their governance that they demand.

That is primarily why I

advocate promoting human rights in China: not to remake China in our image or to interfere in Chinese internal affairs, but in recognition that how the leaders of China treat their own people affects the stability of China and its ability to play a

constructive role in world affairs.

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Finally, we have a commercial interest in China. We seek a share of China's growing market, as China secures access to our markets. I do not believe in neo-mercantilism, but I do believe China should recognize the generosity with which we have welcomed Chinese entry into our markets since 1978. And I believe that American business firms should not work at a handicap in securing market shares at this early stage in China's development vis-avis our competitors.

In short, we have major strategic interests with China. It is a great power that sets it apart from, for example, Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia, or Romania. It is a nuclear power. And it is a

Our strategy toward China since

nation with which we are unprepared to sustain an adversarial or animosity ridden relationship. 1971 has been to draw it out of its isolation and to integrate it in the international community. Underlying this strategy was the recognition that the burden of keeping China poor, weak, and isolated in world affairs--our strategy of the previous twenty years--had proven too costly. Our calculus was that by building

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I believe for the most part that the response has been appropriately tough to date. I particularly approve the

suspension of weapons sales, the delay in issuance of

Coupled with loss of

concessional interest rate loans to China by the United States and our allies, the delay in processing new World Bank loans, the postponement of the GATT negotiations, and the postponement of any further relaxation of export controls. tourism, disruption of exports, and loss of foreign business investments in China, these measures are likely to cost China between six and eight billion U.S. dollars in foreign currency earnings in the next twelve months. A projected trade deficit of four billion U.S. dollars could expand to ten to twelve billion or more U.S. dollars, prompting a squeeze on China's monetary

reserves.

I believe no more should be done at this time, though if human rights abuses persist, emigration is restricted, or China's international behavior becomes irresponsible, it may be necessary to apply further sanctions--such as withdrawal of MFN status or tightening export control restrictions. applying additional sanctions out of principle. I simply think prudence dictates seeing whether what we have already done will be sufficient. Prudence also dictates holding further, damaging moves in reserve, in case the situation continues to deteriorate.

I am not averse to

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I also do not believe--as some might argue--the events of May-June invalidate our strategy of engaging China in the world community. To the contrary, the clash between modernizers and conservatives proved so intense because our strategy was working. We continue, in short, to have major incentive to ease China's difficult transition from a Stalinist-type, planned economy and totalitarian political system to a guided market economy and a political system that accepts diversity, response to popular will, and tolerates some dissent. And we therefore as a nation

must be able to respond swiftly when the situation improves.

What considerations should therefore govern our approach to China at this point? Here is the list that I would keep in mind:

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Let our expressions of moral indignation recognize that most of the Chinese officials who receive our statements probably share our grief and dismay toward the tragedy.

Too many of our pronouncements are self-righteous and do not acknowledge that our sentiments are felt by many Chinese as well. Human life and dignity are as precious to Chinese as they are to Americans.

Let us not inadvertently drive the leaders of China into isolation or evoke their strong inclinations toward xenophobia

and nativism.

Excessive rhetoric on our part or application of

the harshest economic sanctions available to us could return us

to an adversarial relationship with China.

Let us not so weaken our ties with China that, if a similar abandonment of reform policies were to occur in the Soviet Union, the natural and only course for Moscow and Beijing would be to forge a close relationship. It is important that we continue to engage in dialogue with the Chinese and consult with them on matters of mutual concern.

Let us not become entwined once again in a Chinese civil war. A number of Chinese intellectuals and students, for totally understandable reasons, seek to overthrow their government and wish to enlist us in their cause. Even as we sympathize with their plight and give them refuge in our midst, as we must, let us recognize that their interests and ours do not coincide.

Let us therefore retain a balanced posture, mindful of both interest and principle. Let us not be governed by the emotion of the moment but keep in mind--as President Bush has sought to do--our longer term strategy, pursued by five Presidents, of seeking to integrate China into the international community.

But let the leaders of China confront the consequences of their actions. Deny them the opportunity to blame China's intensifying economic difficulties on Western actions. burden rest on the leaders for their inability to confront

Let the