« VorigeDoorgaan »
In 1807, when France had 130 departments, the expense of the Ministry of the Interior was 740,273f; it is now, when the number of departments is only 86, threefold. Under the Empire, there were in the ministry four chiefs of departments; in 1819, six; in 1823, seven; in 1824, eight; and now (1845) M. Duchatel has under his orders an under-secretary of state, a private secretary, three directors, thirteen heads of departments, and sections, and thirty-nine chief clerks. The number of officials has increased more rapidly since the revolution (1830.) It amounts to a fourth more than at the period of the Restoration. The finance ministry, which in 1830 had 59,700 officials, has now more than that number by 12,890. The sev
1830, 2,539 officials, with salaries of 8,836,000f.; and in 1844, 3,060, with salaries of 9,962,800f.: or the administration of Paris alone cost 1,126,500f. more in 1844 than in 1830.*
Thus, in the fifteen years of the Consulate and of the Empire of Napoleon, when France was con-eral ministerial offices in Paris alone employed in stantly engaged in wars, with the exception of the short peace of Amiens, the total amount of contributions paid by the eighty-six departments was 8,160,000,000 francs; in the fifteen years of the Restoration the same departments paid 14,250,000,000 francs; and in the thirteen years of the reign of the citizen king, they have paid 14,210,000,000 francs.
That comes down only to 1844; continued to 1848, as subsequent to 1844 the expense was much increased, the comparison would be still more unfavorable to the government of Louis Philippe. M. Michel Chevalier, writing in 1848, said, "The whole naval and military expense under Bonaparte in 1802 was 315 million francs; and the military and naval expense in 1846, under Louis Philippe, exceeded 576 millions."
effect of every revolution is double.
A great mistake is afloat as to the prosperity cept 1806," he adds, no year of the reign of of France. The Times, for example, speaks of Napoleon, till 1811, exceeded, for military and the "expansion of the national resources under naval purposes, the expense of 1846." But the Louis Philippe ;" but if any such expansion had increase of expense, for the civil administration, taken place, it would have shown itself by an inappears to have been greater than that for the mil-crease of the people. Whenever and wherever itary. At least, the number of persons employed national resources increase, the population inby the government is astonishingly large. The creases. Fully analyzed, it may, indeed, be said cost is said by the author of France to be 18,462,1241. Mr. Herries, on the 16th ult., called the public attention to the fact stated by Mr. Porter, that the number of persons in the service of our government had been reduced between 1815 and 1835, from 27,365 to 23,500, and their salaries at the latter period was 2,780,000l. The number of such persons employed in France was, in 1844, not less than 900,000. Including the police, the number was 992,000, and adding the military, the government of France may be said to comprise 1,392,000 persons, or about 1-26th part of the whole population. The number of persons employed in the government of the two countries does not admit of an actual comparison between England and France, because the bulk of our municipal and county magistrates and officers are either not appointed by the crown or do not receive salaries, while all such persons are appointed directly or indirectly by the crown in France. At the same time, it is evident that the number of persons employed in administering the government of France is much greater than is employed in administering the government of England. A German writer estimates them at fifteen times as many. As a specimen of the increase in France, we may quote that of the Ministry of the Inte
that there is no other test of prosperity than their continual and permanent increase. They will always breed fully up to the means of subsistence, and if these means be abundant, the increase will be rapid. Certainly we have seen official accounts of immense imports and exports, particularly exports; but how much of them were sent to Algeria to supply the wants of the army, and were paid for out of the government expenditure, did not appear in the returns. Certainly, too, we know, from authentic sources, that while the imports and exports were assuming, at least on paper, an appearance of expansion, the shipping of France, one index of prosperity, was declining. M. Michel Chevalier tells us that the number of great ships-ships of three hundred tons and upwards-had fallen off in nine years, betwixt 1837 and 1846, 21 per cent., or from 300 to 237. In 1830, according to Mr. M'Culloch, the number of ships was 14,852; in 1840, 15,600; and 1844, 13,679. Without giving us any specific data, M. Blanqui, in his recent work, Sur des Classes Ouvrieres, referred to in the Economist on June 2d, complains loudly of the decay of manufactures in France, and explains at some length the cause of the decline, and the deterioration in the condition of the workmen. We have on several * Müller's Statistiches Handbach, for 1845.
occasions quoted from M. Thiers, Mr. M'Culloch, and others, statements of the alarming number of actual paupers and of persons scarcely able to subsist in France. We have shown, on the authority of Mr. M'Culloch, that not only is the agriculture of France extremely bad, in relation to that of England-not only does one acre in England yield considerably more than two acres in France-not only do two husbandmen in England supply a surplus of food for four other individuals, while in France two husbandmen only supply a surplus to feed one other person-but, bad as agriculture is in France, it is becoming worse. The number of cattle and horses is falling off, and the consumption of butcher's meat throughout the country is declining. This sad condition does not date from the Revolution of 1848; all these facts relate to France in the palmy and prosperous days of Louis Philippe, and indicate, with unerring certainty, that the general malaise which M. Blanqui notices as heralding that great storm, was a more effective cause of the revolution than the writing and talking of demagogues.
We may confirm this general view by a quotation from Le Libre Echange of February 13, 1848. Unfortunately, M. Frederic Bastiat's calm and thoughtful wisdom was not appreciated by either the bigoted and spendthrift coercionists, who insisted on carrying out their own system by forts and armies, or their antagonists, the republicans, who ran to the other extreme, and, in the fury of their self-will, made a sweeping and a devastating change.
with progressively increasing slowness-namely, in the first 11 years, 9 per cent.; in the next 9 years, less than 6 per cent. ; and in 7 years, from 1835 to official returns analyzed by M. Legoyt, (and quoted 1842, 3 1-10th per cent. only. According to the by Mr. Mill,) the increase of the population, which from 1801 to 1806 was at the rate of 1.28 per cent. annually, averaged only 0.47 per cent. from 1806 to 1831; from 1831 to 1836 it averaged 0-60 per cent. ; and from 1836 to 1841, 0.41 per cent.; and from 1841 to 1846, 0.68 per cent.; but M. Legoyt is of 1841, and the increase between that time and 1846 opinion that the population was "understated in consequently overstated; and that the great increase during the period was something intermediate between the last two averages, and not more than 1 in 200."
The extraordinary fact then is, that the French population, who were not reconciled to the waste of life and treasure which took place under Bonaparte by his splendid victories, then actually increased in numbers, and, we must believe, increased in wealth and material well-being, much faster than under the elder Bourbons, and faster still than under Louis Philippe. It is plain from these facts that, instead of society expanding rapidly in France, in which alone is health and safety, it was coming to a dead lock before the revolution of February; and such is the fatal mistake of the system there followed-such the error of their creed, or the perversity of their politicians-that the course since pursued has terribly increased the mischief. “By far the strangest feature in M. Passy's statement,' says the Times," is the total absence of any real and positive proposition for the reduction of the Without speaking (said M. Bastiat) of the em- public expenditure.' The system, of which the barrassment of our finances of which the principal principal features were an increase of expenditure source is the application of those ideas which form and debt, with no increase, if not a positive dethe system of protection-a painful languor affects all the branches of the national industry. Agricul- crease, of resources, is to be continued and aggrature vegetates, manufactures languish, our mercan- vated. M. Passy, like his colleagues, regards an tile marine dies out. Some particular branches of extension of the functions of government-and of industry suffer more than others; such, for example, course an increase of expense-as a necessary as that of the wine-growers, who complain inces- consequence of the increase of civilization. Accordsantly, and with reason; such as the linen manufac-ing to the French theory, as men become more ture, which suffers not less, though it complains not, lest it should advocate freedom of trade, which can alone save it. But it may be said that the evil is general. There is not at present a single branch of industry of which the condition can be praised. It is a remarkable thing, in fact, that the distress (malaise) which afflicts France extends with double intensity to all its foreign possessions.
enlightened, moral, and wise, they are less to be trusted, and require more government.
We do not regard ourselves as over prosperous in England; we complain much and justly of the pressure of population, but in 40 years, when the French increased only 21 per cent., our population increased 100 per cent., or four times as much as But the most decisive test of the very slow pro- that of France; and, what is of more importance, gress and condition of France, is the state of the it has increased, not in a retarding, but in an population. Mr. J. S. Mill, in his recent work accelerating ratio. Between 1801 and, 1811, the on political economy, says, in accordance with increase was 18.50 per cent.; between 1831 and other authorities, that "the census of 1806 showed 1841 it was 28 24 per cent. The population of a population of 29,107,425. In 1846, according the United States, undoubtedly the most prosperous to the census of that year, it had only increased to country of the globe, increases still faster than 35,409,486, being an increase of little more than our population, though we come nearly next to 21 per cent. in 40 years." But that increase them; but the population of France, with two took place in a retarding ratio. It was greater exceptions, increases more slowly than any popuunder Napoleon than under the elder Bourbons, and greater under the latter than under Louis Philippe. We take the proof from Mr. Mill:
In the 27 years, from 1815 to 1842, the population only increased 18 per cent. ; and during that period,
lation of the civilized world. A population that does not increase is not prosperous; and we may find a clue to many of the disasters of France in the wonderful disproportion between the increase of the population and of the government expendi
ture. The latter has gone on in an accelerating | consequence; for it would be absurd to suppose ratio. In forty years, the increase of the people that we could be permitted to quarrel on our own was 21 per cent.—the increase of expenditure 2 account, and that Great Britain would bear the fold, or 250 per cent. We may all mourn with brunt of the contest. the Times, as France seems likely to be the centre of continued convulsions in Europe, that there is to be no substantial alteration in her system and expenditure.
From the Montreal Herald.
CANADIAN INDEPENDENCE AND ANNEXATION.
We say, then, that a federal union and independence are inseparable; and we proceed to show how much less advantageous that arrangement would be, than the union with our southern neighbors.
The expenses of government in case of a federal union would be divided into two parts, that which belongs to the local or state government, and that which belongs to the federal government. In Canada at present we pay only the first set of expenses. Great Britain pays all those other charges, which in the United States are borne by the federal government, and would have to be borne by the federal government in case of a union with the provinces.
THERE are a considerable number of persons, who, while they admit all the evils of our present condition-for who does not admit what each feels in his own individual case?—are yet indisposed to take that bold and decided step, which appears to us the only probable remedy. To these persons the nostrum of a federal union with the sister provinces-with or without independence-appears By a federal union, therefore, we save nothing a better course, more consistent with old ideas and of sources of expense, which we should incur by feelings, than that of an incorporation of our for- annexation; it is easy to show that these expenses tunes with those of the neighboring States. This would be vastly greater in the former case than in opinion originates in honest, manly devotion to the the latter. We have two millions of people in country of our birth-to the desire still entertained British North America. Joined to the United to preserve the name and condition of British sub- States we should form a nation of about twentyjects. It is, therefore, respectable, and to be re- four millions. But the two millions, in order to spected; but is nevertheless founded in mistake. the maintenance of a thorough system of diplomatic We have said that these persons lean to the idea relations abroad, would require as many ambasof a federal union of the British North American sadors and consuls as would be necessary for the provinces, with or without independence of Great twenty-two. The two millions would have to go Britain; for among those who have not fully con- to all the cost of paying for a president, instead sidered the subject, there is a vagueness of per- of paying the eleventh part of the cost of one such ception which prevents some of them from seeing functionary for the twenty-two. The two millions distinctly that a federal union can be nothing, un- must keep up a great variety of other civil establess it be accompanied by independence. But it lishments in the same way and out of their own resources, instead of sharing the burden with ten times their own number. Lastly, the army and navy must either be manifestly useless, or it must be equally powerful with that army with which it would probably have to contend in case of war.
is easy to show that this is the fact; and that, therefore, to advocate such a plan is also to advocate a separation from the mother country.
A federation is a number of states, each managing its own local affairs as we do at present; but united by the tie of a general and metropolitan The nation with which the North American government, which arranges, for the entire group, Union would have to dread collision would clearly all that regards their external relations. That is be the United States, therefore our army would to say, the federal governinent determines all ques- either be utterly incapable of affording us protections of peace and war, and, of consequence, all tion, or it must be as numerous as theirs. Two questions as to the extent and employment of the millions of population, then, must go to the same army and navy. It takes charge, also, of all diplo- expense as twenty millions; or else waste all the matic communications with foreign powers; all ne- outlay in useless form, whereas by a union with gotiations and treaties; and all restrictions, customs, the twenty millions, which would diminish the or other taxes imposed upon foreign commerce. necessary cost of the present military establishNow, unless there be these foreign relations, ments maintained by the larger population, the there can be no federal government, for the simple same protection might be had for a tithe of the reason that the federal government would have no money. functions would have nothing to do. should establish a federation to-morrow, in order to find some business for the general government to do, in order to prevent such an institution from becoming as useless a mockery as that of the governor-generalship, under the present system, we should have to obtain from Great Britain the right to treat with independent nations as an independent state. The cost of maintaining the army and navy would be necessarily thrown upon us, as a
So far, then, it is evident, that the items of increased expenses, rendered necessary by a change, would be incalculably greater in the case of a federal union than in that of annexation. Let us see what would be the advantages. The great advantages to be looked for in either case, arise from enlarged markets for our produce an increased field for our future industrial enterprises. Now a federal union of the British provinces would add, if they were all customers, only five hundred thou
sand people to our commercial system. Of our the exports for the month of July in the present two staples, lumber and breadstuffs, these five hun-year show an increase of more than two millions, dred thousand people would require nothing but compared with the same month last year: while breadstuffs. But annexation to the United States those of the seven months exhibit an increase of would add twenty million to our commercial sys- more than five millions in 1849, compared with tem; would give us markets wherever railroad, 1848. What was lost by continental revolutions in canal, sea-going ship, or pack-horse could trans- 1848, has been restored to our general commerce by port our present produce, and would open the same the tranquillity, such as it is, which now reigns vast region to our manufacturers, protected from in Europe. And those sudden and great changes foreign competition by a high differential tariff. have chiefly affected our trade with Germany, because it is so much larger than any other.
Instead of taking our breadstuffs only, this immense population would every year require more and more of the produce of our forests, while the funds which came here in return would accumulate till they grew into capital, and were reinvested in the manufacture of fresh sources of profit. Finally, the federal union would give no privileges to our Canadian vessels, steamers or otherwise, which they do not now possess; annexation would give free entry to our craft in every water of the continent.
The contrast is succinctly stated, but we think it is sufficiently striking to induce any one who reflects upon it to give up the federal union, and cleave to the larger and better measure.
IN whatever light we regard Germany, it is unquestionably the most important “foreign relation" which this country can boast of. The only other country that has any pretensions to a comparison with it, is the United States of America. The manufactures of Great Britain are consumed in Germany to a larger amount than in any other country whatever. On the other hand, Germany supplies this country with wool, timber, flax, hemp, and grain, to an aggregate amount exceeding our imports from any other single country, unless it be in some years from the United States, in the trade of which cotton alone forms so important an item. If to our direct exports we add those which pass through Belgium, Holland, and other channels, the amount of British manufactures disposed of in Germany is not less than twelve millions annually. In other words, Germany, as a market for our goods, is equal to those of the possessions of the East India Company, Ceylon, the whole of the Australian colonies, the Cape of Good Hope, and the British possessions in North America, all taken together. When the German markets were paralyzed and deranged last year, in consequence of the political disturbances, which destroyed all credit and confidence, we had a striking example of the influence exerted by them on British industry. In the course of a few months our exports fell off upwards of £5,000,000. With tranquillity partially restored in Europe, our exports have increased as suddenly in the present year as they declined in 1848. According to the board of trade tables, which we publish this day,
In everything, therefore, which affects the permanency of that tranquillity, this country has a deep and important stake. There is no more vulgar error, common as it hitherto has been, than that our success and prosperity can be built up on the misfortunes of our neighbors. Thus it is impossible that those who understand the true importance of the commercial intercourse between this country and Germany, can look with apathy upon the efforts now making at Berlin to consolidate into some rational confederation the scattered elements of the great German empire. We are in no humor at the present time to criticize too severely the errors of the past, whether of omission or commission, which have been made by those in whose hands the destinies of Germany have been placed. They have been sufficiently numerous. We are rather disposed to aid, in every way we can, what appears to us to be the most likely means of cementing, if not all Germany, at least those states in the north which, from identity of interests and similarity of views, are capable of forming one great union, which will be sufficiently powerful to suppress domestic anarchy and forbid foreign aggression. By such a union alone can the peace of the north of Europe be guaranteed.
Taking the brilliant speech of M. de Radowitz, in the second Chamber at Berlin, as the true exponent of the policy of Count Brandenburg, and of the views and wishes of the King of Prussia, we must admit, that, for the first time since the revolutions of 1848, do we now see a well-founded hope for a reorganization of the German states into one united and intelligible policy. In the Frankfort Assembly we never had any confidence. It was based upon a theory which, however grand and imposing, embraced conflicting elements, which we had no hope to see reconciled. However much Austria and Prussia might appear to do homage to the "occasion," no one who considered the different principles and material interests which they represented, to say nothing of the private ambitions and jealousies which animated the representatives of two such great powers, could believe that either contemplated a true adherence to an arrangement which neither believed could be permanent.
But the Frankfort Assembly is now a matter of history. German unity, in the grand sense contemplated by that body, proved a failure, because it was based upon a vague theory, and not upon the wants and interests of the people. Since its dissolution it has been evident that the two great powers of Prussia and Austria have been striving
What, then, has Germany to choose between at this moment? On the one hand, there is Prince Swarzenburg's proposal for a great confederate empire of seventy-four millions, of discordant and dissimilar elements, with Austria at the head, and to include a mutual guarantee of all possessions, and consequently of Lombardy and Venice; and of which, no doubt, the cabinet of Vienna would be the moving spirit, as well with respect to its commercial policy as its general liberties. On the other hand, there is the proposal of Prussia, to establish a federal union of those states whose interests and views are similar and identical-based upon a liberal representative system. The one is reaction in politics-protection in commerce. The other is " progress" in both. The one addresses itself to a vision-an incompatible theory; the other, to actual existing facts-to living realities. The one, from its discordant elements, and reactionary attributes, could not fail to lead to confusion, anarchy, and (finally) to military despotism; the other, to a gradual amelioration of the present condition of the people, the expansion of their liberties, and the accomplishment of free trade. At the present moment, the one works by private intrigue; the other, by open and clearly announced principles and plans.
to influence a future organization of the German | determining the rights and powers of the federal states. These efforts on the part of Austria no government, and those of the independent sepadoubt would have assumed a more decided shape rate states, and based upon a free and liberal reprelong before now but for the occupation which she sentative system. has had in Italy and Hungary. At the present moment there are three plans open to Germany. The first is to remain in its present dislocated condition, with even the organization of the Zollverein, although literally in force (unless superseded) till 1853, practically, for any great object of progress or improvement, in abeyance; the second is to make another attempt to form one empire, with the reigning family of Austria at its head; and the third is to form such a limited union of the states which comprised the Zollverein of 1833, with such others in the north as are disposed to join it, leaving Austria and some of the minor states in the south to an independent existence. The first of these plans could lead only to continual intrigues, conflicts, and anarchy. The second to a reactionary policy, both with regard to the liberties of the people and the freedom of commerce, which would soon prove fatal (in the present temper of the German nation) to the governments themselves, both central and local, however formed. The third seems the only plan which promises anything like permanency, because it is based upon actual existing facts, and not upon any vague theory, because it assimilates itself to the material wants and the views of the people, and does not rely upon the people assimilating themselves to its dogmas; because it is a constitution No one who has at heart the maintenance of made for a people, suited to their interests and that tranquillity which is so far reëstablished in actual existence, and does not depend upon a peo- Europe can feel indifferent as to the success of the ple for its sake changing their habits and views in Berlin project. It is already far advanced. Ausorder to adopt it. Such is the proposal now made tria has lost its opportunity, if, indeed, it ever at Berlin, under the immediate sanction of Prussia. existed. On the 30th of the present month, the We have confidence in the Berlin constitution, Reichstag will be fully convened in both houses, because it is moderate in its pretensions, avoiding senate and representatives, at Berlin, when the the grand but impracticable visions which proved constitution will be formally submitted, and, no fatal at Frankfort, and confining itself to an at- doubt, accepted. On the 15th of October, the tempt to meet the real and present wants of that general German Parliament will be convoked, repportion of Germany which can ever be perma- resenting the new federal empire, which will emnently united. The whole objects and policy of brace, including Holstein, a population of about this constitution are most ably explained in the twenty-eight millions, of which Prussia alone posspeech of M. de Radowitz, already alluded to. sesses sixteen millions. The only thing which is He dwells with great stress upon the misfortunes now necessary for the full success of a project so of the past year-upon the anarchy which long admirably calculated to meet the peculiar position prevailed and against which, as yet, no perma- and wants of the German states, is that the King nent security has been taken. The old organi- of Prussia, and those statesmen who have origizations of 1815 and of 1833 have equally fallen to nated and proposed it, shall carry it out in the pieces, and are no longer of any true force. Yet, true spirit of M. de Radowitz's professions. The without organization, what is Germany? Confed- cabinet of Berlin must be prepared to carry it out eration is not more needful to the United States in a frank, liberal, and enlarged spirit. We tell of America than it is among the numerous petty them that they cannot afford to vacillate or hesistates of Germany. "Germany can only present tate. They have put their hand to the work, and, itself as a union, in relation to foreign states. Its for their own sake and the sake of Germany, they politics and representation must offer a united must persevere in it. If they do, they will have whole, with whose several divisions foreign powers the credit and the honor of having laid the founhave nothing to do. It is necessary I should show dation of a great confederation, which, though that this demand contains the condition upon which independent in all its parts for local purposes, will the life of the nation depends." Prussia, in short, form a powerful unity for all common objects, now seeks to establish a federal union, following which will contain within itself the germs of progthe example of the United States of America, in ress and rational liberty. For our own part, we