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Mr. BROWN. Excuse me just a minute.

When we are talking about the locomotives out of service, are we talking about locomotives being retired or locomotives ordered out of service because of the repairs required as a result of inspection?

Mr. MENK. Repairs. I suppose this is a function of time that the engine is getting older and they find what they call defects with more locomotives.

Mr. BROWN. Let's get back to the freight cars in table 6.

Mr. MENK. Well, I assume that this is a statement of penalty defects but it is what we call a bad order ratio. I am not sure these figures are right, 7.1. It would seem to me that the figure actually is around 5 percent right now. It may be that a lot of these cars are stored, not used, reported as bad order or, if penalty defects, I assume that again it is a function of the aging of the car fleet. The railroad industry is making less than 3 percent return on its investment and is having a terrible time in some areas to make capital expenditures to replace the older cars they should replace.

Mr. BROWN. This relates to the decline as opposed to the number of freight cars.

Mr. MENK. Well, the number of freight cars is declining but the capacity of the fleet is increasing. As we buy more cars the cars we buy are larger and I think the capacity as of right now is increasing in a small rate but the number of cars is declining.

Mr. BROWN. But you referred to the low profit return as a factor in the railroad's inability to replace freight cars and, therefore, having more freight cars with defects. If this legislation is passed and standards are set

Mr. MENK. There are already standards set on this. These are what they are talking about. They are talking, I am sure, about DOT inspectors finding penalty defects.

Mr. BROWN. Wouldn't it be possible that the Department of Transportation would just require you to replace so many cars that had such and such defect or certain kinds of defects on a regular basis as part of their standards?

Mr. MENK. I am not so sure they would do that. I assume that they would require us to make repairs in accordance and specify the type of repairs, material used, and so forth and so on, to the cars. I don't know. As I said, I haven't seen the standards they propose.

Mr. BROWN. Let's assume they do that and that this would have the expected effect on your costs and therefore your profits. Now, what is the next step after that?

Mr. MENK. Then our return would be less than it is now.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed 17 minutes I am told and I believe we will have to limit our questions. So go ahead for 1 or 2 more minutes and we are going back on the 5-minute rule.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know the significance of the figures which have been presented in this booklet and how they relate to this legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. BROWN. If I can then I would like to have a chance to come back to the witness after others have had their chance to ask questions. The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead now.

Mr. BROWN. Let me pursue that one point.

If the Department of Transportation by setting its standards requires the replacement of freight cars in accordance with table 6 to get it back down to the 1955 percentage of, say, 4.6 where it is now set at 4.1, and this has an adverse effect on the situation of the railroad profit, is it your presumption that the railroads would come in and ask for rate adjustments in order to take care of this increased cost factor that is required by the safety standards set by the Department. Mr. MENK. Well, not knowing what it is going to cost I wouldn't know but I would presume that if the cost is a substantial amount of money that we would have to pass this on to the consumer just like other industries do, the automobile industry. I think we would be in the same shape that they would be in. I wouldn't know. Not having the specifics it would be hard to say but, if our costs go up, then the cost of transportation goes up and we have to make a profit to stay in business.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman present his questions in writing so that they will be submitted for the record so that all can read them. I believe he is getting to hypothetical questions that the gentleman is unable to answer because he said so. I believe if you get those in writing he would have time to consider them and give more definite

answers.

Mr. BROWN. Let me ask this, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

I would be happy to have in writing from the witness, or from the industry generally, comments on the relative significance of the tables which are presented in this booklet. I think frankly that there are areas of information here which have implied significance which doesn't necessarily follow with reference to such things as the maintenance of rail, track, and length of cars and that sort of thing which I would like to get comments on.

The CHAIRMAN. I think about the only way that you can ever get them is if they have a little time to study them and the group get together on them.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you.

(The information requested follows:)

Hon. HARLEY O. STAGGERS,

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS,

Washington, D.C., June 10, 1968.

Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,

House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the recent hearings on H.R. 16980 the railroad industry was asked to comment on certain statistical tables submitted to the Committee as part of the evidence of the labor proponents.

The requested analysis is attached. We believe it demonstrates that the evidence referred to does not constitute any justification for the bill. We request that this analysis be included in the record of the hearings.

Respectfully,

MEMORANDUM

WILLIAM M. MOLONEY.

At the hearings on H.R. 16980 held on June 4 Congressman Brown asked that the railroad industry furnish an analysis of the significance of the tables contained in the "Supplementary Memorandum" prepared by Mr. Winfield M. Homer and submitted as a part of the evidence of the railway brotherhoods. The following are comments on these tables :

Table 1 shows freight cars owned by Class I railroads and new freight cars put in service during the years 1930 to 1966. It would appear to have no relevance

to the question of safety, and it is referred to in Mr. Homer's memorandum (p. 3) only as a table that illustrates one of the "more important changes made in railroading over the last several decades." It shows nothing as to the average age of the Class I freight car fleet. Figures published by the American Railway Car Institute indicate that the average age of the Class I fleet declined by more than 10 per cent during the period 1946–1962 (the latter being the last year for which such information was published). This reduction in age was accomplished not only by new car acquisitions but also by retirements of substantial numbers of older cars. Retirements of such cars exceeded 45,000 in each of the years 19461962. In each of the years 1963-1967 Class I freight car retirements have exceeded 80,000 (1967) estimated).

Table 2 is called "Motive Power Utilization" for Class I railroads during the years 1936 to 1963. It shows the percentage of total road locomotive miles and yard locomotive hours operated by various types of motive power. It reflects the disappearance of steam and the ascendancy of non-steam power on American railroads. This constitutes no justification for the bill because non-steam power is demonstrably safer than steam power. Table 2 contains no parallel figures of casualties attributed to locomotive defects; but if it had done so, the marked superiority of the diesel and electric in this respect would have been evident. Some indication of this superior safety can be found in the following tabulation of the frequency rates of casualties attributed to defects in steam and non-steam locomotives per 100 million unit miles:

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1 The years 1945-1959 were chosen because they are the only period in which U.S. railroads simultaneously operated significant numbers of both steam and non-steam locomotives. Locomotive unit miles were chosen as the measure of frequency because only locomotive casualties are covered and because a defect on any locomotive unit may cause a casualty. Locomotive unit miles therefore measure the exposure to the risk of a casualty. The markedly better safety record of non-steam power was owing to the characteristics of the machines themselves-as developed by and for the railroads and not to any governmental regulation. This is evident because during this period both the steam and the non-steam locomotives were inspected and tested by the some governmental agency, operating under the same broad regulatory statute, the Locomotive Inspection Act.

Table 3 shows new rails and cross ties laid by Class I railroads during the period 1930 to 1966. It shows that fewer replacement ties have been installed in the later than in the earlier years and that the same is true of new rail laid. The purpose of the table is apparently to suggest a decline in the condition of track but it fails in this purpose for five reasons: (1) The table takes no account of the improved treatment methods for tie preservation that have been developed since 1930 which assure a longer life for ties. Ties so treated require less frequent replacement. (2) The table takes no account of the 15 per cent decline in miles of track owned by Class I roads, which were 383,076 in 1930 and 322,582 in 1966. (3) The table takes no account of the laying of used but serviceable rail to replace worn-out rail. (4) The table takes no account of improved methods of rail manufacture which virtually eliminate certain rail flaws and thus permit longer and safer rail life. (5) The table takes no account of the trend to welded rail in recent years. Such rail is safer and longer-lived than conventional rail and also reduces stress on ties.

Table 4 shows mileage "protected by" centralized traffic control during selected years from 1929 to 1986. This shows a steady increase in miles of track and miles of road so protected over the years. The Interstate Commerce Commission has found that centralized traffic control increases safety. This table therefore demonstrates the extent of a safety activity which the railroads have voluntarily engaged in, not any reason why a safety bill is needed.

The same applies to Table 5, which shows mobile radio installations on certain railroads during the period 1948 to 1962. The Federal Communications Commission has found that mobile radio, both end to end and point to train, is an aid to safety.

Table 6 shows the percentages of freight cars and locomotives found defective by the Interstate Commerce Commission during selected years from 1931 to 1966. Defects on cars as referred to in this table relate solely to so-called safety appliances (such as handholds, sill steps, running boards, couplers and, especially since 1958, when the Power Brake Act was adopted, brake parts and appurtenances). Defects on locomotives relate to all parts of each unit. The suggestion is that all such defects have a direct and necessary relation to safety, but they do not. A handhold bent 1⁄4" is a “defect," for example, and almost every one of the almost 2 million freight cars and locomotives that operate in the United States has many handholds. A single brake piston on a car that travels farther than 10′′ is a "defect" but long piston travel on several cars has no measurable effect on the braking capacity of a train in which they are included. A locomotive that does not carry tags or cards showing that certain tests have been made within specified periods is "defective" even though the tests have in fact been made and passed. Absence of a cab card is a ground for ordering the locomotive out of service. One of the most common defects found on locomotives is oil on floors or passageways. This defect does have a relationship to safety, since men can slip on oil spots; but it is not a defect that is peculiar to locomotives or even railroads. It occurs wherever machinery is used.

Table 7 relates solely to locomotive defects, which have been discussed briefly above. As stated in the testimony of the Department of Transportation, H.R. 16980 would provide little or no additional jurisdiction over locomotives, which are now regulated under the broad authority of the Locomotive Inspection Act.

Table 8 shows the decline in employment of maintenance personnel from 1933 to 1967. The conclusion is sought to be drawn that this reduction proves undermaintenance of way and equipment, but it does not. It is common knowledge that during these 30-odd years, mechanization of maintenance has enabled the same job to be done better by fewer employees. The table, then, is no more than a showing of how technology can improve productivity.

Table 9 shows the average speed of freight and passenger trains on Class I railroads for selected years during 1921 to 1967. There is no showing here or elsewhere that this modest increase in average speeds has any relation to safety. Table 10 provides similar information on the length and weight of freight trains during selected years since 1921. It would appear to be equally without relevance, particularly in view of the numerous revolutionary improvements in track and equipment made during those 47 years.

Table 11 provides the same information for passenger trains.

Table 12 shows the number of train accidents, by class of accident, between 1930 and 1956, both in totals and in frequency per million motive power miles. Because all but a few of the subsequent tables in Mr. Homer's memorandum also relate to train accidents and their frequency, it is well to summarize here some of the distortions inherent in his approach: (1) "Train accidents" are defined solely by reference to monetary damage to railroad property. During the years 1930 to 1956 there were 7 different measures employed in various years; but since January 1, 1957 the amount has remained unchanged at $750. One "cause" of increased train accidents in recent years, therefore, is inflation. (2) Because train accidents are based on property damage, they have no necessary relation to casualties. In each of the year 1961-1967, for example, less than 9 per cent of all train accidents resulted in casualties. Only 6.6 per cent of the train accidents experienced in 1967 resulted in casualties. Moreover, between 1961 and 1967, train accidents never accounted for more than 5.9 per cent of all railroad casualties, and in the last three of those years they were less than 4 per cent. (3) A substantial portion of the casualties that do occur in train accidents result from grade crossing accidents. The Interstate Commerce Commission, as the result of a lengthy proceeding, recently said:

"Summarizing the evidence in this proceeding it is apparent that while mechanical difficulties encountered by the motor vehicle are the cause of some of the grade-crossing accidents, by far the main cause is the failure of the motor vehicle operator to exercise due care and caution or to comply with the existing laws or regulations in the operation of his motor vehicle.” (32 L.C.C. 63.) (4) Casualties resulting from train accidents have decreased by more than 24 per cent between 1961 and 1967. For these and other reasons Mr. Homer's many tables relating to train accidents and their frequency do not provide justification for H.R. 16980.

When Mr. Homer shows the frequency of train accidents in this and later tables he uses the measure of motive power miles. Such a measure is valid

when he is discussing motive power failures and a few other types of accidents; but it is clearly invalid when it is used—as it is-to measure the frequency of car failures, or roadway failures, or employee error. When it is so used it creates distortions because the measure has no logical relation to the risk exposure purported to be shown.

Table 12 has all the foregoing deficiencies. It has one other in addition, for statistics covering only 1930 to 1956 have no relevance to a bill being considered in 1968.

The same comments apply to Tables 13 and 14, which again survey train accidents, measured by motive power miles (Table 13), and covers only the period 1930 to 1956.

Table 15 shows merely the number of train accidents by general cause that occurred 8 to 10 years ago. The foregoing comments therefore apply to this table as well.

Table 16 is concerned with train accidents only, those attributed to "roadway defects." Even if such accidents were a reliable index to railroad casualties (which they are not), the frequency of such accidents is measured on the table and accompanying chart by motive power miles. This may be valid as to the few accidents caused by signal defects; but it is clearly invalid as to all the other accidents caused by "roadway defects." The exposure to risk from defective rails, ties, and the like must be measured by total traffic over them-ton milesnot merely locomotive traffic.

Table 17 is a mere restatement of Table 16 broken down into numbers of accidents resulting from particular causes.

Table 18 shows train accidents caused by defects in equipment from 1961 to 1966 and also the frequency of such accidents measured by motive power miles. Here again, motive power miles is a most unrealistic measure when it is used to show the frequency of accidents resulting from defects in equipment. All equipment, not merely locomotives, is exposed to risk.

Table 19 merely restates Table 18 by absolute numbers subdivided into attributed causes.

Table 20 shows the number and frequency of train accidents caused by employee error "and other factors." An appended chart of frequency (again measured by motive power miles) shows a very steep rate of climb in both the frequency of accidents caused by employee error and in the total number of such accidents. Nothing in the bill or the statements of its proponents suggests that rules to regulate employee error would or could be adopted under it.

Table 21 shows train accident collisions and their frequency measured by motive power miles.

Table 22 is a restatement by causes of the employee error train accidents set forth in Table 20.

Table 23 shows wage rates paid, measured by train miles and car miles, to two classes of maintenance employees during recent years. It would seem designed to suggest that inflation has not been a great "cause" of increased train accidents despite the establishment of the $750 definition in 1957. The effect of inflation on this "cause" in the face of the inflexible limit, however, can best be gauged by standard indices of cost increases. It would be hard to deny that considerable inflation has taken place in the last 10 years.

The same comments apply to the price of certain railroad materials listed on Table 24.

Table 25 summarizes grade crossing accidents and casualties during 1961 to 1966. It serves to demonstrate the substantial share of all railroad fatalities and injuries resulting from this cause, which admittedly has little relevance to any fault on the part of the railroads. Moreover, representatives of the Department of Transportation have testified that they do not intend to regulate grade crossing safety even if the bill is enacted.

Table 26 breaks down the types of grade crossing accidents for a single year. Table 27 shows all train accidents in 1965 and 1966, the frequency thereof measured by motive power miles.

Table 28 takes the same data for these years, plus another, based on preliminary data. This is evidently with a view to showing that in two years, at least, the preliminary data differed from the final.

Table 29 shows total casualties in railroad accidents for 1961 to 1966 broken down by types of accidents. It shows that by far the greatest number of both

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