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favor the measured approach taken by the President. They favor the way he has been attentive to the subtle interplay of human rights, including in Tibet economic development, and geopolitical and strategic interests in formulating our present policy.
The situation in China remains unsettled and, in some respects, unpredictable. No one can say with any degree of certainty where China will be a few months or a year from now. We and the Allies are taking a careful approach, avoiding precipitous reactions which might have unintended consequences and foreclose our options. We continue to monitor events very closely. It is important that our policy reflect the needs of the situation as it evolves.
The administration and the Congress share similar concerns about China and U.S.-Chinese relations. In almost all respects, we have the same objectives. But we do have a difference of opinion as to whether further legislation is necessary at the present time. The administration believes that it is not. Legislation such as that adopted by the House, which limits severely the President's ability to respond quickly in what can be a rapidly changing situation, would only take us down the road toward economic sanctions and the latter have generally proven ineffective, easy to circumvent, and costly to the economic interests of those countries which have imposed them.
This is a difficult time for all of us who have followed China over the years. We have been greatly disappointed by recent events, which show that the road to reform in China will be a much
arder one than many Americans had hoped. Nonetheless, as the President noted in his recent trip to Poland, the movement toward political democracy and economic liberalization will be difficult to stop in the long run. Change has its own irresistible momentum. The changes can be sometimes inspiring, as the President found in Warsaw, and setbacks can be agonizing as they have been in China during the past month. But ultimately the governments—whether they be in Poland, China or elsewhere in the world-need the support of those they serve in order to create lasting economic prosperity and sustain social order. China, too, will learn this lesson.
“China's rendezvous with freedom”, as Secretary Baker said in his presentation at The Asia Society on June 26, "like its rendezvous with the advancing nations of the Pacific, cannot be long delayed. We will be there to help when day follows night." To do less would be a disservice to those who gave their lives in and around Tiananmen Square on June 3 and June 4 and a disservice to those working for change today. The President needs as much flexibility as possible to respond to changed and changing circumstances. We have that flexibility now. We, in the administration and the Congress, should work together to maintain it.
Thank you very much. I will be pleased to take your questions following my colleagues' statements.
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Williams.
[Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the joint subcommittees were recessed pursuant to other business.]
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Yatron. We now go back from Bulgaria to China, and we will hear from Mr. Ford.
STATEMENT OF CARL W. FORD, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSIST
ANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
I have a prepared statement that I would like to submit for the record and supplement that with a few comments. First, I would like to note that just like my colleagues, this Congress, and American people, we at the Defense Department were as shocked and saddened by the atrocities committed in Beijing at Tiananmen Square.
I would also like to add, I personally was as outraged with the aftermath of Tiananmen as I was to the brutal killings. What was outrageous was the big lie, the attempt to try to convince not only the Chinese people but the international community that none of it had happened, that none of what we had seen on TV had really happened.
It also was chilling to see the repression that was clearly going on in China. I have to admit that I have some of the same sort of feelings about what we ought to do about China in the aftermath as I sense on the committee. I think that the challenge that both we in the Executive Branch and the Congress and the American people have to keep in mind is to find some way to also, in our anger and outrage, keep our eye on the longer view as well. I think that Dick Williams in his testimony pointed to a very important point, and that is I am reminded of those television views of the Statue of Liberty built and honored in Tiananmen prior to the killings. I have to believe that at least in part the reason there was a student democracy demonstration, and that workers and others joined those students in the Square was, at least in part, because of the opening of China to the West, with the U.S. being a very major part of that. Those political, economic, cultural, educational exchanges that have occurred over the last few years, and even the military relationship, which I am more concerned with, had something to do with the forces that are at work in China to have more reform, a more modern society, a more modern government.
Now, obviously that has been stamped out for the moment, but I, for one, happen to believe that those democratic forces are still alive in China; that those ideas can't be killed; and that at some point in the future it will be important for the United States to be there to encourage, to assist, to promote change and progress in China. The challenge is to try to find a way to say how concerned we are, and take actions that make sure that Chinese don't misunderstand how serious we are, At the same time we have to maintain the flexibility so that, at some point, over the longer term we can still be prepared, able, and ready to move forward with trying to improve the prospects for democracy and reform and progress in China.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF CARL W. FORD, JR.
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
MR. CHAIRMAN. THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE TODAY AND SHARE SOME THOUGHTS WITH YOU ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE EFFECT OF U.S. SANCTIONS ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS.
ALL AMERICANS, INDEED PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD, HAVE BEEN MOVED AND SHOCKED BY THE TELEVISION IMAGES WHICH CAME OUT OF CHINA IN MAY AND JUNE. IN THE BEGINNING, WE SAW STUDENTS, LATER JOINED BY PEOPLE FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE, EXPRESSING THEIR HOPE FOR GREATER FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND MORE CONTROL OVER THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DESTINIES. IN THE END, WE WITNESSED A TRAGEDY ON TIANANMEN SQUARE FOLLOWED BY GOVERNMENT REPRESSION AND A MASSIVE PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO COVER UP THE TRUTH.
PRESIDENT BUSH RESPONDED QUICKLY, IN FACT, AHEAD OF THE LEADERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO DEMONSTRATE QUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND OUR INDIGNATION AT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES. THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS INCLUDED SUSPENSION OF U.S. ARMS SALES TO CHINA ALONG WITH MILITARY VISITS AND EXCHANGES, SUSPENSION OF ALL HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT VISITS AND EXCHANGES, AND SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO DEFER CONSIDERATION OF INTERNATIONAL LOANS TO CHINA.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP, BUILT UP OVER MANY YEARS BY FIVE SEPARATE ADMINISTRATIONS, WOULD BE PRESERVED. THIS REFLECTED THE FACT THAT CHINA IS AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY AND THAT GOOD U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS SERVE U.S. STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.
ACTIONS TAKEN BY CHINESE, HOWEVER, HAVE CREATED AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PURSUE SIMULTANEOUSLY OUR HUMAN RIGHTS AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS. THE
QUESTION THE ADMINISTRATION MUST ANSWER IS WHAT COURSE OF ACTION, WILL BEST SERVE U.S. INTERESTS? I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE SOME THOUGHTS WITH YOU ON THIS IMPORTANT PROBLEM.
FIRST, LET ME ADDRESS THE STRATEGIC SIDE OF THE EQUATION. SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON'S HISTORIC OPENING TO CHINA IN 1972, U.S. POLICY HAS BEEN BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT A SECURE, MODERNIZING CHINA CAN BE A FORCE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. EVERY SUCCEEDING U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS SOUGHT TO BUILD POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND MILITARY BRIDGES TO THE CHINESE AS PART OF OUR BROADER STRATEGY IN ASIA. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR CHINA TO BECOME INCREASINGLY MORE INVOLVED IN A POSITIVE WAY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIÉS AND WITH ITS NEIGHBORS IN THE REGION. THIS SERVED U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS BY HELPING CHINA BECOME A CONTRIBUTOR TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT AND A POSITIVE FACTOR IN GLOBAL STABILITY,
IN BUILDING THESE BRIDGES, WE HAVE TAKEN THE LONG TERM VIEW. U.S. AND CHINESE INTERESTS ARE NOT ALWAYS PARALLEL, AND WE HAVE IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE WE HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA, WE BELIEVED THAT, OVER TIME, OUR INTERACTION WITH CHINA WOULD ALSO BE CONDUCIVE TO GREATER REFORM AND OPENNESS FOR THE CHINESE PEOPLE.
THERE ARE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES WHICH DEMONSTRATE HOW U.S. CHINA POLICY HAS HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL EVENTS. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DETERRENCE OF SOVIET AND VIETNAMESE EXPANSIONISM IN Asia. DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA ATTEST TO THIS. BEFORE THE INCIDENT IN TIANANMEN, THE PRC'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS WERE BETTER THAN THEY HAD EVER BEEN. THERE WAS, AND CONTINUES TO BE, STABILITY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT, AND THE PRC AND TAIWAN ARE PURSUING PEACEFUL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THEIR DIFFERENCES. CHINA HAS
INCREASINGLY BECOME A MORE ACTIVE MEMBER OF VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND WAS, SLOWLY BUT SURELY, MOVING TOWARD
MORE RESPONSIBLE FOREIGN POLICY, AND, UNTIL RECENTLY, A LESS RESTRICTIVE DOMESTIC POLICY.
ACTIONS TAKEN BY CHINESE LEADERS TO PUT DOWN THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE SEVERELY STRAINED U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. THE SUSPENSION OF MILITARY VISITS AND EXCHANGES AND ARMS SALES TO CHINA HAS BROUGHT TO A STANDSTILL THE U.S.-CHINA MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. FURTHERMORE, U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS TO CHINA CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED IN A STATE OF SUSPENSION FOR VERY LONG. UNDER U.S. LAW, DOD CONTRACTS WITH U.S. DEFENSE CONTRACTORS WHICH IMPLEMENT THESE PROGRAMS MUST BE TERMINATED IF THE CHINESE ELECT TO WITHHOLD REQUIRED PAYMENTS. IF THE CHINESE FORCE THE TERMINATION OF THESE PROGRAMS THEY WILL LOSE APPROXIMATELY $208 MILLION ALREADY PAID IN OF THE $602 MILLION TOTAL VALUE OF ALL CHINA FMS PROGRAMS. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, IT IS VERY PROBLEMATICAL WHETHER CHINA WOULD EVER AGAIN BE WILLING TO ENTER INTO A COOPERATIVE FMS PROGRAM WITH THE UNITED STATES.
DESPITE ALL THIS, THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE WHICH SUPPORTED OUR CHINA POLICY PRIOR TO JUNE 4, 1989 REMAINS VALID. WHEN CHINESE TANKS ROLLED INTO BEIJING AND PLA SOLDIERS OPENED FIRE ON THEIR OWN PEOPLE, THE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS OF ASIA AND THE WORLD DID NOT CHANGE. WHAT CHANGED WAS OUR ABILITY TO WORK WITH THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP TO PROMOTE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TO COORDINATE THE PURSUIT OF OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS AS A RESULT OF DEVELOPMENTS INSIDE CHINA.
THIS, MR. CHAIRMAN, POINTS UP THE DILEMMA WHICH CONFRONTS us. IF OUR ACTIONS ARE TOO FAR-REACHING, LONG-LASTING, AND NOT CAREFULLY TARGETED, WE RISK DESTROYING THE VALUABLE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP AND FOSTERING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR EVEN MORE IMPROVED SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH WE WELCOME THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST TO HAVE WORSE RELATIONS WITH CHINA THAN THE