periments which will provide further classes of data applying to this overall goal. One is scheduled for this month and the other for next May. In addition, a new type of laboratory simulation of weapons effects on ultrahard deep-buried facilities has proved very useful in small scale, and next year we will scale it up. We planned to provide technology for the hardening of missile systems with minimum penalties on cost and performance. We indicated that we would emphasize full use of modern electronics in hardened form. In the past year we have demonstrated the capability to produce hardened components of very advanced solid-state technology but in a rather simple degree of circuit integration. Next year we expect to demonstrate hardening of much more complex electronic devices. In another area of missile hardening, the testing of a new concept of dustand ice-resistant reentry vehicle nose tips looks promising. This may lead to better and less expensive nose tips for both nuclear and non-nuclear environments. Since the latter problems have been critical to most reentry developments in recent years, the importance of this effort is obvious.

NATIONAL NUCLEAR TEST READINESS PROGRAM

We planned to update the national nuclear test readiness program. This program supports our capability to resume atmospheric testing in the event of Soviet abrogation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The sense of security which has grown during 12 years of compliance with the treaty has made it inevitable that funding for readiness would be reduced in favor of programs which appeared more urgent. This has made it [deleted]. We have studied this problem extensively from the technical side in the past year and have found it most difficult to resolve. In fact, we are presently cooperating with JCS, OSD, and ERDA in a comprehensive study to determine what the future of the program should be. Findings of this study with appropriate recommendations are to be forwarded to the President.

It may be possible to make reductions in future years depending on decisions arising from the study. However, it should be emphasized that both Army and Air Force functions also depend on DNA support at Johnston Island, our primary readiness facility. One example is the storage of Army RED HAT munitions. [Deleted] only one-third of our RDT&E readiness budget could be saved. The remaining two-thirds would continue to be required to support data collection and research efforts which have application beyond that of pure readiness. Although I am talking about RDT&E funding at this point, it is also appropriate to mention the O&M costs associated with readiness. They are manifested largely in maintaining Johnston Island. The O&M budget for both operational and support responsibilities on the island is $11.3M for FY 76. [Deleted.] The remainder would be needed to sustain non-readiness activities on the island.

I would like to discuss an additional objective which we set last year. I realize there is a tendency to talk only about successes, but this one concerns a failure: We planned to try out, in prototype form, an innovative concept which offered the possibility of further large cost savings in underground tests. The concept was incorporated in a test executed in October 1974 with unsuccessful results. [Deleted.] As a result [deleted] the tunnel did not seal well. Had there been test articles in place, they would have been destroyed.

I should emphasize there was no escape of radioactivity to the outside. We are continuing to investigate this failure until we understand the causes. The findings will benefit the remainder of the program. However, we have no further plans for this innovation at this time.

I have reported on what we considered were some of our major near-term goals a year ago. As expected, most of these goals have not been fully satisfied in one year and continued efforts will be a large part of our FY 76 and FY 7T programs.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE

I would now like to turn your attention to some additional major goals which have crystallized since I last reported to you. As I mentioned earlier there is intensive activity within the DOD to rethink our positions on tactical nuclear warfare and to develop options in both hardware and employment plans to improve the deterrent effect of our weapons. Figure #1 has been used by Mr. Donald R. Cotter, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, in discussing the desirable characteristics of nuclear forces.

FIGURE 1. DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR FORCES

High survivability and penetration capability.

Warning, surveillance and attack assessment capability to support decisionmaking during and after nuclear attacks.

Adequate command, control, and communications to ensure responsiveness of nuclear forces.

Clear capability to selectively execute an extensive range of attacks in response to potential threats for actions by an enemy.

Conformity with the provisions of arms control agreements.

While he was not talking specifically about our Agency, the information he presented clearly shows why we are close to the center of the action on the first four items. The last item on the chart does not directly involve the technical work of our agency. High survivability and penetration capability depend upon adequate knowledge of weapon effects and the ability to harden everything from command posts to aircraft electronics. Surveillance and attack assessment capabilities require survivable systems and the ability to predict the effects nuclear explosions will have on our own forces. Based on the knowledge we gained during atmospheric testing and on our research efforts of the last ten years, we know that communications will be difficult and uncertain in a nuclear environment. This is due to the fact that nuclear detonations can affect both communications equipment and the atmosphere through which radio signals must propagate. We need additional knowledge to assure the capability for hardening against these effects.

Selective employment of a range of attack options requires additional understanding of weapons. Specifically, we need better estimates of effects of lowyield weapons. We have found that low-yield weapons do not scale directly with those of higher yields.

For all these reasons, we have in FY 75 greatly augmented our Tactical Systems Vulnerability and Hardening project. In FY 76 we will initiate another new project in Command, Control, and Communications with primary emphasis on theater communications. The aggressive pursuit of these new tactical and communications projects is one of our major near-term goals.

OTHER NEW GOALS

Some other new and important near-term goals can be listed briefly :

To support the MX program through extensive high explosive field testing of basing concepts, related analytical work, and application of the hardened reentry vehicle work.

[Deleted.]

To explore the new concept of the shallow-earth penetrator. This weapon would be of low-yield and detonated a few feet below the ground so as to produce a large blast environment but much reduced initial radiation.

To define a high-confidence concept for equipment to simulate the phenomenon known as systems-generated electromagnetic pulse. [Deleted.]

To consolidate, into a form suitable for systems predictions, selected data obtained in the last few years [deleted].

At this time I would like to invite your attention to Table #1 which summarizes our request for funds. Considering inflation, our request corresponds closely with last year's appropriation.

TABLE 1.-FISCAL YEAR 1976 AND FISCAL YEAR 197T BUDGET REQUESTS

I will now cover each of the three appropriation areas in turn to provide additional detail.

Table #2 shows a breakdown of our RDT&E budget request. The two program elements are subdivided into the project areas indicated. These funding categories are self explanatory, but I would like to elaborate on a couple of significant aspects of the table.

First, I would like to point out the reason for some of the fluctuations you see. The Aerospace Systems area was abnormally low in FY 1975 because we transferred money into the Non-Nuclear Testing area. This was done in order to acquire data for the Aerospace Systems project which could only be obtained through large-scale non-nuclear field tests. In FY 1976 we will return these funds to the Aerospace area to accomplish work which was deferred, and provide for renewed emphasis on aircraft vulnerability problems. The new communications project and the greatly increased activity in tactical systems are readily seen. We have completed the major portion of the work that the Radiation Physics project was created to perform. The project will be canceled in FY 1976. The remaining effort, principally on fallout, will be accomplished under Tactical Systems. The Strategic Structures project will be augmented substantially because of MX work. The High Explosive Simulation effort under Non-Nuclear Tests will be increased because of MX and tactical warfare simulation tests. The $4.7 million increase in Underground Nuclear Tests will not take care of inflation in this area and our actual rate of work in man-years will be lower. The Tests in Other Environments budget was unusually large in 1974 and 1975 because it paid for our monitoring of foreign tests. Considering the public statements by the French that they do not plan to do more atmospheric tests, we have not planned for further monitoring.

DNA-ERDA

Secondly, we provide a number of test facilities for common use by all the Services. The most significant of these, and the largest single item in our budget, involves underground nuclear effects tests. DNA works closely with ERDA in the underground testing program and the division of research responsibility is very clear. ERDA conducts research to support their weapon development program and we perform nuclear effects tests. The ERDA laboratories conduct ex

periments during our tests to determine effects on hardware they are developing. At this point, I would like to discuss our O&M Program and invite your attention to Table #3:

This program is designed to insure adequate manpower and facilities to support the major tasks already mentioned. As indicated, the overwhelming bulk of our requirements fall under Nuclear Weapons Operations-our personnel and facilities overhead. Our facilities are at four principal locations: The agency headquarters in Washington, D.C.; an operational command headquarters in Albuquerque, New Mexico; the readiness-to-test facility at Johnston Island in the Pacific; and Enewetak Atoll, where we are charged with clean-up of radioactive residue from early testing. A fifth facility, which is in Bethesda, Maryland, houses the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) and is supported by RDT&E funds.

I should like to point out initially that there will be an approximate $2.5 million increase in FY 76 as compared to the present fiscal year. There was a similar increase in FY 75 over FY 74. These increases have been primarily a result of cost growths for fuel, supplies, and equipment as well as rising transportation costs for material shipped to Enewetak Atoll and Johnston Island. Pay raises for Civil Service personnel in the agency and for contractual employees at Johnston Island have accounted for some of the increase. Also, commencing in FY 1975, we began paying rent to GSA on our headquarters building at the rate of $438 thousand for the first year with an increase to $593 thousand for FY 76.

MANPOWER

In the area of manpower utilization, we have been successful in reducing total DNA authorizations from the FY 75 Presidential Budget submission of 1,427, to a proposed FY 76 authorized end-strength of 1,209. This is a reduction of approximately 15.3 percent. Upon completion of the radiological cleanup of Enewetak Atoll, 37 additional authorizations will be returned to the Services. This will reduce the Agency baseline to 1,172, representing a cumulative manpower reduction of 17.9 percent. Included in these reductions is the elimination of 24 middle and upper management positions (GS-14/0-5 and above). We have continued the trend toward a reduced average civilian GS grade level as an integral part of our overall personnel management program. Finally, our program calls for civilianization of an additional 37 military positions by FY 78. These conversions will be tailored to the normal rotation cycle of military incumbents and are independent of the authorizations to be deleted upon completion of the Enewetak Atoll project.

Table No. 4 summarizes our total procurement budget request for FY 76 with two prior years for comparison.

As you see, our direct program for FY 76 is $3,310,000 up $3,037,000 from FY 75. This significant increase results from the planned procurement in FY 76 of a Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) computer at a cost of $2,896,000. This computer is necessary to replace existing equipment which will exceed its economic life during calendar year 1976. The data processing operational requirement to replace this equipment has been validated by JCS. Upon receipt of the WWMCCS computer we will be in a better position to perform our command and control mission as a component within the WWMCCS community and, further, to take advantage of the numerous benefits offered by the system. These benefits include reduced hardware costs, common training and logistics support, and common software support. Delaying procurement beyond FY 76 could result in equipment failures with subsequent negative impact on effective data processing operations and, most importantly, on DNA's command and control mission in nuclear weapons stockpile reporting.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I have given you an overview of our charter, discussed our progress on goals presented last year, described future programs, and provided the rationale underlying our appropriations request.

I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

SUMMARY STATEMENT

Chairman MCCLELLAN. Do you have a summary statement?
General JOHNSON. I can summarize it, yes, sir.

I would like to spend 3 or 4 minutes summarizing that, if I may.
Chairman McCLELLAN. You may read it.

General JOHNSON. I certainly appreciate the opportunity to present our program and budget for fiscal year 1976 and for the transition period, fiscal year 197T. During my testimony I would like to review the Agency's mission, last year's stated objectives and the results achieved, our future objectives and requirements, and the funding required to accomplish these objectives and requirements.

PRINCIPAL MISSIONS

To review briefly, our principal missions are fivefold:

1. To conduct the Department of Defense nuclear weapons effects research and test program.

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