through fuch unfairness and depravity of temper, as would ⚫ make one violate an acknowledged law of nature under fuch temptation, even without any tenet about these fingular rights of neceffity. It is plain here, that fome of the ordinary rules are of 'much greater importance than others; fo that fewer cafes ⚫ can poffibly happen wherein fuperior advantages can accrue to mankind from counter-acting them. The more impor⚫tant any rule is, and the greater the evils are which obedience to it prevents, and which enfue from the counter-acting it, the greater alfo must be thofe evils to be declined, or advantages to be obtained, which can juftify the receding 'from it. Some rules are made fo facred, by the moral feel⚫ings of the heart, and by their continual great importance to the public good, that fcarce any cafes can happen, in which departing from them can occafion, in the whole, fuperior advantages to mankind; or, which is the fame thing, 'fome laws of nature admit no exceptions. But other laws ⚫ are only morally univerfal, holding in all ordinary cafes, but admitting fome exceptions. To deny all exceptions, upon pleas of neceffity, contradicts the sense of mankind. In fome laws of lefs importance to the good of men, pleas of neceffity are allowed valid by all. As we afcend to more fa• cred and important laws, the matter grows more doubtful, whether any neceffity can found a juft exception.' The doctor now proceeds to give fome examples for the illustration of what he advances on this fubject.-A ship loaden with provifions and ammunition comes into the port of a city unjustly and cruelly befieged, where a maffacre is intended by the befiegers; fuppofe the citizens, almost perishing with famine, and wanting military ftores, and having neither money nor goods which the merchant would take for his grain or ammunition, whereas he can get a high value from the befiegers. Muft the townfmen here regard his property, our author afks, and expofe themselves to perifh with their families, either by famine or a maffacre; nay, perhaps expofe a whole nation to the most cruel flavery? No certainly. They may juftly take thefe goods, he thinks, by force, tho' there be the greatest hazard that they fhall not be able to compensate their value; fince, if the city is taken, they are all ruined. A fingular neceffity, too, he is of opinion, may fuperfede the common rule of veracity. Suppofe a Genghifcan, or any fuch eaftern monfter, refolved on the maffacre of a whole city, if he finds they have given any protection to his enemy, and afking a citizen, in whom he confides, about this fact, whe ther ther his enemy had ever been fheltered by the citizens; and that by deceiving the monfter he can preferve the lives of hundreds of thousands; whereas telling him the truth shall occafion the most horrible flaughter: upon fuch ftrong motives of humanity, he thinks, and every good man, we prefume, must think, that one's heart could not reproach him juftly for breaking through the common law of veracity, and conquering the natural impulfe towards it. He gives another example.-Suppofe a juft prince defeated by an inhuman brutal ufurper, and flying with his family, and the braveft men, the only hope of the state; and that they get into a house near the fea, whence they hope presently to make their escape; and that the ufurper, feeing another party flying paft that houfe, afks one whom he takes for a friend to his caufe, who yet is fecretly faithful to his prince and the liberty of his country, whether the prince be fled into that house? To hesitate, or be filent, on fuch an occafion discovers the whole truth; but his fpeaking contrary to his knowledge may preferve the only remaining hopes of a nation: this too, our author thinks, cannot be criminal. Some divines have denied all thefe extraordinary rights of neceffity upon the following principles. The common rules or laws of nature, fay they, fhould always be observed, whatever evil may enfue; nor can the highest profpects of advantage juftify our departing from them in our conduct. Nay, fome tell us, that we know not all the remote effects of actions. Such as appear to us of good tendency, may, in the whole, have pernicious effects; and thofe may have good effects in the whole, which appear to us of the most hurtful tendency. In answer to this our author obferves, that if our incapacity of judging about the diftant effects of actions fhould preclude all pleas of neceffity, it will alfo preclude all our ordinary reasonings about the tendency of actions, by which we discover the ordinary laws. The truth is, we must follow fuch probabilities as the conftitution of our nature, and our closest attention, can fuggeft to us, both in settling the ordinary rules of life, and in determining the exceptions in fome rarer cases. For it is only by our reasonings about the tendencies of actions, and those sometimes pretty remote, that we arrive at those conclufions which we call the ordinary laws of nature. In treating of this fubject the doctor briefly examines a vague maxim, by which fome perfons would exclude thefe pleas of neceffity: the maxim is, We must not do evil that good may come of it. This fentence,' fays he, is of no use in morals, as it is quite vague and undetermined. Must one • do do nothing for a good purpose, which would have been evil without this reference? It is evil to hazard life without a view to fome good; but when it is neceflary for a public intereft, it is very lovely and honourable. It is criminal to expose a good man to danger for nothing; but it is just even to force him into the greatest dangers for his country. It ⚫ is criminal to occafion any pains to innocent perfons, without a view to fome good: but for reftoring of health, we reward chirurgeons for fcarifyings, burnings, and amputations. But, fay they, fuch actions done for thefe ends are not • evil. The maxim only determines, that we must not do for a good end fuch actions as are evil, even when done for a good end. But this propofition is identic and useless, for who will tell us next, what these actions, fometimes evil, are, which may be done for a good end? And what actions are fo evil that they must not be done even for a good end? The maxim ⚫ will not answer this queftion; and truly it amounts only to this trifle, you ought not, for any good end, to do what is evil, or what you ought not to do, even for a good end. The main difficulty is, how far can this plea be extended? It cannot be refused in many ordinary laws about property, and our common labours. Nay, it may found exceptions to fome of the general laws of nature, about the prefervation of life. But what are these laws which admit of no • fuch exceptions? This is one of the defiderata in morals, and must probably remain fo till our knowlege grows more perfect in fome higher ftate.' The doctor proceeds to lay down fome general remarks to prevent abuses on this fubject; but after all that can be fúggefted on this head, we muft have recourfe, as he obferves, to the inward feelings of an honeft heart, which must make the application of general principles to particular cafes. And thus the truly good man, and his fentiments, muft be the laft refort in intricate cafes. Men truly virtuous will feldom be in danger of abufing the pleas of neceffity; and no rules or rigid tenets and opinions will bind the unjust, the covetous, the ambitious, the selfish, or the bigots in falfe religions. If they allow the pleas of neceflity in important cafes, they will mifapply them. If they do not allow them in opinion, they will counteract in practice those very laws which they deem strictly univerfal, without any exceptions. Having confidered, in the fecond book, the rights and duties founded in nature previous to any adventitious states or lafting relations, introduced by fome inftitution, contract, or 'deed of men, our author proceeds, in the third, to treat of do mestic and political relations, and the special rights and duties arifing from them. He begins with the firft relation in order of nature, which is marriage; lays down the duties of husbands and wives in this state; points out the mischiefs of polygamy; fhews that the marriage contract should be perpetual; and what are the moral impediments of marriage. As to near degrees of confanguinity or affinity, which Chriftians, and many heathen nations too, have always looked upon as moral impediments of marriage, he obferves, that the natural reasons commonly alleged, fcarce feem to have force proportioned to the great infamy, and the notions of impiety, attending fuch marriages. There is one manifest and important reason of prudence, however, he tells us, why a wife legiflator fhould prohibit fuch marriages; that were they not reftrained and abhorred, the early opportunities would make them exceedingly frequent, and by this means the facred bonds of affection would be too much confined; each family would be a little fyftem by itself, detached from others; atleaft as to all the stronger bonds of affecction. Whereas now, in confequence of the prohibition, and the general abhorrence enfuing upon it, or upon any other causes which may probably concur in this matter, multitudes of families are beautifully interwoven with each other in affection and intereft, and friendly ties are much further diffused. There may be other reafons,' fays he, in nature, not 'known to us, or not yet fully obferved. A mixture of different families may be neceffary to prevent a degeneracy of ⚫ the human race; as fome pretend, that fuch intermixtures, or croffing the ftrain by cattle of a different breed, is neceffary to prevent their degenerating; if we can decently make fuch comparisons.' In the further confideration of this fubject, he points out the just causes of divorce, fhews how divorces fhould be made, and concludes with a short examination of Plato's fcheme in regard to marriage; the grand fault of which, he tells us, is that it is not adapted to human nature, and to the affections which God has implanted in it. He proceeds to confider the rights and duties of parents and children, of masters and fervants; and then points out the motives to constitute civil government, and fhews what are the effential parts of it. After this he takes a view of the feveral forms of polity, with their principal advantages or disadvantages: in what he fays on this fubject, he fhews a very extenfive knowledge of both antient and modern history. 6 He He confiders likewife the rights of governors, and fhews how far they extend; enumerates the ways in which fupreme power is acquired; and examines the nature of civil laws and their execution. As pious difpofitions towards God, a firm perfuafion of his goodness, and of his providence governing the world, and adminiftring juftice in a future ftate, by rewarding juftice, temperance, and all focial difpofitions, and punishing the contrary, are the fources of the most fublime happiness, and the strongest incitements to all social, friendly, and heroic offices, the civil power, he tells us, should take care that the people be well inftructed in these points, and have all arguments prefented to their understandings, and all rational inducements proposed, which can raise these perfuafions, and confirm thefe difpofitions. As every rational creature, however, has a right to judge for itself in religious matters; and as men must affent according to the evidence that appears to them, and cannot command their own affent in oppofition to it, the magiftrate has Ro right, he obferves, to extort mens fentiments, or to inflict penalties upon their not agreeing to the opinions he thinks just; fince fuch penalties are no evidences to convince the judgment, and can only produce hypocrify; and are monftrous ufurpations on the moft facred rights of all rational beings. He is of opinion likewise, that the magiftrate can have no right to punish any for publishing their fentiments, how false foever he may think them, if they are not hurtful to fociety. As to direct atheism, or the denial of a moral providence, or of the obligations of the moral or focial virtues; these indeed directly tend to hurt the ftate in its most important interefts: and the persons who publish fuch tenets cannot well pretend any obligation in confcience to do fo. The magiftrate may therefore, he thinks, juftly restrain them by force; as he might any deluded fool or enthufiaft, who pretended confcience in invading the rights or properties of others; fince he has an undoubted right to defend the ftate and its members against whatever hurts them, let the pretences of the authors be what they will; and thus has a right to restrain fuch as would by any fophiftry corrupt the weak into fentiments inconfiftent with their duty to their fellows, or fuch as are deftructive of the public happiness, by taking away the moft powerful incitements to all good offices, and reftraints from injury. But as there is little danger that fuch tenets will ever prevail in a civilized nation, where knowlege and arts are encouraged; and as punishments inflicted by public authority, befides moving the compaffion of men, fometimes give an air of importance to |