presence of the emperor, and in the struggle exerted their utmost strength, which on this occasion was redoubled by love. Each

of them, fired by an ardent desire of marrying the emperor's daughter, with all his might strove to put his rival into the sack. Rauber at length carried the day, the strength and valour of the German thrust the bravery of the proud Spaniard into the sack: by this means Rauber attained the possession of his fair Helena, and the Spaniard, after so terrible a disgrace, left the court.

Rauber had no children by this lady; but his second wife made him ample amends for this defect; for she brought eight twins into the world, one son whom he named Andrew Eberhard, and seven daughters, of which one died unmarried: the others were all married into illustrious families. Rauber's strength was so great that he could break in pieces the strongest horse-shoe. He once took by the beard a Jew that had been baptized, and striking upon it with his right hand, both the beard and the jaw-bone of the jew came off into his hand. This happened at Gratz, upon the request of the archduke Charles, at whose court was a jew that had been baptized, who for stature and strength might be well compared to a giant; the archduke Charles being desirous to know whether the jew was stronger than Rauber, in order to try their strength, obliged each of them to receive from the other one blow with the fist, they were nevertheless allowed to decide by lot who should strike the first, which chanced to be the jew. He gave Rauber so violent a blow that he was obliged to keep his bed eight days, and his chamber many more. When he was recovered, it was Rauber's turn to give the jew a blow, which he did in the following manner. He took hold of the long beard of the jew, and twisting it twice round his left hand, with his right he struck upon it with such prodigious force, that not only the beard, but the under jaw-bone came off into his hand, which soon cost the jew his life.

The beard of Rauber was a real prodigy, and of so