TABLE E-4.-TRAIN ACCIDENTS PER BILLION GROSS TON-MILES, U.S. RAILROADS 1 Accident data for all railroads; gross ton-mile data for class I line-haul railroads. 1965 accident data and frequency rates are preliminary. * Preliminary. Source: ICC Statements M-400 and M-450 and OS reports. Hon. HARLEY O. STAGGERS, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., March 14, 1966. Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, DEAR CONGRESSMAN STAGGERS: This is in reply to your letter of March 8, 1966, concerning the increase in defective locomotives found by our Inspectors and an increase in accidents in Fiscal Year 1965. During Fiscal Year 1965, our District Inspectors inspected a total of 76.044 locomotive units of which 9,391, or 12.3%, were found to have defects which were in violation of the Commission's regulations as compared to 11.1% found defective in Fiscal Year 1964. Of the total number of locomotive units inspected in Fiscal Year 1965, 646 units, 67 units more than in Fiscal Year 1964, were found to have defects which warranted their being ordered out of service. In Fiscal Year 1965, 87 accidents were caused by the existence of defects on locomotives which were in operation as compared to 76 accidents in Fiscal Year 1964. We believe that the following factors are involved in this undesirable trend: The average age of the Nation's locomotive fleet is increasing and approximately 85% of the locomotive units currently in service were built prior to 1958. It may reasonably be expected that increased maintenance is necessitated by the increased age. During the last several years, there has been an appreciable increase in the number of miles operated daily by locomotives and they are now hauling more cars containing heavier loads and at higher speeds. During the last several years, there has been a trend on the part of the carriers to centralize locomotive maintenance facilities. Consequently, there are now fewer facilities and fewer inspection and maintenance personnel than were available in the past. We believe that on some railroads the quality of inspection and repair procedures used by carrier personnel has deteriorated. This belief is supported in part by the fact that the majority of locomotive units found defective and/or ordered out of service by our District Inspectors had previously been inspected by carrier personnel and were ready for service. It is our further belief that accident potential, and consequently the number of accidents, increase as the operation of defective locomotives increase. If any further information is desired, we will be pleased to furnish it. Sincerely, JOHN W. BUSH, Chairman. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, Hon. HARLEY O. STAGGERS, Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, DEAR CONGRESSMAN STAGGERS: Thank you for your letter of March 16 and the enclosed copy of a letter, dated March 14, addressed to you by Chairman Bush of the Interstate Commerce Commission. I appreciate the opportunity you have thus given us to comment upon it. That letter is limited to the subject of locomotives and is largely a summary of portions of the 54th Annual Report of the Commission's Section of Locomotive Inspection for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965 (but not published until March 7, 1966). At the outset, I should inform you that the significance of certain facts stated in the letter and the validity of certain conclusions drawn from them have been directly challenged by this Association in litigation now pending before the Commission. This litigation, involving proposed amendments to the rules under which non-steam locomotives are inspected and known as Ex Parte 243, was begun in May 1964. Hearings were held before Commission Examiners during the period June 15 to December 15, 1965, and briefs to the Examiners were filed on March 15, 1966, the day before your letter was written. Obviously it would be improper for me to comment here on the details of this litigation or the specific issues it involves while it remains undecided. It is appropriate, however, for me to respond to some of the statements in the letter, and I will do so partly on the basis of what we believe to be fully proved in the record of the case. 1. The letter cites an increase in defects found in locomotive units and an increase in units ordered out of service because of defects during the latest period as compared with the preceding period. It is demonstrable, however, that there is no necessary relation between defects found and casualties experienced. This is in part because many so-called "defects" have little or no relation to hazards, actual or potential. 2. The letter also cites an increase in the number of accidents in the latest period; but, it fails to mention that the number of casualties in this period is lower than in the preceding period and, in fact, is the lowest of the last three years. 3. As one of the causes of what is called "this undesirable trend"-though we cannot regard a trend toward fewer casualties as undesirable-the letter assigns the increasing average age of the locomotive fleet. But during the post-war period casualty rates have fallen as the average age of the fleet has risen. To ignore this fact-which is demonstrated by the Commission's own published figures-is to overlook the effectiveness of the railroads' extensive program of rebuilding and renovating older locomotives. Reference to original building dates does not take this program into account, though it is a matter of major significance as respects both the safety and the efficiency of the present fleet. 4. Also referred to are increases in average miles operated by locomotives with longer, heavier trains at higher speeds. The implication seems to be that older locomotives are being utilized to an extent that strains their capacity. The fact is, however, that these increases in the averages in recent years are attributable to the use of new and rebuilt locomotives, which are more powerful and efficient and are capable of providing this added service without strain or hazard. This capability, indeed, has been a major justification for the greater capital expenditure required to obtain the more modern units. 5. A slighting reference is made in the letter to railroad inspection facilities and practices, with the assertion that "a majority" of the units found defective and ordered out of service had "previously" been inspected by railroad employees. Each unit, however, must by law receive a general inspection by railroad employees at least once each day it is in service, to say nothing of various periodic inspections of particular appurtenances. Assuming that the approximately 30,000 non-steam units in the fleet are in service on an average of 350 days each in a year, it follows that well over 10 million general daily inspections are given them each year. The number of instances referred to is infinitesimal by comparison with this total. We believe our employees are entitled to be proud that only this tiny proportion of the inspections they have made has been asserted to be ineffective. In this connection, I should like to point out that there is no relationship between the inspections referred to and the presence or absence of a fireman, as necessary inspections are made by other railroad personnel. 6. The best index of locomotive safety is one not mentioned in the letter. This is the casualty rate, a statistical comparison between casualties said to have been caused by defective locomotive units and the exposure to hazard caused by operation of the units. This can be determined from the Commission's published statistics. For non-steam locomotives during the post-war period it can be summarized in the following four-year averages: DEAR CONGRESSMAN STAGGERS: Further reference is made to your letter of March 8, 1966, regarding our Section of Locomotive Inspection's Report for Fiscal Year 1965, our reply of March 14, 1966, and your recent transmittal dated March 25, 1966, wherein you enclosed a letter from National Railway Labor Conference Chairman J. E. Wolfe, dated March 18, 1966. In accordance with your suggestion, we wish to make the following comments on Mr. Wolfe's letter. First, let us point out that Mr. Wolfe has raised the issue of relationship between accident trends occasioned by the presence or absence of firemen, to which we made no reference in our Locomotive Inspection Report or in our letter to you dated March 14, 1966. Mr. Wolfe apparently overlooked your request for specific information regarding the increase in the number of defective locomotives and in train-service accidents shown in our report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965. Secondly, Mr. Wolfe extracts a partial summary from the Commission's 79th Annual Report-1965 with regard to the causes of the "major portion" of train accident increases. However, a more accurate statement is as follows: There was a 10.3 percent rise in the number of train accidents reported. with the major portion of the increase due to derailments caused primarily by faulty equipment, track conditions, and by highway-grade crossings. In the past 4 years, accidents have shown a continued increase after having been substantially reduced in the fifties. Third, the statistical tables submitted by Mr. Wolfe were extracted from testimony presented by Mr. II. E. Greer, Director of Research, National Railway Labor Conference, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce on September 24, 1965, during its hearings held on the Railroad Work Rules Dispute in connection with Public Law 88-108. I also appeared as a witness before the same committee and presented testimony on August 30, 1965, while serving as Acting Chairman in the absence of then Chairman Charles A. Webb. At that time, we advised the Committee of our activities under the authority of the Accident Reports Act, which requires that monthly reports of all railroad accidents are to be made by carriers, directs the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe the method and form of reporting, and authorizes the Commission to investigate all collisions, derailments, or other accidents resulting in serious injury to persons or property. The information received from the carriers is compiled, analyzed, and published to provide comprehensive information, so that maximum benefits can be derived from the reports by the Commission, railroads, labor organizations, and other parties interested in the promotion of railroad safety. The data received in the accident reports is published in four publications. They are: 1. Statement M-450-Preliminary Report of Railroad Accidents and Resulting Casualties, 2. Statement M-400-Summary of Accidents Reported, 3. Accident Bulletin, 4. Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Bulletin. The aforenamed Commission publications have been cited as sources of information in Mr. Wolfe's statistical tables. This is correct to the extent that data was taken from the aforesaid publications. The carrier accident reports submitted in accordance with current Commission reporting rules do not distinguish between accidents involving trains operating with or without firemen. Therefore, from the information available to us, we are unable to relate the rise in accidents to the absence of firemen. We are aware of and have been concerned with the annual rise in train accidents. While there are variations which probably are affected by seasonal and climatic conditions, there has been an increase in total train accidents from a monthly average of 341 in 1961 to 443 in 1984. The preliminary figures for 1965 indicate a monthly average of 483. While there has been some increase in other train accidents from 41 to 57 and collisions from 82 to 102, the greatest increase has occurred in derailments, which have increased from an average of 221 per month to 283 per month. Crew consist may have some bearing in accidents involving collisions and other train accidents. Derailments are most often the result of defects or failure of equipment or roadbed. It is impossible, without detailed knowledge of each individual case, to determine whether another pair of eyes might have detected the potential of a derailment prior to the time of its occurrence. In the same period, railroad employment has declined, so that there are fewer train and engine service employees, but more train accidents. However, during this period the total number of hours worked by train and engine service employees has remained about constant, and locomotive and motor train miles have increased. This trend indicates that fewer people are working about the same number of hours, resulting in extended tours of duty for the affected employees, and also indicates that in the same number of hours additional mileage is being covered. We are concerned with the continued rise in train accidents and regret that we are unable to give you more specific information as to factors responsible for this increase. Sincerely, JOHN W. BUSH, Chairman. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Hon. HARLEY O. STAGGERS, Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, DEAR CHAIRMAN STAGGERS: I am sending you this letter as my initial reply to your letter of May 3rd concerning the report of the Committee on Government Operations on the Interstate Commerce Commission's activities in the field of railroad safety. First of all the report starts out on the first page with the statement: Safety on our Nation's railroads is one of the prime responsibilities of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Despite a greatly increased expenditure by the Federal Government for rail safety, there has been no appreciable decline in either the number of railroad accidents or the number of deaths and injuries resulting from such accidents in the past decade. Hearings were conducted by the Government Activities Subcommittee under the chairmanship of Congressman Jack Brooks on September 15, 1964, for the purpose of determining whether the railroad safety program of the ICC might be more effective. Does the "greatly increased expenditure" refer to the I.C.C. appropriations for railroad safety? If so I think the statement is not too relevant. Our employees received certain congressionally stipulated salary increases and other statutory increases, e.g., increased travel rates, and government contributions to the retirement and insurance funds, and by comparison to the safety responsibilities of the I.C.C., a relative handful of additional employees have been added. Furthermore, the authority of the I.C.C. does not extend to maintenance of track and structures, ete. Since 11% of all the railroad accidents are due to derailments and approximately 86% due to other factors which we do not control (making a total of approximately 97% outside of our jurisdiction) and because of the vast increase in rail mileage due to the increase in the economy of our country, I repeat that I cannot so directly relate our modest dollar increase in appropriations to the fact that there has been no appreciable decline in either the number of railroad accidents or the number of deaths and injuries resulting from such accidents in the past decade." The whole report is a condemnation of the safety efforts of that section of the I.C.C. When a report does nothing but find fault with what is a good, but greatly understaffed operation it is, in my opinion, not a truly objective report. If the Bureau of the Budget and/or any committee of Congress wants statistics on the full area of safety activity the I.C.C. is charged with covering it is my opinion that they and we together could reach a realistic figure of how many inspectors it would probably take to adequately cover the whole responsibility. Then, too, according to this report, if a man is making a long (or a short) trip from A to B to check a safety matter under our jurisdiction at B another man should be on the payroll to make the same trip to see what the boxcar situation is at B. I believe it may be possible for a Department of Transportation to develop a staff of adequate size, but I doubt that the I.C.C. would be granted that kind of an increase in budget and personnel-both for railroad safety and for car service. I have not responded to the report paragraph by paragraph in this reply because I feel the immediate reply I have given is a proper and a practical one. I am having our staff make a further detailed analysis and that detailed reply will follow as soon as it is completed. I will also ask the staff to give you some information to explain the 86% figure mentioned in this letter. Sincerely, JOHN W. BUSH, Chairman. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Hon. HARLEY O. STAGGERS, Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, DEAR CHAIRMAN STAGGERS: This is in further reply to your letter of May 3, 1966, concerning the report of the Committee on Government Operations on Interstate Commerce Commission activities in the field of railroad safety. In my letter of May 9 I advised that a further detailed analysis and reply would be forthcoming. Our staff has now reviewed the report in detail and prepared its analysis, a copy of which is enclosed. Although we recognize that there is always room for improvement in our railroad safety program and are constantly striving for means to achieve improvements within the limited resources available to us, we cannot agree with the principal findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in the Committee's report. In short, we do not believe that the report represents either a fair or accurate portrayal of the Commission's efforts in the field of railroad safety. To begin with, the report of the Committee does not acknowledge the Commission's limited jurisdiction in railroad safety operations. As our analysis indicates, approximately 97 percent of all accidents are attributable to causes over which we have no jurisdiction. The report leaves the connotation that there has been a deterioration in railroad safety as a result of our efforts since 1954. Our analysis indicates just the reverse since there has been approximately a 33 percent decline since 1954 in the number of accidents due to causes falling in the Commission's area of jurisdiction. The report also fails to recognize that railroad management is chiefly responsible for operating railroad safety programs and that the Governmental efforts to promote safety are limited by resources as well as legislative jurisdiction. In this connection, we do endeavor to make certain that the railroads are doing their job in this area. With our limited resources, spot checking is the only means by which this can be done. Even more of concern is the fact that the report condemns a number of efforts being made by the Commission to improve the Commission's railroad safety program. For example, the report criticizes the cross-use of various types of personnel and strengthened supervision over field operations, although the results show that these two programs are paying dividends in terms of increased productivity and better safety enforcement. We believe that we are doing a most |