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same disregard of money in an attempt the very act shows them forth in their to seduce that friend's wife or daugh- native shape and proper dimensions. ter. No man ever sacrificed the half From this first strong movement, of his estate for friendship, on a sud- which, however, is not single, but may den, instinctive, constitutional impulse spread itself in great diversity of forms of temperament. Such an act could through the mind — from this first only have been performed by a gene- passive sway of emotion, the mind re. rous man. And, although a generous iurns, and rises up in its strength to man may commit a wicked action, he act on the object, either with power is less inclined to do so, we think, than of will and desire to escape from it, or an ungenerous man, more especially with power of will and desire to posan action of consummate baseness and sess and enjoy it. This power of feeldeliberate cruelty. The illustration is ing, of will, or of desire, is thus far no striking, but it is not satisfying, and otherwise dependent on the intellecshows the advocate, not the judge. tual mind than as the intellectual faFinally, to assert that all the evil culties mix in all its acts-conceiving produced by Hobbes and the whole and understanding the object, conceivschool of materialists will appear in- ing and understanding the means to considerable, if it be compared with pursue or to fly from it. They act the mischief effected and occasioned by perfectly, and with great subtlety and the sentimental philosophy of Sterne, force, but in mere subservience to and his numerous imitators, is alto- passion—as a part of it, but separable gether monstrous, and in the direct from it. teeth of a hundred of Mr Coleridge's In all passion, we find two states moral speculations in the • Friend,' and perfectly distinct fron each other his · Lay Sermons,' in which he has, the emotion arising from contemplawith considerable force, struck at the tion of the object, which is an affec. root of the selfish system of the Phi- tion of pleasure and pain, and in which losopher of Malmsbury. A few fan- the mind may be passive merely; and, tastic and mawkish novels - what arising out of this, the movement of were they to the host—not yet ex- the mind to or from the object. There tinct - of hard - featured wretches, is also a third state, intimately conwho, in the name of morality, have nected with this last, and yet differing laboured to destroy all moral respon- from it—the state of the will. sibility, and to found duty on power?
The first point, then, is the suscepBut we cannot help thinking that, tibility of impression and emotion. În had Mr Coleridge taken a more pbilo- some minds, this exists to a great ex-. sophical view of the constitution of our tent, without producing strong exernature, he would have seen that the tion of the will. It is then properly term Sensibility does, in its best and called Sensibility, which regards simtruest signification, denote one great ply the capacity of being strongly and constituent of our being, by which deeply affected. However, Sensibility we are capable of being affected in itself may be of very different characvarious and sometimes extraordinary ters; as it may be quick and vivid, degrees of pleasure and pain, and with but transient ; or its affections may various and sometimes extraordinary be more calm, but deep and fixed. degrees of will and desire, by different The susceptibility of great exhilaraobjects made known to us by our tion of heart, for example, or of sudpowers of understanding. It denotes den and passionate sorrow, is found a capacity, by which we are susceptible under the first character. Under the of suffering and misery, by which the second, deep and steadfast joy, which whole variety and strength of our moral sustains in the mind no more, perhaps, nature is unfolded, and from which our than a calm bright serenity, and yet intellectual reason draws its amplest implies, not a tranquil indisposition and most precious stores. It is open to be affected, but an extreme and fine to the impression of all the objects sensibility to pleasure. On the other which the world may offer it. These hand, the same temper of mind may present themselves, and the emotion produce a settled and enduring melanarises, making to the mind disclosure choly. This is the first affection in of itself, bringing out to its sight, with which the mind is nearly passive. visible force and strong undoubted Now, though we may regard those reality, powers which lie there often impressions on the Sensibility as given unknown, and always unmeasured till merely in order to prepare and lead on those movements of the will through masters of the most important tewhich the mind is carried into action, nets of any of our metaphysical mowhich may be conceived as the ulti- ralists. mate purpose and proper end of those Sympathy is supposed by Dr Smith affections of pleasure and pain—yet, to act towards the production of Moral if the emotion should not reach to Sentiment in three ways:- First, by will, we by no means necessarily es, enabling us to judge others, viz. by teem this falling short of its seemingly enabling us to put ourselves in the desired end, as a defect in the work place of others, and thus to compare ing of the mind. On the contrary, the their conduct with what ours would affections of the Sensibility are often be ; upon which comparison we ap. very touching to us to contemplate, prove or condemn. Secondly, by enor beautiful, majestic, and sublime, abling us to conceive the judgment when they reach not to the produc. which others make of us. Thirdly, by tion of any purpose in the will ;-as participation in the gratitude and rethe sorrow which is felt for those who sentment of those who are benefited or mourn, when our sympathy can offer injured either by ourselves or others. them nothing but its sorrow ;--as the On the first of these views, an obsergrief of those who mourn the loss of vation of a simple kind suggests itself, that which they have loved, when and has been made. If sympathy did their piety restrains all impatient no more towards the production of murmuring at their own privation, and moral sentiment than to enable us to all vain longing towards that which judge others by taking their place, it is gone. Their grief, in its simplicity, might be said that the doctrine would is most affecting and beautiful. So contain nothing at variance with any the happiness of children, on whom other theory of morality; since sym. joy falls like the sunshine, and passes pathy would then do no more than away. Such, too, is the admiration place us in the necessary situation for we feel for characters of greatness, forming the judgment. The cause of who, in the humility of our reve- our judgment would still have to be rence, seem to us lifted up far above shown. When we imagine ourselves our imitation. In those instances, and in the place of another, and conceive numberless others that might be sup- how we shouid act, and approve or posed, all that we see is, the first simple condemn him accordingly, there must emotion strongly declared in the soul, be some principle in our mind, not but not passing on to the effects that only determining our conception of naturally and properly arise out of the how we should act, but determining primary feeling.
also our satisfaction in that concepWe have not room now to say more tion, and this must be already a moral on this subject; but the little we have principle. This is the argument of Mr said may, perhaps, serve to show, Stewart and Dr Brown, and would prothat in his vituperation of Sensibility, bably occur to many other enquirers, Mr Coleridge has either confined his as it is not unobvious. It does not apconsideration to the popular, and, pear, however, on further considerawe might say, vulgar meaning of tio entirely satisfactory. the term ; or that, if he had in his The object of Dr Smith is to set mind any reference to its proper and aside the idea of an independent, ori. philosophical meaning, his invective ginal, moral principle, by showing that betrays a very imperfect knowledge it is made up in many different ways ; of the essence and agency of this but he has not himself explained, as dispart of the constitution of our na- tinctly as he might have done, the part ture.
which Sympathy takes, under his first It would likewise appear, from the head, in superseding an original prinsneer at Sympathy in the long pas- ciple. To understand him consistentsage now quoted, as well as from ly, we must explain the first point of other more direct allusions elsewhere, his doctrine for ourselves. Thus:that Mr Coleridge held very cheap When I place myself in the situathe moral system of Adam Smithi
. tion of another, and, conceiving my But we suspect that, notwithstanding own conduct, find it to be in some es. his too frequent expressions of slight sential point at variance with his, I towards what he and others of his feel a pain in the contemplation of his school are pleased to call the Scotch act. Now, this is not necessarily a Philosophy, neither he nor they are pain of moral condemnation, but a
pain of repugnance and aversion. My - ideas evidently inseparable from own imaginary mode of action is grate- an adverse judgment--and which, in ful and satisfying to me; not original- fact, after all these adjunctive ideas ly (according to Dr Smith’s theory) of passion have been separated from by my understanding of moral right it, remain as its essence-are not inin it, but by the strong natural affec- cluded in such a feeling, nor appear to tion, which, in my conceived situation, be in any way deducible from it. would, I must suppose, carry me to Secondly, that it appears possible for act in the manner I now conceive, with us to entertain moral judgments in earnest desire and lively pleasure. It direct opposition to the force of all is the opposition of this man's act, such our natural feelings; as, when and, it is to be presumed, along with we are occasionally called on to judge his act, his temper, to this my affec- of acts which we feel it to have been tion, that is the cause of my pain in impossible that we ourselves should the first instance, and, in the next, of have performed, which we do not my aversion towards himself. This contemplate without repugnance and pain and dislike are not properly, in fear, and which we are nevertheless their origin, moral sentiment, but na- compelled, even with dislike, to actural feeling. They are of the same knowledge to have been right, as we kind, although, with respect to sub- might possibly conceive a case of a jects of a higher order, as that pain father delivering up his son to justice. and dislike with which we consider In like manner, on the other hand, men, savages for instance, whose man.. our conscience will occasionally conner of living is loathsome to us. There strain us to condemn acts which we is, in this last case, no place for moral cannot say that we ourselves, in the condemnation; nothing but a strong, same situation, should not have done ; and indeed an invincible natural aver- acts indicating no feelings which we sion. Now, according to Smith's the- do not recognise in ourselves, and ory, it is this natural pain and dislike with which by nature we are not with which we look upon acts and strongly inclined to sympathize. Both states of mind, contradicting strong these reasons appear to establish a inherent feelings of our own, that is decided distinction between our nameant to be represented to us as one tural affections and our feelings, how. of those elements, not originally, nor ever strong, and our moral principle. in themselves properly speaking moral, This part of Dr Smith's argument, but which enter into and make up that therefore, may be considered and anvariously-compounded feeling, or ra- swered in either of two ways.--Either system of feelings, to which, when ther, with Mr Stewart and Dr Brown, completed, we give the name of moral we may conceive him to have meant, sense, or conscience.
that, having by sympathy placed ourTwo things are very certain, with selves in the situation of another, and respect to the point of theory we have found that our conduct would coincide now been endeavouring to explain :- with, or differ from his, we therefore The first, that the natural feeling of morally approve or condemn himwhich we have spoken does take place; in which case, there is the logical dethe other, that, on the whole, this na. fect in the argument which these writural feeling agrees with, strengthens ters suppose, namely, that it presupand supports our moral judgment. poses the principle which it undertakes The question is, whether we have, in to deduce, and represents that as cauthe cases in which such a feeling must sing the judgment which merely plabe acknowledged, besides this feeling, ces us in the situation for exercising à distinct and peculiar principle of it: Or it may be understood in the moral judgment. Grounds for the opi. way in which we have now attempted nion that we have, are ;-first, that to explain it, and it then seems to be there is one element of all moral judg- liable to the two objections which we ment, which it appears not easy to have made. We are inclined to think deduce from such a feeling, namely, that Dr Smith has not treated this condemnation. We may find in it point so explicitly as to enable us to the grounds of dislike, disgust, ab- say with certainty which of the two horrence, separation, rejection, ex- views really represents his opinion. clusion, anger, scorn, hatred; but the It is possible that he might not have distinct and peculiar idea of right examined it so closely as to make up violated and consequent condemnation his opinion with perfect distinctness upon it. He may have even fluctuated theory, what has been imperfectly between the two views. The theory presented to its author, previously to of a writer is not always to be tried trying it. Admitting what has been merely by the words in which he has said, the question arises (which we given it.
His book cannot contain all cannot now discuss), whether this dishis thoughts. Nor is it, finally, to be like is to be acknowledged as an eleconsidered altogether and merely as ment of a composite moral sense, or personal to him: It is a suggestion only as one of the supports, of which in philosophy ; and it is allowable to there are many, of native conscience, philosophy to complete, in a specious
CORONATION ODE FOR QUEEN VICTORIA I.
JUNE 28, 1838.
The Sceptre in a maiden-hand,
Rule, VICTORIA, rule the Free ;
No Slave within thine empire breathe,
Rule, Victoria, rule the Free,
Not by the tyrant-law of might, With Mercy's beams yet more benign, But by the Grace of God, we own, Light to thy realms in darkness send, And by the People's Voice, thy right Tiil none shall name a God but thine, To sit upon thy Fathers' throne. – None at an Idol-altar bend.
Rule, Victoria, rule the Free ; Rule, Victoria, rule the Free,
Heaven defend and prosper Thee! Till they all shall pray for Thee. Thee isles and continents obey,
At home, abroad, by sea, on shore, Kindreds and nations, nigh and far, Blessings on Thee and thine increase ; Between the bound-marks of thy The sword and cannon rage no more, sway
The whole world hail Thee Queen of The Morning and the Evening Star.-- Peace !
Rule, Victoria, rule the Free, Rule, Victoria, rule the Free,
Edinburgh : Printed by Ballantyne and Company, Paul's Work.
Arnold's HISTORY OF ROME,
AND T. CADELL, STRAND, LONDON.
PRINTED BY BALLANTYNE AND CO. EDINBURGH.