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ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

SECRETARY WEINBERGER IN HIS FY 1985 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS STATED, *...EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT REQUIRES A DEFENSEIN-DEPTH STRATEGY THAT BOTH MAXIMIZES ENEMY ATTRITION AND AFFORDS A HIGH LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR OUR NAVAL FORCES..." MR. WEINBERGER WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT THE LONG RANGE P-3 AIRCRAFT, CAPTOR MINES AND ATTACK SUBMARINES SUPPORTED BY UNDERSEAS SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS. SUBMARINES THAT PENETRATE THESE BARRIERS THEN ENCOUNTER A LAYERED DEFENSE SCREEN SURROUNDING OUR NAVAL TASK FORCES AND CONVOYS.

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ADMIRAL WATKINS, IN HIS APPEARANCE ON THE FY 1985 BUDGET TESTIFIED THAT, "...THE NAVY'S SEALIFT CAPABILITY, INCLUDING THE CRUCIAL MOBILIZATION CAPACITY OF THE MERCHANT MARINE, IS CENTRAL TO OUR STAYING POWER. WHILE PROLONGED CONFLICT IS NOT AN OBJECTIVE, WE MUST NEVERTHELESS PREPARE FOR SUCH A POSSIBILITY. HISTORY REMINDS US THAT WARS TEND TO LAST LONGER THAN ANTICIPATED...IF OUR MILITARY POWER IS ISOLATED FROM REACHING AND SUPPORTING OUR ALLIES, WE CAN HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF PREVAILING IN A MILITARY CONFLICT OR TERMINATING SUCH A CONFLICT ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES. IF WE CANNOT PROJECT AND SUSTAIN OUR MILITARY FORCE IN THE FORWARD DEFENSE OF OUR ALLIES...WE COULD BE ISOLATED AND REDUCED TO DEFENDING OUR OWN SHORES... ...THE ADDITION OF MODERN FRIGATES TO OUR FORCE BRINGS THE NAVY ONE STEP CLOSER TO...HAVING THE MINIMUM PRUDENT LEVEL OF ESCORTS FOR THE WARTIME MISSION OF PROTECTING VITAL SHIPPING, UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS

FORCES..."

"

THE NAVAL RESERVE HAS BEEN GIVEN THE MISSION OF ASW MARITIME CONVOY ESCORT BY THE CONGRESS. IT IS THEREFORE OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO NRA WHEN THE TOOLS ASSIGNED AND PROJECTED TO CARRY OUT THE ASSIGNED MISSION ARE REVIEWED AND EVALUATED. WHEN SECRETARY WEINBERGER TALKS ABOUT DEPLOYING THE SQR TOWED ARRAY SONAR ABOARD ALL OF THE FF-1052 CLASS FRIGATES, ...INCLUDING THOSE IN THE NAVAL RESERVE...", HE LEAVES OUT THE "WHEN". THE TOWED ARRAY SONAR IS NOT SCHEDULED TO BE INCORPORATED INTO ANY NAVAL RESERVE SHIPS UNTIL SOMETIME AFTER THE FYDP YEARS WHICH COULD MEAN THAT THEY WILL NEVER BE INCORPORATED INTO THE RESERVE FRIGATES SINCE THEY WILL BE CONSIDERED TOO OLD BY THEN TO BACKFIT OR UPGRADE TO A CAPABLE ASW PLATFORM.

THE

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE HAS SUFFERED CONSIDERABLY OVER THE YEARS IN THE NAVY. EVEN IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF ASW, IN THE MIDDLE 60S, FUNDS FOR THE ADVERTISED "NUMBER ONE" PRIORITY WERE MILKED OFF FOR THE MORE GLAMOROUS PROGRAMS. IN THOSE DAYS WE HAD OVER TWO HUNDRED DESTROYERS WHICH HELPED CONSIDERABLY TO FILL NEED FOR ASW MARITIME CONVOY ESCORT. THE PROTECTION OF THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SLOC) AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINES BECOMES MORE COMPLICATED ALL THE TIME DUE TO THE EVER IMPROVING SOVIET TECHNOLOGY AND TACTICS. YET, THE UNITED STATES APPEARS TO PUT ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE ON THE BACK BURNER, APPARENTLY BELIEVING THAT IT CAN BE ADDRESSED SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE. WHEN BUDGETS ARE CUT, THE ASW SYSTEMS TAKE THE BRUNT OF THE SLASHES. IF WE LISTEN TO ADMIRAL RICKOVER, THE SOVIET SUBMARINE EFFECT ON THE SLOC COULD BE CATASTROPHIC.

THE NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION BELIEVES THAT LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE ASW FORCES BELONG IN THE NAVAL RESERVE. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IS BASICALLY A WARTIME MISSION SO THEORETICALLY THAT IS WHEN ITS NEEDED. SINCE ASW IS A COMPLICATED PROFESSION IT NEEDS HIGHLY EXPERIENCED AND COMPETENT PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE WEAPON SYSTEMS AND A SIGNIFICANT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM TO CONTINUE IMPROVING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS. ONCE THE EXPERT IS TRAINED DURING HIS ACTIVE DUTY STINT HE CAN VERY EFFECTIVELY PERFORM IN THE RESERVE FOR YEARS.

THE SITUATION AS IT NOW EXISTS IN THE NAVAL RESERVE IS THAT THE SURFACE RESERVE IS RECEIVING MODERN FRIGATES WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY NUMBER 26 SHIPS. To

BE EFFECTIVE, HOWEVER, THE SHIPS MUST HAVE COMPLETE WEAPONS SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES AND THAT MEANS TOWED ARRAYS TO FIND THE TARGETS AND HELICOPTERS TO PROSECUTE THEM. IN THE BUDGET CRUNCH THE PLANNERS HAVE CUT THE HELICOPTERS, NOT ONLY ON THE RESERVE SHIPS BUT ALSO IN THE ACTIVE FORCE AND HAVE PUSHED THE TOWED ARRAY PROCUREMENT FOR RESERVE FRIGATES OUT OF SIGHT. NRA HOPES TO CONVINCE THE CONGRESS TO MODIFY THAT PLAN.

IN THE VP COMMUNITY THE RESERVE P-3S MOSTLY FALL OUT OF THE FORCE IN THE MID1990S WITHOUT REPLACEMENTS UNLESS REMEDIAL ACTION IS STARTED NOW. NRA PROPOSES A PLAN TO UPGRADE THE P-3A/BS AND BEGIN PROCUREMENT OF P-3CS FOR THE NAVAL RESERVE.

NAVAL RESERVE Frigates

RECENT EVENTS HAVE ONCE AGAIN REMINDED US, ALL TOO CLEARLY, THAT THE UNITED STATES IS AN ISLAND NATION, A TRADING NATION, WHOSE ECONOMIC SURVIVAL REQUIRES IT TO HAVE GLOBAL INTERESTS AND GLOBAL COMMITMENTS. MEETING THESE COMMITMENTS REQUIRES SEAPOWER, IN ALL ITS FORMS, AND OFTEN, ON SHORT NOTICE. WHILE OUR OTHER ARMED FORCES ARE INVOLVED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS, THE U.S. NAVY AND THE MARINE CORPS ARE, ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, THE FIRST CALLED AND THE LAST RELEASED FROM SERVICE. WE MUST NEVER FORGET THAT A SUPERIOR NAVY IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF OUR ISLAND NATION.

IN HIS REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE FY 85 BUDGET, DEFENSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER SAID, WITHOUT UNDERSTATEMENT, "...SEALIFT IS VITAL FOR PROJECTING AND SUSTAINING THE FULL RANGE OF COMBAT AND SUPPORT FORCES. IN A LARGE DEPLOYMENT, IT WOULD DELIVER A MAJORITY OF THE CARGO (INCLUDING MUCH OF THE NON-PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT FOR HEAVY DIVISIONS AND SUPPORT UNITS) AS WELL AS MOST OF OUR AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES... ..." ADEQUATE SEALIFT THEN, CANNOT BE OVER EMPHASIZED IN TERMS OF ITS BEING CRITICAL TO OUR NEED TO PROJECT AND SUSTAIN OUR FORCES OVERSEAS.

JUST HOW CRITICAL CAN BE SEEN BY REMEMBERING THAT IN OUR PRESENT CONTINGENCY PLANS CALLING FOR MOVING OUR COMBAT FORCES TO EUROPE, OR KOREA, OR TO SOUTHWEST ASIA, 95% OF THE DRY CARGO MUST GO BY SEA. FOR FUEL DELIVERIES, THAT PERCENTAGE BECOMES 99%. IN TERMS OF TONNAGE, MORE FUEL MUST BE MOVED THAN ALL DRY CARGO

MOVED BY AIR AND SEA COMBINED.

KNOWING HOW CRITICAL THE ARRIVAL OF THIS VITAL CARGO AND FUEL IS TO OUR FORCES, CAN WE BE SURE THAT IT WILL IN FACT ARRIVE? MANY AUTHORITIES SAY WE SHOULD BE VERY CONCERNED. THEY POINT OUT THAT AT THE START OF WORLD WAR II, GERMANY HAD FEWER THAN 50 ATTACK SUBMARINES READY FOR ACTION. HOWEVER, DURING 1942 ALONE, 1,664 ALLIED SHIPS WERE SUNK, A LOSS OF A STAGGERING 7.8 MILLION TONS OF CARGO. IN MARCH OF 1942, IN JUST ONE MONTH, 273 MERCHANT SHIPS WERE SUNK, MORE THAN PRESENTLY MAKE UP THE ENTIRE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET. IT WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE, RECOGNIZING THE GREAT NEED FOR RESUPPLY OF THE DEPLOYED FORCES AND THE ATTRITION POSSIBILITIES OF THE SUPPLYING FORCES, TO IGNORE THE

HISTORY OF SUBMARINE WARFARE AND ITS EFFECT ON SEALIFT AND SEAPOWER. EVEN THOUGH TODAY WE HAVE BETTER ASW WEAPONS AND SENSOR TECHNOLOGY, SO DOES OUR LIKELY OPPONENT. AND, THEY DON'T JUST HAVE 50 ATTACK SUBMARINES, BUT 300, A RATIO OF 3-TO-1 OVER OUR ATTACK SUBMARINES. THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNDERSEAS FLEET IS IMPROVING SUBSTANTIALLY AND CONSEQUENTLY THE U.S. CAPABILITY TO DETECT, TRACK AND DESTROY MUST ALSO BE UPGRADED. THIS INCLUDES THE NRF WITH ITS MISSION OF ASW MARITIME CONVOY ESCORT.

IN ADDITION, IN WORLD WAR II WE WERE CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH TRANSPORTING FINISHED GOODS AND SUPPLIES OVERSEAS. TODAY, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO IMPORT LARGE QUANTITIES OF STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS NEEDED FOR A WARTIME SURGE OF PRODUCTION. So, PROTECTION OF OUR MERCHANT MARINE IS VITAL BOTH GOING TO A CONFLICT AREA WITH SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL, AND RETURNING WITH CRITICAL MATERIALS.

SEAPOWER CAN BE SUSTAINED ONLY THROUGH SEALIFT. IN TURN, SEALIFT NEEDS TWO MAJOR COMPONENTS:

FIRST, IT REQUIRES AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF THE REQUIRED MIX OF MERCHANT MARINE SHIPS TO CARRY THE TONNAGE OF MEN AND SUPPLIES NEEDED. WE SHOULD BE CONCERNED TO THE POINT OF ACTION ABOUT THE QUANTITY AND SUITABILITY OF TODAY'S MERCHANT FLEET TO PERFORM THIS MISSION. THE TOTAL PRIVATELY OWNED U.S. FLAG MERCHANT FLEET HAS DEGENERATED TO ABOUT 580 SHIPS. THESE WOULD BE AUGMENTED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET (NDRF) OF ABOUT 272 SHIPS IN VARIOUS STATES OF PRESERVATION. HOWEVER, OF THESE, ONLY 170 ARE DRY CARGO VESSELS. THE NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS CURRENT EFFORTS IN CONGRESS AND ELSEWHERE, TO REJUVENATE OUR COUNTRY'S MERCHANT MARINE.

SENATOR TOWER, IN HIS CHARGE TO ADMIRAL WATKINS ON JUNE 30, 1982 WHEN THE CNO ASSUMED HIS PRESENT POSITION, STATED, "...THERE IS A SERIOUS CHALLENGE THAT I WOULD OFFER HIM (ADMIRAL WATKINS)...THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE AND THE CIVILIAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE. I FEEL IT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR NATIONAL NEED FOR MARITIME SUPERIORITY...WE ARE INEXTRICABLY TIED TO OVERSEAS SOURCES OF PETROLEUM AND MINERALS...ARE WE READY TO FACE A MILITARY CRISIS WITHOUT A VIABLE MERCHANT SERVICE...? WHAT IS THE DETERRENT VALUE OF A POWERFUL FLEET IF THE WORLD KNOWS WE CANNOT KEEP IT ARMED, FUELED, FED AND REPAIRED?..."

SECOND, SEALIFT NEEDS TO ENSURE THAT THESE CRITICALLY NEEDED MERCHANT SHIPS
ACTUALLY ARRIVE WITH THE PRECIOUS MEN AND CARGO THEY WILL BE CARRYING MEN AND

CARGO WHICH WILL BE NOT ONLY NEEDED, BUT IRREPLACEABLE. EVEN THE LOSS OF A FEW
SUCH SHIPS FILLED WITH HIGHLY SKILLED TECHNICIANS, SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS,
ABRAMS TANKS, AND THE LIKE, WOULD BE DEVASTATING. YET, PROTECTING THESE VITAL
SHIPS, EACH RUNNING A GAUNTLET OF HIGHLY CAPABLE SOVIET ATTACK SUBMARINES, IS A
MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NAVAL RESERVE AND THE 26 ESCORT SHIPS WHICH ARE IN OR
SCHEDULED TO JOIN THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE.

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS APPROVED A PLAN TO TRANSFER EIGHT FF-1052 KNOX
CLASS AND EIGHTEEN FFG-7 PERRY CLASS FRIGATES TO THE NRF BY 1990.
WE HAVE
STRONGLY ADVOCATED THIS NAVY PLAN FOR TRANSFERRING RELATIVELY NEW, MISSION
CAPABLE SHIPS INTO THE NRF. SUCH ACTION APPARENTLY PROVIDES ESCORT SHIPS WITH
THE NECESSARY ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE THE SAFE
ARRIVAL OF THESE CRITICALLY NEEDED MERCHANT MARINE SHIPS.

NRA HAS SEVERAL CONCERNS, HOWEVER, IN THE EQUIPPING OF THESE SHIPS WHICH
HAVE SUCH A KEY ROLE IN THE NAVAL RESERVE.

THERE ARE

1) WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE NUMBERS OF ESCORT SHIPS NEEDED. IT IS OUR
UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE TWENTY SIX NRF FRIGATES, PLUS ANY ESCORT SHIPS PROVIDED
BY NATO NATIONS, WILL COMPRISE THE TOTAL MARITIME CONVOY ESCORT CAPABILITY
AVAILABLE IN THE ATLANTIC--APPROXIMATELY 60-65 ESCORTS--AND THAT IS IF THE
CONFLICT SITUATION IS ONE IN WHICH WE ARE JOINED BY OUR NATO ALLIES.
CONFLICT SCENARIOS IN WHICH OUR NATO ALLIES WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED OR COULD NOT BE
SUPPORTIVE. THIS TOTAL IS FAR SHORT OF ANY ESTIMATES OF REQUIRED NUMBERS. IN
FACT, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATED THAT THE UNITED STATES NAVY IS
SHORT AS MANY AS 100 ASW CAPABLE ESCORTS IN THE ATLANTIC ALONE. AND, WE ARE NOT
BUILDING ANY NEW ONES. THE FY 1985-89 SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM CALLS FOR 13 AEGIS
CRUISERS, 14 DDG-51 DESTROYERS. NO FUNDS ARE ALLOCATED FOR FRIGATES. THE NAVAL
RESERVE ASSOCIATION RECOMMENDS THAT CONGRESS CONSIDER INCREASING THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE FRIGATES FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE NRF AS A MEANS OF REDUCING, SOMEWHAT, THE
OVERWHELMING SHORTFALL IN ESCORT SHIPS.

2) OUR SECOND CONCERN IS THAT OF CAPABILITY.

WITH THAT FEW ESCORTS, WE

MUST BE CERTAIN THAT EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THEM CAN PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED TASKS,

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