PREFACE. THE following Correspondence, which passed betwixt the late Mr Combe and myself, was such as often occurs among friends. Mr Combe and I were well known to each other, having been members of the same profession, and I may add that there was not one of our number who was more respected on account of his ability as a lawyer, and esteemed for his private worth, than the celebrated author of the "Constitution of Man." Mr Combe's letters are few in number, but as they were written while his last Essay on the "connection betwixt science and religion" was passing through the press, they, in their relation to that work, may seem to many of his admirers of some importance. I make no apology for publishing them, although it must be evident that they were neither written nor intended for such a purpose. But I may add, that I have committed them to the press at the request of one whose high position constitutes him a qualified judge of the propriety of so doing. My professional intimacy with Mr Combe was such as warranted me to write to him with perfect freedom, without incurring the least charge of presumption. As to my own letters, I may say that they possess little intrinsic merit, but as they stand in a certain relation to those of Mr Combe, I have ventured to submit them as they were written, with only a few verbal additions and corrections. It is no marvel that I failed to draw out of Mr Combe a categorical answer to the all-important question I submitted to him, seeing, by his published Essay, that he held the strange notion that sin has in it no moral turpitude, and that man is just as God made and intended him to be. Sin was thus in his eyes only a something which no human language could possibly express! My only regret is, that my inability to reply may have had more influence in confirming than shaking Mr Combe's preconceived scepticism. All I can say is, that I availed myself of the opportunity afforded me of doing my best in the circumstances in which I had voluntarily yet accidentally placed myself. Had Mr Combe not advised me, in order to discover truth, "to reject everything which only appeared untrue, and embrace boldly and firmly whatever views only appeared sound," I would not have entered on the discussion contained in my second letter. I felt that the advice was conceived in language so indefinite, that no human mind could, by following it, possibly distinguish truth from error; and I had some hope that I might have been able, by submitting my views of the unsatisfactory conclusions of heathen philosophy, to draw out of one whose fame had reached to the world's end a more positive and assuring criterion of truth than merely vague appearances," which might be only fanciful dreams-mere abstractions-nothing! And this, after all, is scepticism, even in the hands of its greatest master! What, then, is man, according to the great George Combe? His present condition is one of wretchedness and despair. His future? The blackness of darkness for ever! CORRESPONDENCE, &c GEORGE COMBE, Esq. Edinburgh, 16th March 1857. Dear Sir, Our friend, Mr, lately in a conversation I had with him, said he wondered that I could believe the Bible to be a revelation from God. He added, that he attended Dr -'s Church, where you and several others whom he named, also attended. I said I was surprised at this, but he explained by saying that the Doctor never offended by treating questions of Scripture in a manner which contradicted his views, and he sent me the Work of Hennell on the subject for perusal. He also informed me that you held the same opinions. I returned the volume, with a few remarks; and I verbally stated that I had just been informed that you had mentioned to Mrs Dr Samuel Brown, that shortly before the Doctor's death you and he had had a conversation on the same subject, and that you then said you were now satisfied that the gospel scheme was the "truth." Mr has, however, since informed me that, so far from this being the case, he understands you are bringing out a Work more decided than any yet published against the doctrine of the Christian system. May 1 be allowed to say a few words on a point which Hennell has not touched? It is of so essential importance to an inquiring mind, that I make no apology for this intrusion. It is as follows: Taking it for granted that the great First Cause of all things is a Being whose inherent qualities are wisdom, power, goodness, and truth, and that justice and holiness are His essential attributes, it follows that man, who is a being placed under fixed laws, and yet capacitated to do much for his own happiness and well-being, ought to observe those laws, and thereby secure all the happiness of which his nature is capable of enjoyiug. But no man has ever obeyed all those laws which relate to right and wrong, hence present suffering, and that disquiet of mind which conscious violation of those laws produces. Imperfection is thus stamped on the best of men. He feels that he is a moral delinquent; and, as such, there can be no affinity betwixt a perfect Being and an imperfect creature. So far from attracting the creature to God, the knowledge of His absolute justice necessarily repels him, and the less perfect the creature is, the greater must be the distance at which he stands from his Creator. The question then is,-How is this evil to be remedied consistently with the perfections of God? Reason cannot answer this all-important question; and there can be no certainty unless the mind of God be revealed concerning it. The mind thus becomes perplexed, and longs for a solution of the difficulty. After I had read Hennell, I thought if his views were true, what then is man? what is his position now? and what his future? I could not answer; and I may add, that the impression left on my mind from reading that book was so painful for a time that I could scarcely endure it. I, however, recalled to mind the evidences of the truth of Revelation. I saw in Scripture a unity of divine truth pervading it throughout, and which unfolds a scheme of wondrous love to man, of which his past history is but one great manifestation of its first development, and, on the principles of Butler's Analogy, leads the mind by faith to rest in certain hope. Even Cicero felt that his reason only led him to entertain a vague belief in the immortality of the soul; yet his determination was, that those sceptics who might call such an opinion "a fond deceit," should not be allowed to deprive him of it, for one thing was certain, namely, if he were mistaken, those who now laughed at him would not then be able to do so, for they would be in a similar condition. But I think we have more than a mere vague opinion regarding the Christian system, which, notwithstanding all the evils which have arisen from perverted views of it, has done more for civilization than all the philosophical systems which ever existed. May I trust that in preparing your Work you will notice the point I have mentioned, for no doubt you must have satisfied your own mind on this all-important subject. I cannot expect you will take the trouble to answer this note, which is written with the kindest feeling, but I assure you it would place me under a deep obligation were you, at your convenience, to explain the point to which I have referred, and thereby aid me in my further investigation of truth.—I am, Yours faithfully, ROBERT DEUCHAR. Edinburgh, 23d March 1857. ROBERT DEUCHAR, Esq. Dear Sir, I duly received your letter of the 16th March, and beg to thank you for the report of your interview with Sir Walter Scott, which is very interesting. I have just sent to the press the last sheet of a new edition of my thoughts on the relation of Science and Religion, which contains a full exposition of my views on many points connected with religion, and I beg to refer you to it, because it is impossible for me to discuss such questions with particular persons through the medium of letters. One thing only I beg to remark,-If your mind is thoroughly satisfied with your present faith, I advise you to hold it fast, and enjoy it. Why should you feel pain when you condemn my views, which I anticipate that you will do, because I am satisfied that I have done my best to reach truth? Now, if you are equally satisfied that you have done your best to come to truth, and have attained it, hold it fast, and give yourself no concern about other men's opinions. If you doubt your own faith, then pursue new light, and do so in the spirit of truth, and cast aside fear. No man's opinion ought to cause you pain, or excite in your mind dissatisfaction, unless these opinions overthrow errors into which you have fallen, and then the pain will only be temporary. After becoming familiar with new truths, you will become happier and better; but do not dally with your conscience; reject everything which appears untrue, and embrace boldly and firmly whatever views appear sound, and you will find peace.-I am, dear sir, yours sincerely, GEO. COMBE. GEORGE COMBE, Esq. Edinburgh, 27th March 1857. Dear Sir, I beg to thank you for your answer to my former letter. I shall carefully peruse your intended publication. I did not feel pain simply on account of Hennell's attack on the Christian system. It arose from a feeling that if that author's views were correct, I was at once deprived of all hope, for I found in his work no satisfactory answer to the question, How can guilty man be justified in the sight of a holy God? I may add, that I have not found in any heathen writer a solution of this question. SOCRATES did not answer this question; neither do I think his Defence was an honest one. It was disingenuous-a mere denial of the charge that he reviled the gods; and his last vow gave the lie to his higher belief, if he had any such belief at all. Zenophon shews that he was a polytheist. Plato testified to Socrates's intemperance; at least to his giving direct countenance to this vice in its most beastly form (Alcibiades' Feast). And the manner in which he spent the night's debauch, even to break of day, shewed he had little of that piety which might have been expected from such a teacher of truth. At one time Ꮲ he doubted the propriety of praying to the gods at all. It is true that he asserted that justice and truth were eternal and immutable principles; that virtue was the chief good, and was to be loved for its own sake, independently of its utility. This was his highest achievement in moral science-his only philosophy. Yet no one can read the affecting circumstances of his death without feelings of the deepest sympathy and admiration. His calm and dignified deportment, and last words, clearly shewed that he held a strong belief in the immortality of the soul, and of a future state of happiness or misery, as the reward of virtue or the punishment of vice. He no doubt taught that virtue consisted in doing what was right. Hence he said that revenge was highest injustice, and when we suffer unjustly we ought not to do evil in return. This was all very good, and shews that his great mind had nearly discovered the perfect golden rule-" do to others as you would that they should do to you." But he fell far short of this truth; for virtue with him was more negative than positive—that is, it was passive, not active. I may suffer and not revenge a wrong, still I may not love my enemy by rendering good for evil; on the contrary, Ι may hate him. Is this virtue? Does it even approximate to the ideal absolute-perfection? * "Thus faith approves itself sincere, By active virtue crowned," PLATO, however, appears to have imbibed little of the spirit of his master, and seems to have derived as little benefit from his noble example. Socrates died a martyr for the cause of freedom of opinion; but Plato was a bloody bigot in religion. Thus we find him inculcating as law a blind submission to the religion of the State, and forbidding private or domestic altars under pain of death! How inconsistent? for he still rigidly adhered to the teaching of Socrates, and ably refuted those false moralists who asserted and publicly defended, the opposite theory by their sophistical reasoning. Revenge, said he to the sophists, was highest injustice, and in no case ought we to do evil-not even a "little evil" to an enemy. But, like Socrates, he failed to perceive that perfect virtue is not only inconsistent with the spirit of revenge, but is also itself a principle of active benevolence; and this is truly its essential quality. Love worketh no evil, therefore to love is to be just, virtuous, good. * A learned Professor, to whom I had submitted the following Correspondence, said to me that I had misrepresented Plato. I afterwards directed his attention to the passage I had quoted. "It is impossible for a man to be a friend to an enemy." "He then admitted that my view seemed after all to be just, and added, that it was entirely new to him, for he had never before met with it in any Com. mentator. It is scarcely possible that Aristotle could have said that revenge was just and honourable," &c., had he not seen that his great Master had contradicted himself, |