SECT. VIII.

Dissension between the two Roman consuls. Whether it be likely, that Hannibal was upon point of flying out of Italy, when the Romans pressed him to fight. The great battle of Cannæ.

THESE new generals arriving at the camp, dismissed M. Attilius, one of the last year's consuls, requesting it because of his age and weakness; Servilius they retained with them as their assistant. The first thing that Æmilius thought necessary, was to hearten his soldiers with good words; who, out of their bad success hitherto, had gathered more cause of fear than of courage. He willed them to consider, not only now, their victories in times past against the Carthaginians, and other more warlike nations. than were the Carthaginians; but even their own great numbers, which were no less than all that Rome at the present was able to set forth. He told them in what danger their country stood; how the state and safety thereof rested upon their hands; using some such other common matter of persuasion. But the most effectual part of his oration was, that Hannibal, with this his terrible army, had not yet obtained one victory by plain force and valour; but that, only by deceit and ambush, he had stolen the honour which he had gotten at Trebia and Thrasymene. Herewithal he taxed the inconsiderate rashness of Sempronius and Flaminius; of whom the one saw not his enemies until he was surrounded by them; the other scarce saw them when they struck off his head, by reason of the thick mist, through the darkness whereof he went groping (as it were blindfold) in.

to their snares: Finally, declaring what advantages they had against the enemy, and how destitute the enemy was of those helps by which he had hitherto prevailed against them; he exhorted them to play the men, and do their best. They were easily per suaded; for the contemplation of their own multitude, and confidence of the Roman virtue in matter of arms, gave them cause to think, that under a captain so well experienced, and every way sufficient, as Æmilius was known to be, they should easily prevail against the Carthaginians, that came far short of them in all things else save craft, which would not always thrive. But in one thing they mistook the meaning of their general. It was his desire that they should have heart to fight; not that they should lose the patience of waiting a convenient season. But they having pre-conceived a victory, thought all delays to be impediments, and thereby sought to rob themselves of their best help, which was good conduct. They remembered what talk they had heard at Rome, and were themselves affected with the vulgar desire of ending the war quickly; wherein, since Æmilius had acknowledged that the advantage was theirs, why did he make them forbear to use it? Thus thought the common soldier; and thus also thought the conusl Terentius, who was no less popular in the camp than he had been in the city. Expectation is always tedious; and never more than when the event is of most importance. All men longed, both at Rome and in the army, to be freed from the doubtful passions of hope and fear; therefore Terentius, who hastened their desire to effect, was likely to win more thanks than did his colleague, though greater in performance. Thus, while the Romans think themselves to have the better of their enemies, they fall into an inconvenience, than which few are more dangerous; dissension of their chief commanders. Varro would fight,-Æmilius would so too; but said that it was

not yet time: why? because the enemy must shortly dislodge, and remove hence into places less fit for his horse. But shall the Romans wait, till Hannibal, having eaten up his last year's provisions, return into Campania to gather a second harvest? This would (said Varro) savour too much of Q. Fabius; and your haste (said Paulus) doth savour no less of C. Flaminius. Their deeds were like their words; for they commanded by turns interchangeably every day. Emilius lodged six miles from Hannibal, where the ground was somewhat uneven. Thither, if the Carthaginians would take pains to come, he doubted not to send them away in such haste, as they should not leave running till they were out of Italy. But they came not. Terentius therefore the next day descended into the plains; his colleague holding him, and beseeching him to stay. Nevertheless, he sat down close by Hannibal; who, as an unbidden guest, gave him but a rude welcome and entertainment. The Carthaginian horse and light armature, fell upon the Roman vant-courrers, and put the whole army in tumult, whilst it was yet in march; but they were beaten off, not without loss; for that the Romans had, among their Velites, some troops weightily armed; whereas the Carthaginians had none. The day following Emilius, who could not handsomely withdraw the army out of that level ground, encamped upon the river Aufidus; sending a third part of his forces over the water to lie upon the eastern bank, where they entrenched themselves. He never was more unwilling to fight than at this present; because the ground served wholly for the advantage of his enemy, with whom he meant to deal, when occasion should draw him to more equal terms, Therefore he stirred not out of his trenches, but fortified himself; expecting when Hannibal should dislodge, and remove towards Geryon, Cannæ, or some other place, where his store lay, for want of necessaries; whereof an army foraging the country

was not likely to carry about with it sufficient quantity for any long time.

Here it would not be passed over in silence, that Livy differeth much in his relation from Polybius; telling many strange tales of the misery into which Hannibal had been driven, and of base courses that he devised to take, if the Romans could have retained their patience a little longer. He had (saith Livy) but ten days provision of meat. He had not money to pay his soldiers. They were an unruly rabble, gathered out of several nations, so that he knew not how to keep them in order; but that from murmuring, they fell to flat exclammations; first about their pay and provant, and afterwards for very famine. Especially the Spaniards were ready to forsake him, and run over to the Roman side. Yea, Hannibal himself was once upon the point to have stolen away into Gaul with all his horse, and left his foot unto their miserable destinies. At length, for lack of all other counsel, he resolved to get him as far as he could from the Romans, into the southernmost parts of Apulia; to the end that both his unfaithful soldiers might find the more difficulty in running from him, and that his hunger might be relieved with the more early harvest. But, whilst he was about to put this device in execution, the Romans pressed him so hard, that they even forced him unto that which he most desired,—even to fight a battle upon open champain ground, wherein he was victo

rious.

It was not uncommendable in Livy to speak the best of his own citizens; and where they did ill, to say, that, without their own great folly, they had done passing well. Further also he may be excused, as writing only by report. For thus he saith, Hannibal de fugâ in Galliam (dicitur) agitâsse; Hannibal (is said) to have bethought himself of flying into Gaul where he makes it no more than a matter of hearsay, as perhaps was all the rest of this re

lation. As for the process itself it is very incredible. For if Hannibal, coming out of Gaul, through the marshes and bogs of Etruria, could find victuals enough, and all things needful unto his army the summer foregoing, what should hinder him to do the like this year? especially seeing he had played the careful husband in making a great harvest; since he had long been master of the open field; and, besides, had gotten by surprise no small part of the Romans provisions? Suitable hereunto is all the rest. If Hannibal had taken nothing but corn and cattle, his soldiers might perhaps have fallen into mutiny for pay. But he brought gold with him into Italy; and had so well increased his stock since he came into that country, that he had armed his African soldiers all Roman-like, and loaden his followers with spoil; having left wherewith to redeem as many of his own as were taken by the enemy, when the Romans were not willing, as finding it not easy, to do the like. In this point, therefore, we are to attend the general agreement of historians, who gave it as a principal commendation unto Hannibal, that he always kept his army free from sedition, though it were composed of sundry nations; no less different in manuers, religion, and almost in nature, than they were in languages: and well might he so do, having not only pronounced, that which of his men soever fought bravely with his enemy, was thereby a Carthaginian; but solemaly protested and swore, (besides other rewards) to make as many of them, as should deserve and seek it, free citizens of Carthage. The running away into Gaul was a senseless device. Hannibal, being there with his whole army, took so little pleasure in the country and people, that he made all haste to get out of it.

And what should he now do there with his horse? or how could he be trusted either there or elsewhere? yea, how could he desire to live, having betrayed all