half, when they found themselves prevented by the more nimble ships of Spain.

This may suffice to prove, that a strong army in a good fleet, which neither foot nor horse is able to follow, cannot be denied to land where it list, in England, France, or elsewhere, unless it be hindered, encountered, and shuffled together, by a fleet of equal or answerable strength.

The difficult landing of our English at Fayal, in the year 1597, is alleged against this; which example moves me no way to think, that a large coast may be defended against a strong fleet. I landed those English in Fayal myself, and therefore ought to take notice of this instance. For whereas I find an action of mine cited, with omission of my name; I may, by a civil interpretation, think that there was no pupose to defraud me of any honour; but rather an opinion, that the enterprise was such, or so ill managed, as that no honour could be due unto it. There were indeed some which were in that voyage, who advised me not to undertake it; and I hearkened unto them somewhat longer than was requisite ; especially whilst they desired me to reserve the title of such an exploit, (though it were not great,) for a greater person. But when they began to tell me of difficulty, I gave them to understand the same which I now maintain, that it was more difficult to defend a coast than to invade it. The truth is, that I could have landed my men with more ease than I did, yea, without finding any resistance, if I would have rowed to another place; yea, even there where I landed, if I would have taken more company to help me. But without fearing any imputation of rashness, I may say, that I had more regard of reputation in that business than of safety. For I thought it to belong unto the honour of our prince and nation, that a few islanders should not think any advantage great enough against a fleet set forth by queen Elizabeth; and further, I was unwil

ling that some Low-country captains, and others, not of mine own squadron, whose assistance I had refused, should please themselves with a sweet conceit, (though it would have been short, when I had landed in some other place,) that for want of their help I was driven to turn tail.' Therefore I took with me none but men assured, commanders of mine own squadron, with some of their followers, and a few other gentlemen volunteers, whom I could not refuse; as Sir William Brooke, Sir William Harvey, Sir Arthur Gorges, Sir John Scott, Sir Thomas Ridgeway, Sir Henry Thinne, Sir Charles Morgan, Sir Walter Chute, Marcellus Throckmorton, captain Laurence Kemys, captain William Morgan, and others, such as well understood themselves and the enemy; by whose help, with God's favour, I made good the enterprise I undertook. As for the working of the sea, the steepness of the cliffs,' and other troubles that were not new to us, we overcame them well enough. And these, notwithstanding, made five or six companies of the enemies, who sought to impeach our landing, abandon the wall whereon their musqueteers lay on the rest for us, and won the place of them without any great loss. This I could have done with less danger; so that it should not have served for example of a rule that failed even in this example; but the reasons before alleged, (together with other reasons, well known to some of the gentlemen above named, tho' more private than to be here laid down,) made me rather follow the way of bravery, and take the shorter course, having it still in mine own power to fall off when I should think it meet. It is easily said, that the enemy was more than a • coward,' (which yet was more than we knew ;) neither will I magnify such a small piece of service, by seeking to prove him better; whom had I thought equal to mine own followers, I would otherwise have dealt with. But for so much as concerns the proposition in hand; he that beheld this, may well remember,

that the same enemy troubled us more in our march towards Fayal, than in our taking the shore; that he sought how to stop us in place of his advantage; that many of our men were slain or hurt by him, among whom Sir Arthur Gorges was shot in that march; and that such as (thinking all danger to be past when we had won good footing,) would needs follow us to the town, were driven by him to forsake the pace of a man of war, and betake themselves to a hasty trot.

For end of this digression, I hope that this question shall never come to trial; his majesty's many moveable forts will forbid the experience. And although the English will no less disdain, than any nation under heaven can do, to be beaten upon their own ground, or elsewhere, by a foreign enemy; yet to entertain those that shall assail us, with their own beef in their bellies, and before they eat of our Kentish capons, I take to be the wisest way. To do which, his majesty, after God, will employ his good ships on the sea, and not trust to any entrenchment upon the shore.

SECT. X.

How the Romans attempt again to get the mastery of the seas. The victory of Cæcilius, the Roman consul, at Panormus. The siege of Lilybæum. How a Rhodian galley entered Lilybæum at pleasure, in despite of the Roman fleet. That it is a matter of great difficulty to stop the passage of good ships. The Romans, by reason of grievous losses received under Claudius and Junius, their consuls, abandon the seas again.

WHEN, without a strong navy, the Romans found it altogether impossible, either to keep what they had already gotten in Sicily, or to enlarge their dominions in Africa, or elsewhere; they resolved once

again, notwithstanding their late misadventures, to strengthen their fleet and ships of war. So causing fifty new gallies to be built, and the old to be repaired, they gave them in charge (together with certain legions of soldiers) to the new consuls, C. Attilius and L. Manlius. On the other side, Asdrubal perceiving that the Romans, partly by reason of the shipwreck which they had lately suffered, partly by reason of the overthrow which they received by Xantippus in Africa, were less daring than they had been in the beginning of the war; and withal, that one of the consuls was returned into Italy, with the one half of the army; and that Cæcilius, with only the other half, remained at Panormus; he removed with the Carthaginian forces from Lilybæum towards it, hoping to provoke Cæcilius to fight. But the consul was better advised. For when Asdrubal had made his approaches somewhat near the town, Cæcilius caused a deep trench to be cut a good distance without the ditch of the city; between which and his trench he left ground sufficient to embattle a legion of his soldiers. To these he gave order, that they should advance themselves, and pass over the new trench, till such time as the African elephants were thrust upon them. From those beasts he commanded them to retire, by slow degrees, till they had drawn on the elephants to the brink of the new trench, which they could by no means pass. This they performed accordingly; for when the elephants were at stand, they were so galled and beaten, both by those soldiers that were on the inside of the trench, and by those that lay in the trench itself, that being enraged by their many wounds, they broke back furiously upon their own footmen, and utterly disordered them. Cæcilius espying this advantage, sallied with all the force he had, and charging the other troops, that stood embattled, he utterly broke them, and put them to their heels, making a great slaughter of them, and taking all their elephants.

The report of this victory being brought to Rome, the whole state, filled with courage, prepared a new fleet of two hundred sail, which they sent into Sicily, to give end to that war, which had now lasted fourteen years. With this fleet and army the Romans resolve to attempt Lilybæum, the only place of importance which the Carthaginians held in Sicily, and all, indeed, save Drepanum, that was near adjoining. They sit down before it, and possess themselves of all the places of advantage near unto it, especially of such as command the haven, which had a very difficult entrance. They also beat to the ground six towers of defence, and by forcible engines weaken so many other parts of the city, as the defendants begin to despair; yet Himilco, commander of the place, faileth not in all that belongs to a man of war; all that is broken he repaireth with admirable diligence; he maketh many furious sallies, and giveth to the Romans all the affronts that possibly could be made. He hath in garrison (besides the citizens) ten thousand soldiers, among which there are certain lieutenants and other petty officers, that conspire to render and betray the town. But the matter is revealed by an Achæan, called Alexom, who had formerly, in danger of the like treason, saved Agrigentum. Himilco useth the help of Alexon to assure the hired soldiers, and employeth Hannibal to appease the troops of the Gauls, which did waver, and had sent their agents to the enemy. All promise constancy and truth; so that the traitors, being unable to perform what they had undertaken, are fain to live in the Roman camp as fugitives that had wrought no good whereby to deserve their bread. In the meanwhile, a supply of ten thousand soldiers is sent from Carthage to their relief, having Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, for their conductor; who, in despite of all resistance, entered the port and city, to the incredible joy of the besieged. The old soldiers, together with the new companies, (thereto VOL. V.

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