program is average. And I resent being put in an average classification.

Mr. FAZIO. Yes. Well, you are a rather unique kind of governmenal entity. The reason I pursue this line of questioning is because I think we do need to be a lot more sensitive to the needs certain kinds of people and their skills bring to the government. Mr. ROSER. I agree wholeheartedly.

Mr. FAZIO. Perhaps we should do this for the record, because there are other people with questions, if you could give us some additional input as to what you think may have been the impact of this transformation that took place with the creation of the Department of Energy in terms of a potential, for want of a better term, brain drain that may have occurred to our various nuclear energy programs.

Mr. ROSER. I will be very happy to do that sir.

[The information follows:]

With respect to the question of the desirability of returning to the excepted service, the answer is a definite yes. I believe that in the interest of consistent and uniform personnel policy, we are innudated with procedures and regulations in the Civil Service. So much so that we can no longer fill critical vacancies with dispatch. In addition to the pay cap problem, we are asking an engineer or other technical candidate to wait an inordinate amount of time for the Civil Service process to be completed. This too often means that employment with the DOE becomes unattractive, given its uncertainties and the better alternatives available.

With the current system, we have a problem in our flexibility to reassign personnel already employed. There is less flexibility to move people who may have several talents into positions which they are not currently labeled as qualified for. As you know, the SES system is supposed to have greater flexibility to address this kind of problem, but there should be no difference in our ability to move capable non-SES personnel when we need to than there should be for SES personnel.

Finally, like the excepted agencies NRC, CIA, FBI, etc., ours is a critical mission requiring us to move quickly and expeditiously if we are to be most effective. Changing the name from AEC to ERDA to DOE did not alter our mission or its requirements, but moving from excepted service to Civil Service has affected us. I submit that a return to the excepted service status would improve our ability to perform to our high standards, and not at the expense of fairness to prospective or current employees.

MX PROGRAM

Mr. FAZIO. I would like to get into two areas that were also the subject of the committee staff investigative report, one of which relates to the MX. I think Senator Nunn, yesterday, referred to a confusion in the MX program. We have had several changes in terms of the basing mode.

We were going to go with the mobile system. Then we were going to go with existing silos and a hardening basis. We have rejected that, apparently, now.

The whole question of the basing of the MX seems to be totally up in the air. We are now casting around for reductions in the defense budget, and I hear people who have been long-term supporters questioning whether we should proceed at the present time.

Could you outline for us what the on-again/off-again basing mode debate has meant for the weapons development and production side of this issue, and where we are at the present time, and what these confusions or delays might mean for the future in this program?

Mr. ROSER. [Deleted.]

Mrs. SMITH. Would the gentleman yield for a question on that subject?

Mr. FAZIO. Sure.

Mrs. SMITH. When do you expect the decision on the basing mode to be made?

Mr. ROSER. The Department of Defense is expecting to reach a final basing decision by July 1, 1982, Mrs. Smith. The basing mode basically does not affect the warhead. A warhead choice has been made.

Mrs. SMITH. I see.

Mr. ROSER. We have been asked to design a warhead for the advanced ballistic re-entry vehicle. We can proceed with that design, notwithstanding whatever the basing mode may be.

Mrs. SMITH. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. FAZIO. Sure. Interrupt again if we hit a point that might relate here. I understand the decision was made just a month ago. Mr. ROSER. That is right, sir.

Mr. FAZIO. I am wondering if we can somehow quantify the costs to the taxpayer we incur when we defer or change some of the basic decisions. I am sure it had an impact. I know the racetrack mode would have produced certain stresses on the warhead that might not have occurred under the silo-hardening approach. These kinds of delays require, I would think, a reaction on your part that would probably tend to build in a certain amount of inefficiency. By attempting to make up for lost time, in effect, which is really what you are being asked to do by the Pentagon, I would assume that has some negative side effects.

Could you describe for us what perhaps the cost might be? Maybe the cost in dollars, but also in terms of capability and availability on an IOC timeframe?

Mr. ROSER. It would be hard for me to quantify in dollars. The M-X warhead engineering development is well underway. The design being pursued is not impacted by uncertainty in a final system basing decision.

Mr. ROSER. [Deleted.]

Mr. FAZIO. They haven't changed the window of vulnerability, so you are simply required to get through it faster.

Mr. ROSER. That is just about it. We are out there on the end of that whip. Whenever it cracks, we better run fast enough to keep from getting thrown off.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. FAZIO. Yes.

Mrs. SMITH. Would you yield for one more question?

Mr. FAZIO. Sure.

Mrs. SMITH. This is not an academic issue with me because this morning I understood the decision is being made to put those first 40 MX missiles in my district. So I am much interested in when the final decision is going to be made. I know this is not quite in your line, but wouldn't the cost be much less, then, if the final missiles were deployed in the same district, the same area where these forty are placed?

Mr. ROSER. It would have nothing to do, Mrs. Smith, with the cost of our manufacturing the warhead.

Mrs. SMITH. With your manufacturing, yes; I understand that. With the whole operation?

Mr. ROSER. That, I think, could only be answered by the Department of Defense, Mrs. Smith. I can't answer that question.

Mrs. SMITH. I get different answers. I was just hoping that I would get some support for one of the answers that I have had. I assure you my people are not happy about this. So thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WEAPON DELIVERY DEADLINES

Mr. FAZIO. I think the concern the committee has is that we see the whole program fully funded. We wonder whether or not that is a realistic question at this point, as to whether we can meet those deadlines and whether or not we are not perhaps overbudgeted to a degree in a program in which, for reasons beyond your control, obviously has fallen behind somewhat.

Mr. ROSER. Well, if we are to meet the IOC that has been laid out for us, we certainly are not overbudgeted as far as we are concerned.

Mr. FAZIO. I appreciate the way you phrase that. The other issue is similar in a sense in that it comes on the question of whether we can meet the stated objectives of the budget. [Deleted.]

Mr. ROSER. [Deleted.]

General HOOVER. [Deleted.]
Mr. FAZIO. [Deleted.]
General HOOVER. [Deleted.]

Mr. FAZIO. [Deleted.]

General HOOVER. [Deleted.]

Mr. FAZIO. I would be happy to yield from now on, Mrs. Smith. I have completed my questions.

Mrs. SMITH. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. Mr. Roser, I would like an answer to my question from both of our fine generals from the Air Force and the Army. The fact that these first forty missiles are deployed out of Warren Air Force Base, would this make it more practical to deploy the next 100, or however many more we have?

General HOOVER. I am Air Force, but I am not in the Department of Defense.

Mr. ROSER. He is assigned to me, Mrs. Smith.

Mrs. SMITH. You can't escape on that basis, because I have been to SAC, and I have gotten their judgment about it.

General EINSEL. I must admit that is not an area, oddly enough; even though I am an Army officer, I am not involved much in missiles by background; I am not really.

That is not really one I am competent to answer. I would suspect that the view of SAC would probably have to prevail, and I must admit in all honesty I don't happen to know SAC's view right now.

Mrs. SMITH. Now, you suspect that the opinion of SAC would prevail. Is that what you said to me?

General EINSEL. That would be sort of my expectation; yes, ma'am.

Mrs. SMITH. SAC says one thing, and the Under Secretary says something else. I would like to ask the gentleman from the Air Force, would you please get the best answer you can get from the top Air Force officials for the record?

General HOOVER. This question is being addressed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A final decision will be available this

summer.

Mrs. SMITH. And I would like to ask you, from the Secretary of Defense, will you please get the best possible answer that you can get for the record, and I know that has to be here within five days, and I am going to be looking for that answer very specifically. [The information follows:]

As you know, the Administration is committed to an interim basing of 40 MissileX (M-X) missiles in existing MINUTEMAN silos, beginning in late 1986. Selection of the MINUTEMAN Wing to host this deployment is involving the President directly and no selection has yet been made. The specific silos involved could conceivably be identified at the same time the Wing decision is made; although the more likely case is that the decision and announcement will be made a bit later. As you also know, we are simultaneously conducting work on three long-term basing modes. The Department of Defense (DOD) position is that, at this time, there is no clear winner or loser. Our intent is to eliminate losers as soon as justified as we present our recommendation to the Congress by 1 July 1983. You expressed particular interest in one of those options because of your perception of how its selection might relate to the interim silo-basing location. Within the ballistic missile defense (BMD) option for long-term basing of M-X, we are examining various suboptions of defended-deceptive basing and superhardening. There are a couple of points you need to know about this. First, the deceptive basing we are considering actually involves three layers of deception, including the BMD radars, the BMD interceptors, and the M-X missile. The ultimate selection may involve only the radars or it may involve other combinations or selections of the three. That is an important part of what we are now studying, and it is premature to speculate about any of the reasonable outcomes of this complex study involving the Army, the Air Force, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Another useful piece of information is that we are not committed in any way to adding such a long-term deployment to the same Wing that will receive the interim 40 missiles. That would be desirable from the singular perspectives of C3 and logistical support, but the actual decision will be made in the realistic military-socioeconomic environment that specifically includes due consideration of productive agricultural land. We have assured you that the views of yourself and your constituents are being very seriously considered and that commitment still stands.

Mrs. SMITH. [Deleted.] Now, I understand that, of course, there are other missile basing modes under consideration. I would like to have your comment about the possibility of that and about taking a productive agricultural land and, you know, I got an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act of 1977, saying it is the sense of Congress that we will not take productive agricultural

land for this kind of program. Of course, it was the shuttle program at the time, but I would like your comments on that.

General EINSEL. I believe at the moment that the Department of Defense is looking actually at a series of at least three alternatives for-

Mrs. SMITH. I have heard them in detail a number of times. But several of the generals have responded under a lot of pressure from me, that as to the idea of carrying those missiles on planes, we don't even have the plane developed. And the idea of deep underground poses many problems, including what do you do with all the stuff that you take out. So it makes this vertical silo basing mode one of, at least, those under top consideration.

I assure you it is of great concern.

[Deleted.]

So I am trying to get all the information I can while we are here in this session.

General EINSEL. That happens not to be an area that I follow on a day-to-day basis, so I am probably no more authoritative on that than anybody else.

Mrs. SMITH. Would you get an answer-the best possible answer? General EINSEL. Happy to get the best possible answer I can; yes, ma'am.

Mrs. SMITH. The highest people you can be in contact with. How they would choose if they could put this on government-owned land, or are going to put it on privately-owned [deleted].

One of the generals said, oh, we would put it in your district; your soil is better.

[Deleted.]

I think we ought to be finding an answer instead of another series of we will do this and then we will do that, and then we will do something else.

I think I have probed about as hard as I effectively can, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FAZIO. I think you are very effective, Mrs. Smith.

Mrs. SMITH. So I will discontinue. I didn't mean to be hard on you, but I want an answer, and I am trying to find it. I suspect nobody knows. Thank you very much.

W82 155MM AFAP

Mr. FAZIO. I would like to go back just for a second to General Hoover and try to clarify something on the 155-millimeter shell.