do so, or never be saved? What will it profit us to fly in his face, and say, It is not just for him to require more than we can do, and then damn us for not doing? when all that he requires, is only that we love God with all our hearts, and our neighbor as ourselves, which, in the nature of things, is infinitely reasonable-and when all our impotency arises only from our sinfulness, and so, instead of extenuating our fault, only discovers how sinful we are. Surely, since all the world stand guilty be fore God, really guilty, and are so accounted by him, we all had best to stop our mouths, and own the sentence just, by which we stand condemned, while it is a time of mercy: for who can tell but God may-pity us?

There is but one way now left to evade the force of what has been said. To a strict demonstration, the law is not, and cannot be abated: there is now no way, therefore, but to deny that there ever was such a law. But then, if God be what I suppose him to be, to a demonstration the law must be such too: there is no way, therefore, but to deny that there is any such GOD! Well, but if God be not what I suppose, what is he? Why, we may see the whole scheme, by the following objection, in a few words.

OBJ. God is a being of infinite understanding and almighty power, perfectly disposed to seek the good and happiness of his creatures as his LAST END. He loves virtue, and rewards it, merely because it tends to make them happy: He hates vice, and punishes it, merely because it tends to make them miserable: All he has in view, in his commands and prohibitions-in his promises and threatenings, is the good, and nothing but merely the good, of his creatures; yea, he esteems things to be virtuous, merely because they tend to make us happy....and vicious, merely because they tend to make us miserable: And now, therefore, if we look upon things as he does, and prosecute the same end-if we love and practise virtue with a sincere view to our own happiness, as our LAST END, we do all that God would have us do. And how can we, if we weigh things, but most heartily and sincerely love so good a God....so kind a father, who so dearly loves us, and so tenderly seeks our good?

ANS. True, if God were verily such an one, the most wicked man in the world could not but love him. Self-love would make it natural. Even publicans love those who love them; and are good to those who are kind to them.... Mat. v. Did men firmly believe God to be such an one, they could not, indeed, possibly be at enmity against him. Self-love would not admit of it: Men would not need any grace to make them love God: Nature would make them love him: They could not but love him, so long as they love themselves. And now, if God, indeed, be such an one, I readily own there is no truth in my whole scheme; but, from first to last, it is all a mistake: for it is altogether built upon a supposition that there is a God, of a temper essentially different.

But then I would query, if God be such an one....if he aims only at his creatures' happiness, why does he ever inflict misery upon them? If he means only to make them happy, why does he ever make them miserable? Why did he drown the old world....burn Sodom....and why does he damn sinners to all eternity?

It cannot be because justice requires it: for, upon this scheme, justice does not require it: For, upon this scheme, sin does, in strict justice, deserve no punishment at all.

A crime deserves no punishment any farther than it is blameworthy A crime is blame-worthy, no farther than we are under obligations to do otherwise. According to their scheme, all our obligations to be virtuous result merely from its tendency to make us happy:* Upon their scheme, therefore, a sinner

[* The scheme which the Author here opposes, is that which founds the obligation to virtue, solely upon the tendency of virtue itself to promote individual happiness-a scheme of perfect selfishness, and pregnant with all the absurd consequences which the Author has endeavored to attach to it. There is another theory distinct from this, and not liable to the same objections, which founds our obligations to virtue upon its tendency to promote public happiness, or the good of God's creatures, collectively considered. This theory, it will be recollected, the Author opposes in a note, page 31st, where he more than intimates that our obligations to virtue arise, not from the mere will of God, nor from any tendency in virtue to promote our own happiness, or the happiness of others, but wholly from the intrinsic moral fitness of things, considered absolutely. But is there no difficulty in conceiving of the moral fitness or unfitness of things, aside from their ob

is to blame for his sins, merely because sin is cross to his own happiness, and tends to make him miserable ;-there is no other evil in sin but this. This is the only reason why God hates it-is set against it, and disposed to punish it: This is the only reason why he would have them avoid it; and this is the only reason they are to blame for it. No man is blame-worthy for sin any farther than he was under obligations to the contrary. All our obligations to virtue, according to them, arise from its natural tendency to make us happy: and, therefore, all the evil of sin must arise from its natural tendency to make us miserable: This misery, therefore, is exactly equal to the evil of sin; for all the evil of sin arises from it, or rather consists in it: This misery is all the evil of sin; and this misery is, therefore, all that renders sin blame-worthy, i. e. I am to blame for taking a course that tends to make me miserable: And why?.... Merely because it tends to make me miserable; for that reason, and for no other: Therefore, I am so much to blame, and no more, for what I do, than according to the degree of its tendency to make me miserable: This misery, therefore, which naturally results from what I do, is equal to my blame-and is, therefore, the worst, and all that I deserve; for no crime deserves to be punished, any farther than it is blame-worthy. And from the

vious tendency to promote or hinder the happiness of the moral world? True, it may be said that our perceptions of right and wrong are wholly distinct from those of happiness and misery: But is it certain that they are wholly distinct from our perceptions of the natural tendency of right and wrong to produce these different ends? Why does it appear right to do justice Between man and man, but because public and private happiness evidently require it?

Perhaps, however, upon a strict enquiry, it would appear that our obligations to virtue rest not wholly upon any single principle; but are grounded upon all those considerations which, according to various schemes, may be justly admitted as proper motives to virtuous action such as the moral fitness of things-the tendency of virtue-the glory of God, and the authority of his law. To reduce all to a single principle, as different theorists have done, is not only to exclude some motive which ought unquestionably to influence our conduct, but to hold up those which are confused, if not unjust, instead of such as are clear and determinate.]

* OBJ. "But are we not, according to their scheme, under obligations result"ing from the authority and command of God ?"

ANS. We are, according to their scheme, under no obligations to regard the authority and command of God at all; only, and merely, and purely,

whole, to a demonstration, it follows, that, upon their scheme, sin deserves no inflicted pain or misery, by way of punishment, over and above the pain or misery which results necessarily from its own nature: And now, if sin does not deserve any such punishment, then justice does not require the Governor of the world to inflict any such upon any of his creatures, though ever so sinful; for justice does not require him to inflict a punishment that is not at all deserved—yea, rather it seems cruelty so to do. If, therefore, justice did not require it, why did God drown the old world, and burn Sodom-and why does he damn sinners to all eternity?

Certainly he did not aim at their good when he drowned the old world and burnt Sodom; and certainly he cannot aim at sinners' good in their eternal damnation. There are some calamities in this life, which God might be supposed to send upon his creatures for their good; and indeed, all things considered, they are well adapted to do them good; yea, and are all made to work together for good to them that love God, and may be numbered among their mercies: But what shall we say when God drowns a whole world, burns up several cities, and damns to all eternity millions of his creatures-yea, and all for nothing, when they deserved no ill at his hands, not the least! Where is his justice now? Yea, where is his goodness? Or what does he mean? What does he intend?

Certainly he cannot intend to deal so severely with some of his poor creaturcs, who never deserved any ill at his hands, merely for the good of others, to fright, and warn, and deter them from vice; for this would be to do evil that good might come

because it is for our interest so to do-as themselves acknowledge.

OBJ." But are we not, according to them, obliged to have regard to our neighbor's welfare?

ANS. Only, merely, purely because it is for our own interest to do so : for, according to them, all our obligations to practise any virtue, arise, originally, only from its being for our own interest. The language of such a practice plainly is, that there is not one being in the whole system worth regarding, but myself:-Iam, and besides me there is no other! I will regard none, but just to answer my own ends; and so, really and strictly, regard none but myself: This is a religion that will suit nature; and, in this sense, may justly be called natural religion.

yea, this would be the way rather that good might never come ; for how could any of his creatures or subjects heartily love him or like his conduct, while they behold millions of their fellowcreatures suffering, for nothing at all, such infinite pains under his hands? Where is his justice? would they all cry: And where is his goodness? They would hate him, and flee from him, and dread a government so infinitely tyrannical. Indeed, to inflict a proper punishment, in case of just desert, is a good thing-tends to maintain government, and make men afraid of sin, and stand in awe of the great Law-giver and Judge of the world: Yea, it is a beautiful conduct, and tends to make God appear amiable in the eyes of all holy beings....Rev. xix. 1—6. But to afflict and torment poor creatures, who do not at all deserve it, and that forever, cannot possibly answer any good end; but, of necessity, must promote a thousand bad ones, when, all the time, the true state of the case is publicly known and understood throughout all God's dominions. It is just as if a father, who has ten children, should tie up five every Monday morning, and whip them almost to death for nothing in the world but to make the rest love him, and be good and obedient children: And would they love him any the more for this? Yea, they could not but hate so cruel a tyrant: Now, therefore, if their scheme be true, why did God drown the old world, and burn Sodom? And why does he damn sinners to all eternity?

Yea, if sin deserves no inflicted punishment, as, upon their scheme, it does not, why does God ever once inflict the least, the very least punishment for it in all his dominions? And that which, though not, in its own nature, more unaccountable, yet is more surprising, why has God, all along, from the beginning of the world, been inflicting such a dreadful train of punishments for sin? Why did God turn the angels out of heaven for their first sin, and doom them to an eternal hell, when they did not at all deserve it? Why did God threaten Adam with death in case of disobedience ?-Why is death said to be the wages of sin? Why did God cause the earth to open and swallow up • Korah and his company?-Why did God cause the carcases of