with one single view, and that completely comprehensive and perfectly clear, by the Divine Mind; so that nothing pertaining to them in any respect was in any degree, unperceived in this perfect manner. This view I consider also as being absolutely one, invariable and eternal. It never began, it will never terminate. It never has been, it never will be, in the least degree changed. All this is involved in the Omniscience of God; and has, I flatter myself, been proved to be a part of the Divine Character.

(2) In the nature and operations of things there is, inherent, a foundation for preference or choice. By this I intend, that some of the things which were thus known by the Divine Mind, were better, or upon the whole more desirable; and that others were less desirable. This, I presume, cannot be denied. It will not be denied, that a multitude of those things which we can imagine, and which God, if he pleased, could create, are much less desirable, and certainly so, even in the view of such minds as ours, than other things which he has actually created. Beyond this it will, I presume, be admitted without a question, that many things which we can imagine, are absolutely undesirable; and that others still would, if brought into existence, be incalculably noxious to the universe. That an individual man, for example, should possess the strength of an elephant, the ferocity of a tiger, the sight and wings of an eagle, and the sagacity of a fiend; or that another individual should possess the power of controuling the elements with the spirit and invulnerability of a fiend; would be things absolutely fatal to the inhabitants of this world. That the Apostles when employed to publish the Gospel, and erect the Christian Church, should have possessed the fraudulent and impious spirit of Voltaire, would, as every sober man must necessarily see, have been a fact incalculably injurious to mankind. These three instances may serve as representatives of millions more, imaginable even by the limited faculties of the human mind.

Should it be said that in the multitude of possible things, there were many equally desirable; and that between these there is no foundation for a choice; I answer, that this is said gratuitously, and cannot be known to be true. Should the person who says it, intend that the things specified are in all respects exactly alike, and only numerically different; it will

be necessary to inquire whether the object of choice proposed, is to create only one of these similar things, and for that end to select one only. If this be the thing intended, I answer, that he amuses himself with words; for, as the things differ only numerically, one of them when created, is equally the archetype of each of these images, and no more of one than of any other; and whatever is included in the nature and operations of them all, is completely realized in the existence of one. But if the object intended be, whether only one, or more than one, of these similar beings shall be created; then I answer, that the objector has himself furnished a complete foundation for a preference; the cases now differing from each other, as a unit differs from two, three, or more; or a single man from many; a difference not only perceptible, but capable of being important, to any supposable degree. Should it be said, that things may differ in some minute particulars, and yet furnish no solid foundation for a preference: I reply, that it cannot be wisely or warrantably said. We indeed may not, and usually do not perceive why things differing very little admit of such a preference; but to the intuitive and all-comprehensive view of God, a little difference between two things may, in the eternal progress of his dispensations, be such as to produce an influence on the universe so diverse, as to render one entirely beneficial, and the other wholly noxious. Few differences can be more minute or trifling to the human eye, than the existence of one hair more, or one less, on the human head; yet God has informed us, that these are all numbered by him; and that he sees a reason for preferring the number actually existing.

But should it be granted, that things, materially differing, existing in any numbers, and making up, in several instances, complete and diverse systems, or universes, may yet be equally desirable in the view of God; I answer farther, that in this case the object of choice would be to create one of these systems, and carry it into complete execution; and it being perfectly indifferent which of them should be brought into being, there would nothing remain to be resolved on, but the act of creating. That which was begun in pursuance of this determination, would thenceforth for this very reason be preferable to the others, and be the most perfect, possible system. (3) This foundation for choice cannot but be perfectly

known to God. As this position will not be questioned by any person, who admits the doctrine under the preceding head, and plainly cannot, but in defiance of reason; I proceed to observe,

(4) That God cannot but have chosen the existence of all those things, whose existence was on the whole desirable, and of no others. The benevolence of the divine character furnishes complete evidence of the truth of this position. The benevolence of God is boundless and perfect. It is the nature of benevolence to desire, and delight in the existence of good; of perfect benevolence, to desire the existence of perfect good, and of boundless benevolence, to desire the existence of infinite good, or, in other words, of all which upon the whole is good. If therefore the existence of any thing is desirable, God cannot but have chosen it, because its existence was necessary to this perfect good; which is the supreme object, and delight of his benevolence. The existence of any being, or event, is desirable upon the whole, only because it is necessary to the perfect good which I have mentioned, either by contributing to the existence, or by being itself a part of that good. It is therefore completely evident, that God cannot but have chosen the existence of every thing, whose existence is upon the whole desirable.

(5) This choice of God, that things should exist, is the only divine energy, and the only cause of existence. The energy of a mind is its will; and this is synonymous with its choice, generally understood; each act of the will being no other than an act of choice. What is thus true of every finite mind, is eminently true of the Infinite Mind. In the Infinite Mind there are no successive acts of choice; but one universal and unchangeable pleasure, which gives birth to every thing. It is metaphysically proper to say, that God wills all things into existence, or that they are produced by his choice, in the full sense in which any effect is said to be produced by its efficient cause. This I suppose will not be denied, so far as the existence of beings is concerned. The only question will probably respect events; and particularly those which are called the actions of moral or voluntary creatures. With respect to these I observe, that it makes no difference as to the truth of this doctrine, whatever difference it may make as to others, ' whether we suppose God to will the existence of these beings,

furnished with those faculties which enable them to act in any given manner, and in the possession of which they will really act in that manner; or whether we suppose him to will the existence of their actions immediately. The pleasure or choice of God in the former case, is the productive cause of the existence of these beings, and of their faculties. With these faculties, these beings of course will certainly, although withdut any necessity except what is attributable to inclination, act in a given manner in every case. All the actions of which they will thus be the subjects were, antecedently to the existence of the beings in question, perfectly discerned by the Omniscience of God; and so far as they will ever have existence, were objects of his choice or preference. He therefore willed into existence such beings, possessed of such faculties as he knew would certainly give birth to the existence of their actions. Although therefore he may have chosen that their actions should be the result of their energy, without a direct exertion of his own; it is clear, that he chose the existence of such beings, possessed of such faculties, with a perfect knowledge that they would be the authors of such actions, and that the actions would exist. As therefore he chose, that beings who he certainly knew would perform these actions, should exist; it is evident that he also chose, upon the whole, the existence of the actions themselves.

It may perhaps be objected, that this doctrine makes God the author of sin: I answer, for the present, that it makes God the author of a universe, in which he knew that sin would A further answer will be given, when this subject comes to be particularly considered under the third head.

exist.

(6) The Scriptures directly assert the doctrine of this Discourse. The text is a strong example of this nature. As it has been sufficiently illustrated already, I shall leave it to your consideration. In Isaiah xlv. 10, God says, My counsel shall stand; and I will do all my pleasure.' This will be admitted to be a complete assertion of the doctrine, unless it should be supposed that there are things done and existing in the universe, which are without and beyond the counsel of God. According to this supposition it must be admitted, that a part of the system of things in the universe was not contrived by him, was not agreeable to his pleasure, nor accomplished with his permission. In Isaiah xliii. 13, God says, I will work;

and who shall let it?' And in Daniel iv. 35, it is declared, He doth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?'

In both these passages it is asserted, that there is no possible opposition or hindrance to the universal agency of God, which operates alike in heaven and in earth; and in both according to his will or pleasure. In Revelations iv. 11, The' four and twenty elders, falling down before Him that sitteth on the throne in the heavens, say, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.' In this passage it is asserted that all things were created, and exist, for the pleasure of God. It is irresistibly inferred therefore, that they exist according to his pleasure. In Acts xv. 18, it is said, Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world:' and in Psalm civ. 31, The Lord shall rejoice in his works.' It cannot be true that God will rejoice in his works, unless they are agreeable to his pleasure, nor any farther than they are agreeable to his pleasure; for this would be to suppose, that he takes pleasure in that which is not agreeable to his pleasure, or is pleased with that which does not please him. As all his works were known to him from the beginning;' so they were certainly agreeable to his pleasure from the beginning; else it could not be foreknown and foretold, that he will rejoice in them.

That the actions of moral beings are foreknown by God, is unanswerably evident from the fact, that almost all the prophecies in the Scriptures are either predictions of the voluntary acts of such beings; or of events accomplished by their voluntary actions; or of events which, without these actions could never exist. The deluge was absolutely predicted by Noah, one hundred and twenty years before it took place; but had mankind repented in that period, the deluge would not have existed. If then God had not certainly foreknown that men would not repent, he could not have certainly foretold the deluge. God predicted the apostasy of the Edomites, the sojourning of the Israelites in Egypt, the refusal of Pharaoh to let them go, their return to the land of Canaan, the revolt of ten tribes from Solomon, the ruin of their empire by Nebuchadnezzar, their captivity, their return, and their final