minent danger which threatened both them and the eity, while he continued among them.

Sorrow, on the contrary, is an uneasiness of mind, arising from a sense of some present evil. This passion has generally a place in funeral discourses, and it may be heightened like the former by comparison, when any past happiness is set in opposition to a present calamity. Hence Cicero aggravates the sorrow at Rome, occasioned by the death of Metellus, from his character and great services to the public while living.

Love excites us to esteem another for some excellency, and to do him all the good in our power. It is distinguished from friendship, which is mutual; and therefore love may continue where friendship is lost; that is, the affection may remain on one side. And when we assist a person from no other motive, but to do him a kindness, Aristotle calls this good will. Love takes its rise from a variety of causes. Generosity, benevolence, integrity, gratitude, courtesy, and other social virtucs, are great incitements to love any one endued with such qualities. And persons generally love those who are of a like disposition with themselves, and pursue the same views. It is therefore the chief art of a flatterer, to suit himself in every thing to the inclination of the person whose good graces he courts. When the orator would excite this affection towards any person, it is proper to show that he is possessed of some, at least, if not all these agreeable qualities. When the conspirators of Catiline were to be brought to justice, Cicero was very sensible of the envy he should contract on that account, and how necessary it was for him to secure the love of

the Roman senate for his support and protection in that critical juncture. And this he endeavours to do in his fourth oration against Catiline, by representing to them, in the most pathetic manner, that all the labours he underwent, the difficulties he conflicted with, and the dangers to which he was exposed on that account, were not for his own sake, but for their safety, quiet, and happiness.

Hatred is opposed to love, and produced by the contrary dispositions. And therefore persons hate those who never did them any injury, from the ill opinion they have of their base and vicious inclinations. So that the way to excite this passion is, by showing that any one has committed some heinous fact with an ill intent. And the more nearly affected persons are by such actions, in what they account of the greatest concern, the higher in proportion their hatred rises. Since life therefore is esteemed the most valuable good, Cicero endeavours to render Mark Antony odious to the citizens of Rome, by describing his cruelty.

Emulation is a disquiet, occasioned by the felicity of another, not because he enjoys it, but because we desire the like for ourselves. So that this passion is in itself good and laudable, as it engages men to pursue those things which are so. For the proper objects of emulation are any advantages of mind, body, or fortune, acquired by study or labour. And persons are generally excited to an emulation of those with whom they converse. So children are often ambi tious of the like virtues or honours which they see in their relations or friends. And therefore it was a

very proper question of Andromache to Eneas, concerning Ascanius, which we have in Virgil:

"What hopes are promis'd from his blooming years?
How much of Hector's soul in him appears!"

Emulation therefore is excited by a lively representation of any desirable advantages, which appear to be attainable from the example of others who are, or have been, possessed of them. But where the felicity of another occasions an uneasiness, not from the want of it, but because he enjoys it, this passion is called envy; which the ancients describe as a hideous monster, feeding upon itself, and being its own tormentor. Aristotle observes, that it most usually affects such persons who were once upon a level with those they envy. For most men naturally think so well of themselves, that they are uneasy to see those who were formerly their equals advanced above them. But as this is a base and vicious passion, the orator is not to be informed how to excite it, but how to lessen or remove it. And the method prescribed by Cicero for this purpose is, to show that the things which occasioned it have not happened to the envied person undeservedly, but are the just reward of his industry or virtue; that he does not so much convert them to his own profit or pleasure, as to the benefit of others; and the same pains and difficulties are necessary to preserve them, with which they were at first acquired.

Contempt is opposed to Emulation, and arises from misconduct in things not of themselves vicious: as where a person either acts below his station and character; or affects to do that for which he is not qualified. Thus Cicero endeavours to expose Cæcilius, and bring him into the contempt of the court, for pre

tending to rival him in the accusation of Verres, for which he was altogether unfit.

To deliberative discourses may be referred fear, hope,

and shame.

So.

Fear arises from the apprehension of some great and impending evil. For the greatest evils, while they appear at a distance, do not much affect us. Such persons occasion fear, who are possessed of power, especially if they have been injured, or apprehend Likewise those who are addicted to do injuries, or who bear us an ill will. And the examples of others, who have suffered in a like case, or from the same persons, help to excite fear. From the circumstances therefore either of the thing, or person, it will not be difficult for the orator to offer such arguments as may be proper to awaken this passion. So Demosthenes, when he would persuade the Athenians to put themselves in a condition of defence against king Philip, enumerates the several acts of hostility already committed by him against the neighbouring states. And because men's private concerns generally more affect them than what relates to the public, it is proper sometimes to show the necessary connexion these have with each other, and how the ruin of one draws the other after it.

The contrary passion to fear is hope, which arises, either from a prospect of some future good, or the apprehension of safety from those things which occasion our fear. Young persons are easily induced to hope the best, from the vigour of their spirits. And those who have escaped former dangers are encouraged to hope for the like happy success for the future. The examples of others also, especially of wise and

considerate men, have often the same good effect. To find them calm and sedate, when exposed to the like dangers, naturally creates confidence, and the hopes of safety. But nothing gives persons such firmE ness and steadiness of mind, under the apprehension of any difficulties, as a consciousness of their own integrity and innocence. Let dangers come from what quarter they will, they are best prepared to receive them. They can calmly view an impending tempest, observe the way of its approach, and prepare themselves in the best manner to avoid it. In Cicero's oration for the Manilian law, he encourages the Roman citizens to hope for success against Mithridates, if they choose Pompey for their general, from the many instances of his former successes, which he there enumerates. We find in history that artful men have frequently made use of omens and prodigies with the populace, either to awaken or expel their fears, and that with the greatest success. But such arguments are not much regarded by wise and prudent men. In the time of the civil wars between Cæsar and Pompey, when the affairs of Pompey's party were very much broken and shattered, one who was in that interest endeavoured to animate the rest and excite them to push on the war with vigour, from a lucky omen (as it was then thought) of seven eagles, which were observed to settle in their camp. But Cicero, who was then present, and knew very well the vanity of such reasoning, immediately replied: That such a happy incident might indeed prove of service to them if they were to fight with jackdaws.

Shame arises from the apprehension of those things that hurt a person's character. Modesty has been wisely